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Developing reproducible analytical pipelines for the transformation of consumer price statistics: rail fares

Languages and translations
English

Developing reproducible analytical pipelines for the transformation of consumer price statistics: rail fares

Matthew Price Technical Lead

8 June 2023

Continuous programme of improvements for consumer

price statistics over several years beginning with rail fares

Aims:

• Obtaining robust sources of alternative data

(scanner/web-scraped data)

• Researching methodologies to most effectively

incorporate the data

• Developing statistical systems for existing and new

data and methods

• Embedding new systems and processes

Primarily, new data will help us to inform the narrative

around what is driving inflation for our users

Transforming UK consumer price statistics

2

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Communication

Education

Clothing and footwear

Furniture, household equipment and maintenance

Miscellaneous goods and services

Restaurants and hotels

Recreation and culture

Transport

Alcoholic beverages and tobacco

Food and non-alcoholic beverages

Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels

Rental prices

(~24% CPIH) Grocery

scanner data

(13% CPIH)

Rail Delivery Group

(transaction) and Auto

Trader (web provided)

data (2.3% CPIH)

ONS and UK Government platform strategy

• UK Government Cloud Strategy is “Cloud First” and

“Cloud Agnostic”

• Aim to use “Infrastructure as a Service” and “Platform as

a Service”

• ONS utilise a range of in-house and cloud platforms

Key requirements for platform

• Secure

• Scalable data storage

• Distributed, scalable compute system

• Dashboard capabilities

• Ability to host web applications

• Interactive research space

Environment Description Main users Data used Stability

Develop Sandbox environments where teams have full

access to explore, test, and do their work.

•Software engineers

•Data engineers

•Infrastructure engineers

Synthetic Not stable

Test Test environment where all systems can work

together allowing testing of individual and

multiple systems.

•Testers Synthetic Stable

Pre-

production

Environment where testing on live data can occur

to ensure changes will be stable before moving

into production.

•Business change team Production (data duplicated from prod

environment)

Very stable

Production Environment where production occurs via

automated scheduling of pipelines. Also, where

research on data and methods can occur.

•Production team

•Research team

Production (where all new data is ingested,

permissions set to prevent researchers

seeing “current month” data for production

datasets)

Most stable

Platform environment strategy

Platform environment strategy

Also aids the development of

new data sources, methods

and pipelines

Data engineering

• Data sources are delivered as files in specific style for

each supplier

• Data engineering stages data prior to processing by:

• Virus scanning and ingesting data

• Validating data against known metrics

• Enrich data by applying appropriate mappers

• Applying standardisation to each source

Data processing pipelines

• Several distinct pipelines make up the full system

• E.g. railfares: data cleaning > elementary indices > aggregation

• Each pipeline follows the same code structure

• Controlled by a user and backend configuration file

• Each pipeline produces output for straightforward audit

of data journey

Producing indices for production

• Production works with an “annual

update”

• Annual round in February initialises data

back series and calculates weights for

next 12 months

• Monthly round (Feb – Jan) updates back

series and produces the new indices

RAP – Reproducible analytical pipelines

• UK Government developed best practice principles

for analytical systems

• Guidelines aim to:

• improve the quality of the analysis

• increase trust in the analysis by producers, their

managers and users

• create a more efficient process

• improve business continuity and knowledge management

RAP for code

• Minimise manual steps

• Use open source software

• Peer reviewed

• Uses version control

• Open sourced code and data

• Follows department good

practice

• Well documented

• Tested

• Uses CI/CD

• Appropriate logging

RAP for platform

• Automated pipelines

• Restricted access to production

• Reproducible infrastructure

Future developments timeline

• Multiyear transformation project

• Systems design template will allow

scaling out of systems easily

• Rolling out new categories every year

Thank you

Outlier detection for alternative data sources, United Kindom

Languages and translations
English

Outlier detection for

alternative data sources

Mario Spina

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

Introduction

• Background to data cleaning • Junk filters vs outlier detection • Main application & methods

• Results: • Second-hand cars • Rail fares • Discussion

• Future developments and conclusions

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

2

Background to data cleaning

• Introducing new, bigger data sources in CPI, bi-annual research

• Transforming rail fares and second-hand cars first

• New methods and techniques to ensure high-quality

• Adapting existing strategies to big data

• Data cleaning selects transactions used for index calculation

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

3

Junk filters vs outlier detection

Data cleaning consists of two underlying components:

Junk filter

Determines observations out of scope by removing as example: - ‘minibus’ from cars - ‘underground’ fares from rail fares

More information on junk filters is available at this publication

Outlier detection

Identifies products with extreme and potentially erroneous prices or price movements

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

4

Main applications & methods

We investigated three applications of outlier detection:

• Global (transaction-level, global distribution)

• Observation-level (transaction-level, product distribution)

• Relative-based (unit value-level, global distribution)

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

5

Main applications & methods

Methods explored in the publication:

Method Fences

User-defined fence LF, UF: Manually selected

Tukey (interquartile) LF: Q1 – k*(Q3-Q1) UF: Q3 + k*(Q3-Q1)

Kimber LF: Q1 - k*(Q2-Q1) UF: Q3 + k*(Q3-Q2)

k-sigma LF: mean – k*sd UF: mean + k*sd

Benchmark No fences

• Note: Q1, Q2, Q3 are the first, second or third interquartile respectively • mean and sd are mean value and standard deviation of a gaussian distribution

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

6

Case studies

• Explored a combination of applications and methods

• Second-hand petrol cars • Diesel cars in backup

• Rail fares

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

7

Results: second-hand cars

Methods of outlier detection explored with second-had cars

Approach Method Parameters Flagged, petrol (%) Flagged, diesel (%)

Benchmark No outlier detection

removal N/A 0 0%

Global User-defined LF = 400,

UF = 60000 0.91% 0.29%

Observation Tukey

(interquartile) k = 3 0.15% 0.10%

Observation Kimber k = 3 1.18% 0.89%

Observation k-sigma k = 3 0.21% 0.16%

Relative User-defined LF= 1/3,

UF = 3 0.03% 0.04%

Relative Tukey

(interquartile) k = 3 1.56% 0.96%

Relative Kimber k = 3 5.04% 3.41%

Relative k-sigma k = 3 0.90% 0.67%

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

8

Results: second-hand petrol cars

Global and observation-based methods

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

• Observation-based methods biased

9

Results: second-hand petrol cars

Relative-based methods

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

• Methods behave similarly

10

Results: rail fares

Methods of outlier detection explored with rail fares • Negligible impact of global outlier detection • Observation-base strategy not applicable due to bimodal distributions

Type Method Parameters Flagged Percent

Benchmark No outlier detection N/A 0 0%

Relative User-defined LF = 1/3,

UF = 3 132,796 0.02%

Relative Kimber k = 3 182,006,519 29.91%

Relative k-sigma k = 3 5,751,068 0.95%

Relative Tukey (interquartile) k = 3 145,194,524 23.85%

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

11

Results: rail fares

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

Relative-based methods

• Difference affected by narrow distribution of relatives

12

Results: discussion

We prefer relative-based outlier detection with a user-defined lower fence of one third and upper fence of 3

• Corrects potentially erroneous spikes • Very mild change otherwise • Removes minimal data

• Reduces risk no-price-change bias • Reduces outdated fences risk • Avoids risk of poor fit • Consistent across categories

• Bespoke k parameter

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

13

Future developments & Conclusions

• Monitoring outliers and indices to avoid bias

• Account for genuine large relatives

• Exploring outlier detection on grocery scanner data • Investigating other methodologies

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

14

Future developments & Conclusions

• Presented Outlier detection for rail fares and second-hand cars dynamic price data

• Discussed potential strategies

• Relative-based outlier detection • Mild impact on indices • 0.25 and 0.03 index points for used cars and rail fares

• Future application to new data sources

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

15

Thanks for your attention!

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

Results: second-hand diesel cars

Global and observation-based methods

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

• Observation-based methods biased

Results: second-hand diesel cars

Relative-based methods

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices, 7-9 June 2023, Geneva, Switzerland

• Methods behave similarly

Measuring inflation as households experience it, United Kingdom

Languages and translations
English

Measuring inflation as households experience it

John Astin and Jill Leyland

Presentation to UNECE Meeting of the Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices Geneva, 7-9 June 2023

Outline of talk • Background

• “Household” vs “macroeconomic” indices

• Australia, New Zealand, UK

• Why we need household indices

The opinions expressed in this talk are our own and it should not be assumed that the Office for National Statistics will agree with all of them.

HCIs vs CPI/HICP HCIs CPI/HICP

Timing Payment (in principle) Acquisition

Weighting Democratic (household) Plutocratic (expenditure)

Interest payments All included Excluded

Student loan repayments Included All tuition fees included when due

Insurance premiums Fully weighted Net weight only

Owner occupied housing All housing related payments (we believe this should include at least some capital payments)

Minor repairs only (net acquisition method to be added to HICPs)

National or domestic National basis (in principle) Domestic basis

Similarity of UK, Australian and NZ household indices

*Current plan is to include capital costs in a secondary index.

UK Australia New Zealand Household Costs Indices (HCIs)

Selected Living Costs Indexes (SLCIs)

Household living-costs price indexes (HLPIs)

Household groups d

19 groups plus total 4/5 groups only 13 groups and total

Timing basis Payment Payment Payment

Weighting Democratic Plutocratic Democratic

Interest payments Mostly included (all in principle)

All included All included

Insurance weights Gross Gross Gross

Owner occupier costs Mortgage interest, all payments other than capital costs*

Mortgage interest Mortgage interest payments indexed by house prices

Taxes related to properties

Included Included Included

One reason we need HCIs (Indices, 2005 = 100)

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Jan-17 Jan-19 Jan-21

Richer households have greater weight in CPI

HCI low income households (Decile 2)

HCI high income households (Decile 9)

CPI

so it is closer to the HCI for richer households

Source: ONS

And if we add in CPI subgroups ...(indices 2005=100)

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Jan-17 Jan-19 Jan-21

HCI low income (decile 2) HCI high income (decile 9)

CPI low income (decile 2) CPI high income (decile 9)

The HCI high income and CPI high income series have been very close over the past decade. But there is a clear gap between the HCI low income and CPI low income series.

Source: ONS

And to conclude… • Originally One consumer price index - primary use often for wage negotiations • From 1990s Macroeconomic uses such as inflation targeting became more dominant • But crucial to understand household experience Measuring inflation as it affects the household budget

  • Measuring inflation as households experience it
  • Outline of talk
  • HCIs vs CPI/HICP
  • Similarity of UK, Australian and NZ household indices
  • One reason we need HCIs (Indices, 2005 = 100)
  • And if we add in CPI subgroups ...(indices 2005=100)
  • And to conclude…

Measuring Inflation as Households Experience it, United Kingdom

Languages and translations
English

1

Measuring Inflation as Households Experience it

John Astin and Jill Leyland1

What is inflation? The famous economist Roy Harrod (1900-1978) defined it as

“the name of that state of affairs in which all or most prices are continually

rising”.

But that doesn’t tell us how to measure it. Any expert knows that there are

many ways to measure it.

As some readers will know, in the 1990s John Astin – one of the authors of this

paper - was in charge of the Eurostat team which was responsible for

developing the EU Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP). This was

intended initially to facilitate the inflation test for countries that were

candidates for the euro, so that when two countries’ inflation rate was, say,

4.5%, it was clear that they were facing the same degree of inflation; they were

measuring it in more or less identical ways. Later it was to become a tool for

the management of the euro zone by the ECB (European Central Bank).

The UK government decided in 2003 that the HICP (now known in the UK as

the CPI) should be the target inflation measure for the Bank of England - fine!

At that time, the main index used for purposes such as uprating pensions,

wages, and so on was the RPI (Retail Prices Index) which had originally been

designed for these types of uses (as had consumer price indices in most

countries). However, in 2010 the UK government decided the RPI should be

replaced as the main inflation index for public sector use by the CPI (HICP). Of

course John was pleased that his “baby” had achieved adulthood - but it was

obviously not the best index to be used for most indexation purposes. Then,

changes made to the way clothing prices were collected reacted badly with the

formulae used in the RPI, which began clearly to overestimate inflation,

resulting in it eventually being deprived of “national statistic” status and its use

discouraged – although its use was, and is still, widely embedded in contracts.

In 2030 the RPI will effectively turn into a derivative of CPI.

All of this led to both authors separately (we did not know each other at the

time) working from 2014 on proposals for a new household-oriented index.

1 [email protected] [email protected] This paper contains our own opinions. It should not be assumed that the UK Office for National Statistics will necessarily agree with all of them.

2

We both felt there was a clear need for an index that measured inflation as

households actually experienced it – or at least as close as possible. We

realised we were both thinking along the same lines and in 2015 we joined

forces to develop the ideas for what we eventually called the HII (Household

Inflation Index).

It took a while for our ideas to be accepted in official circles, but the ONS

decided it was useful and important, and started gradually to publish the new

index (re-named HCI - Household Costs Index) on an annual experimental

basis. Importantly HCIs for different household groupings – for example by

income deciles or working age vs retired – were also published.

With the recent public interest in inflation measures, the ONS have

announced that from around September this year they will be publishing the

HCIs quarterly. Our hope and expectation is that this will become monthly, and

that the HCI can eventually replace the RPI. The HCIs – and not the HICP/CPI -

could – and should - be used for such things as updating pensions, wages etc.

as well as being the standard national measure of inflation regarding food,

clothing and all the goods and services that households buy.

So, what are the differences between the HCI and the CPI/HICP? Bear in mind

that the aim of HCIs is to measure inflation as closely as possible to what

households actually experience:

The HCIs :

(a) are notionally on a payments basis- although acquisition is used in practice

where the two are not very different;

(b) are weighted on a household (democratic) basis, as opposed to a

“plutocratic” basis – a household index should give equal weight to every

household regardless of the level of income or expenditure;

(c) include interest payments (including mortgage interest);

(d) include student loan repayments (in the UK);

(e) use gross insurance premiums - rather than net premiums which exclude

the value of claims paid;

(f) include all housing-related payments made by owner occupiers, including,

we believe, at least some elements of capital payments;

3

(g) are on a “national” basis, excluding payments by foreign visitors and

including, as far as possible, payments by residents when abroad.

(Macroeconomic indices like the HICP are calculated on a “domestic” basis,

including expenditure by foreign visitors and excluding spending by residents

when abroad.)

Table 1 summarises these differences

Table 1: Differences between HCIs and CPI/HICP

We now turn to two other countries, who also publish household indices –

Australia and New Zealand. As far as we are aware these are the only two

other countries who explicitly publish household indices of the type we

describe but please do let us know if there are others.

Table 2 compares the household indices of the three countries.

HCIs CPI/HICP

Timing Payment (in principle) Acquisition

Weighting Democratic (household) Plutocratic (expenditure)

Interest payments All included Excluded

Student loan repayments Included All tuition fees included

when due

Insurance premiums Fully weighted Net weight only

Owner occupied housing All housing related payments (we

believe this should include at

least some capital payments)

Minor repairs only (net

acquisition method to be

added to HICPs)

National or domestic National basis (in principle) Domestic basis

4

Table 2: Household indices of UK, Australia and New Zealand

* The current plan is to include these in a separate derivative index

All three countries use a payments approach, at least in principle. Two use

democratic (that is household) weighting.

All three countries include interest payments made by households while

insurance premiums have full weight. Importantly we all develop these indices

for different groups of households since the experience of different household

types is a key reason for developing household indices.

So while we all developed these indices separately, there is a lot of consensus

between us on how a household index differs from a standard consumer price

index. The fact that we ended up with so much similarity of approaches is

telling.

One area we do not – or not yet – have an agreed approach on is the vexed

issue of owner occupied housing. Although we all include mortgage interest

payments, the authors believe that at least some part of capital payments

needs to be included. The arguments for this are set out fully in our recent

paper listed in the references.

But now let’s turn to the question of why we need household indices. These

charts (which currently only go up to the end of 2021) give one answer.

UK Australia New Zealand

Household Costs

Indices (HCIs)

Selected Living Costs

Indexes (SLCIs)

Household living-costs

price indexes (HLPIs)

Household groups

covered

19 groups plus total 4/5 groups only 13 groups and total

Timing basis Payment Payment Payment

Weighting Democratic Plutocratic Democratic

Interest payments Mostly included (all

in principle)

All included All included

Insurance weights Gross Gross Gross

Owner occupier costs Mortgage interest,

all payments other

than capital costs*

Mortgage interest Mortgage interest

payments indexed by

house prices

Taxes related to

properties

Included Included Included

5

In 2022 and, currently, in 2023 we have had very high inflation in the UK. Of

course, we are not alone in that. Food and energy prices in particular have

increased rapidly. You do not need to think very hard to realise that in these

circumstances lower income households will be particularly affected due to the

high proportion of energy and food costs in their overall expenditure.

But what happened in the past when inflation was modest?

The chart below shows that lower income households (we are using those in

the second decile), represented by the blue line, have experienced a higher

rate of inflation over the period shown than richer households - those in the 9th

decile – represented by the grey line. Specifically this happened over the

period 2008 to 2014 – it can be seen that the gap widened then and was then

broadly stable for the next few years.

Next, consider the CPI/HICP, represented by the orange line. It can be seen

that this is very close to the line for richer households and below that for

poorer households.

Chart 1: CPI/HICP vs HCIs for High income and Low income households (indices, 2005 = 100)

Source: ONS

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Jan-17 Jan-19 Jan-21

Richer households have greater weight in CPI

HCI low income households (Decile 2)

HCI high income households (Decile 9)

CPI

so it is closer to the HCI for richer households

6

Could the CPI if available for income deciles show this? As it happens the ONS

has also periodically published CPI broken down by income deciles. Consider

the following chart.

Chart 2: CPI/HICP and HCI for low and high income deciles (indices, 2005=100)

Source: ONS

For most of this period the high income decile lines for CPI – light blue – and

the HCI – grey are so close they can hardly be distinguished. But the lines for

CPI low income decile - orange – and HCI low income decile – dark blue - are

clearly different.

For policy makers who need to understand, in particular, the pressures low

income households are experiencing, this insight is helpful. For households

living close to the edge a small difference between the rise in prices and the

rise in incomes can cause real hardship.

We hope that this paper gives an idea of what household indices are and why

they are needed. The original purpose of many consumer price indices was

primarily for use in wage bargaining. Then the rise of inflation targeting in the

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Jan-17 Jan-19 Jan-21

HCI low income (decile 2) HCI high income (decile 9)

CPI low income (decile 2) CPI high income (decile 9)

CPI high income decile and HCI high income decile are very close, at least from 2009. But there is a clear difference between the low income deciles.

7

1990s required a series focused on that need. But it is important – indeed

crucial – that household experience is not neglected.

There remain some points where further development or discussion is needed.

How to deal with owner occupier housing costs is one. Longer term questions

include dealing with quality change – is it right to aim to measure all items at

constant quality even when the unimproved product is no longer available?

Another point is to look not just at the weights that are appropriate to

different household groupings but at the different brands they might be more

or less likely to buy or which outlets they are more likely to shop at.

References Astin, J. and Leyland, J. (2015): Towards a Household Inflation Index: Compiling a consumer price index with public credibility

Astin, J. & Leyland, J. (2023) Measuring Inflation as Households see it: next steps for the Household Costs Indices Astin, J. (2021) “Measuring EU Inflation: the Foundations of the HICP” (Palgrave Macmillan. E-book also available at Measuring EU Inflation | SpringerLink Flower, T. and Wales, P. (2014): Variation in the Inflation Experience of UK Households: 2003-2014” (UK Office for National Statistics.) International Labour Organisation et al. (2004): “Consumer Price Index manual: theory and practice International Monetary Fund et al. (2020): Consumer Price Index Manual: Concepts and Methods | 2020 UK Office for National Statistics: Links to HCI publications can be accessed at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/search?q=Household%20Costs%20indices&page=1

8

Payne, Christopher, Office for National Statistics (2021): Measuring households’ experience of price change: the Household Costs Indices (HCIs) Presentation to 2021 UNECE Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices meeting) United Nations et al. (2009) Practical Guide to Producing Consumer Price Indices

Measuring Inflation as Households Experience it

Languages and translations
English

1

Measuring Inflation as Households Experience it

John Astin and Jill Leyland1

What is inflation? The famous economist Roy Harrod (1900-1978) defined it as

“the name of that state of affairs in which all or most prices are continually

rising”.

But that doesn’t tell us how to measure it. Any expert knows that there are

many ways to measure it.

As some readers will know, in the 1990s John Astin – one of the authors of this

paper - was in charge of the Eurostat team which was responsible for

developing the EU Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP). This was

intended initially to facilitate the inflation test for countries that were

candidates for the euro, so that when two countries’ inflation rate was, say,

4.5%, it was clear that they were facing the same degree of inflation; they were

measuring it in more or less identical ways. Later it was to become a tool for

the management of the euro zone by the ECB (European Central Bank).

The UK government decided in 2003 that the HICP (now known in the UK as

the CPI) should be the target inflation measure for the Bank of England - fine!

At that time, the main index used for purposes such as uprating pensions,

wages, and so on was the RPI (Retail Prices Index) which had originally been

designed for these types of uses (as had consumer price indices in most

countries). However, in 2010 the UK government decided the RPI should be

replaced as the main inflation index for public sector use by the CPI (HICP). Of

course John was pleased that his “baby” had achieved adulthood - but it was

obviously not the best index to be used for most indexation purposes. Then,

changes made to the way clothing prices were collected reacted badly with the

formulae used in the RPI, which began clearly to overestimate inflation,

resulting in it eventually being deprived of “national statistic” status and its use

discouraged – although its use was, and is still, widely embedded in contracts.

In 2030 the RPI will effectively turn into a derivative of CPI.

All of this led to both authors separately (we did not know each other at the

time) working from 2014 on proposals for a new household-oriented index.

1 [email protected] [email protected] This paper contains our own opinions. It should not be assumed that the UK Office for National Statistics will necessarily agree with all of them.

2

We both felt there was a clear need for an index that measured inflation as

households actually experienced it – or at least as close as possible. We

realised we were both thinking along the same lines and in 2015 we joined

forces to develop the ideas for what we eventually called the HII (Household

Inflation Index).

It took a while for our ideas to be accepted in official circles, but the ONS

decided it was useful and important, and started gradually to publish the new

index (re-named HCI - Household Costs Index) on an annual experimental

basis. Importantly HCIs for different household groupings – for example by

income deciles or working age vs retired – were also published.

With the recent public interest in inflation measures, the ONS have

announced that from around September this year they will be publishing the

HCIs quarterly. Our hope and expectation is that this will become monthly, and

that the HCI can eventually replace the RPI. The HCIs – and not the HICP/CPI -

could – and should - be used for such things as updating pensions, wages etc.

as well as being the standard national measure of inflation regarding food,

clothing and all the goods and services that households buy.

So, what are the differences between the HCI and the CPI/HICP? Bear in mind

that the aim of HCIs is to measure inflation as closely as possible to what

households actually experience:

The HCIs :

(a) are notionally on a payments basis- although acquisition is used in practice

where the two are not very different;

(b) are weighted on a household (democratic) basis, as opposed to a

“plutocratic” basis – a household index should give equal weight to every

household regardless of the level of income or expenditure;

(c) include interest payments (including mortgage interest);

(d) include student loan repayments (in the UK);

(e) use gross insurance premiums - rather than net premiums which exclude

the value of claims paid;

(f) include all housing-related payments made by owner occupiers, including,

we believe, at least some elements of capital payments;

3

(g) are on a “national” basis, excluding payments by foreign visitors and

including, as far as possible, payments by residents when abroad.

(Macroeconomic indices like the HICP are calculated on a “domestic” basis,

including expenditure by foreign visitors and excluding spending by residents

when abroad.)

Table 1 summarises these differences

Table 1: Differences between HCIs and CPI/HICP

We now turn to two other countries, who also publish household indices –

Australia and New Zealand. As far as we are aware these are the only two

other countries who explicitly publish household indices of the type we

describe but please do let us know if there are others.

Table 2 compares the household indices of the three countries.

HCIs CPI/HICP

Timing Payment (in principle) Acquisition

Weighting Democratic (household) Plutocratic (expenditure)

Interest payments All included Excluded

Student loan repayments Included All tuition fees included

when due

Insurance premiums Fully weighted Net weight only

Owner occupied housing All housing related payments (we

believe this should include at

least some capital payments)

Minor repairs only (net

acquisition method to be

added to HICPs)

National or domestic National basis (in principle) Domestic basis

4

Table 2: Household indices of UK, Australia and New Zealand

* The current plan is to include these in a separate derivative index

All three countries use a payments approach, at least in principle. Two use

democratic (that is household) weighting.

All three countries include interest payments made by households while

insurance premiums have full weight. Importantly we all develop these indices

for different groups of households since the experience of different household

types is a key reason for developing household indices.

So while we all developed these indices separately, there is a lot of consensus

between us on how a household index differs from a standard consumer price

index. The fact that we ended up with so much similarity of approaches is

telling.

One area we do not – or not yet – have an agreed approach on is the vexed

issue of owner occupied housing. Although we all include mortgage interest

payments, the authors believe that at least some part of capital payments

needs to be included. The arguments for this are set out fully in our recent

paper listed in the references.

But now let’s turn to the question of why we need household indices. These

charts (which currently only go up to the end of 2021) give one answer.

UK Australia New Zealand

Household Costs

Indices (HCIs)

Selected Living Costs

Indexes (SLCIs)

Household living-costs

price indexes (HLPIs)

Household groups

covered

19 groups plus total 4/5 groups only 13 groups and total

Timing basis Payment Payment Payment

Weighting Democratic Plutocratic Democratic

Interest payments Mostly included (all

in principle)

All included All included

Insurance weights Gross Gross Gross

Owner occupier costs Mortgage interest,

all payments other

than capital costs*

Mortgage interest Mortgage interest

payments indexed by

house prices

Taxes related to

properties

Included Included Included

5

In 2022 and, currently, in 2023 we have had very high inflation in the UK. Of

course, we are not alone in that. Food and energy prices in particular have

increased rapidly. You do not need to think very hard to realise that in these

circumstances lower income households will be particularly affected due to the

high proportion of energy and food costs in their overall expenditure.

But what happened in the past when inflation was modest?

The chart below shows that lower income households (we are using those in

the second decile), represented by the blue line, have experienced a higher

rate of inflation over the period shown than richer households - those in the 9th

decile – represented by the grey line. Specifically this happened over the

period 2008 to 2014 – it can be seen that the gap widened then and was then

broadly stable for the next few years.

Next, consider the CPI/HICP, represented by the orange line. It can be seen

that this is very close to the line for richer households and below that for

poorer households.

Chart 1: CPI/HICP vs HCIs for High income and Low income households (indices, 2005 = 100)

Source: ONS

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Jan-17 Jan-19 Jan-21

Richer households have greater weight in CPI

HCI low income households (Decile 2)

HCI high income households (Decile 9)

CPI

so it is closer to the HCI for richer households

6

Could the CPI if available for income deciles show this? As it happens the ONS

has also periodically published CPI broken down by income deciles. Consider

the following chart.

Chart 2: CPI/HICP and HCI for low and high income deciles (indices, 2005=100)

Source: ONS

For most of this period the high income decile lines for CPI – light blue – and

the HCI – grey are so close they can hardly be distinguished. But the lines for

CPI low income decile - orange – and HCI low income decile – dark blue - are

clearly different.

For policy makers who need to understand, in particular, the pressures low

income households are experiencing, this insight is helpful. For households

living close to the edge a small difference between the rise in prices and the

rise in incomes can cause real hardship.

We hope that this paper gives an idea of what household indices are and why

they are needed. The original purpose of many consumer price indices was

primarily for use in wage bargaining. Then the rise of inflation targeting in the

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Jan-17 Jan-19 Jan-21

HCI low income (decile 2) HCI high income (decile 9)

CPI low income (decile 2) CPI high income (decile 9)

CPI high income decile and HCI high income decile are very close, at least from 2009. But there is a clear difference between the low income deciles.

7

1990s required a series focused on that need. But it is important – indeed

crucial – that household experience is not neglected.

There remain some points where further development or discussion is needed.

How to deal with owner occupier housing costs is one. Longer term questions

include dealing with quality change – is it right to aim to measure all items at

constant quality even when the unimproved product is no longer available?

Another point is to look not just at the weights that are appropriate to

different household groupings but at the different brands they might be more

or less likely to buy or which outlets they are more likely to shop at.

References Astin, J. and Leyland, J. (2015): Towards a Household Inflation Index: Compiling a consumer price index with public credibility

Astin, J. & Leyland, J. (2023) Measuring Inflation as Households see it: next steps for the Household Costs Indices Astin, J. (2021) “Measuring EU Inflation: the Foundations of the HICP” (Palgrave Macmillan. E-book also available at Measuring EU Inflation | SpringerLink Flower, T. and Wales, P. (2014): Variation in the Inflation Experience of UK Households: 2003-2014” (UK Office for National Statistics.) International Labour Organisation et al. (2004): “Consumer Price Index manual: theory and practice International Monetary Fund et al. (2020): Consumer Price Index Manual: Concepts and Methods | 2020 UK Office for National Statistics: Links to HCI publications can be accessed at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/search?q=Household%20Costs%20indices&page=1

8

Payne, Christopher, Office for National Statistics (2021): Measuring households’ experience of price change: the Household Costs Indices (HCIs) Presentation to 2021 UNECE Group of Experts on Consumer Price Indices meeting) United Nations et al. (2009) Practical Guide to Producing Consumer Price Indices

The Impact of Migration on National Accounts: A UK perspective

The Impact of Migration on National Accounts: A UK perspective

Languages and translations
English

The Impact of Migration on National Accounts: A UK perspective

Richard Heys, Sonia Carrera, David

Freeman, Craig McLaren and Chris

Stickney

20 April 2023

Objective and Structure

• The proposal to include labour accounts within the SNA from 2025 is a key

milestone.

• An opportunity to reflect on modern realities in how to account for

migration in economic statistics.

• Equally an opportunity to consider how best economic statistics can

ensure its perspective is taken into account in social statistics definitions

and concepts discussion on migration (see discussions at 54th UNSC

(2023), considering the role of temporary mobility).

The UK context "A series of world events have

impacted international migration

patterns in the 12 months to June

2022. Taken together these were

unprecedented. These include the end

of lockdown restrictions in the UK, the

first full period following transition from

the EU, the war in Ukraine, the

resettlement of Afghans and the new

visa route for Hong Kong British

nationals (Overseas), which have all

contributed to the record levels of

long-term immigration we have seen.“

In the year to June 2020 UK net

migration was 88,000, which rose to

504,000 in year to June 2022

Key Questions

• How best to account for rapid changes in the structure of

the population?

• How best to align and understand different population

concepts?

• How best to accommodate efforts by population

statisticians and demographers to keep pace with rapid

change?

The change problem

• Economic growth can occur either through the process of more output being generated by the factors

of production within the production boundary, or it can occur by activity, or factors of production

moving from outside the production boundary (and therefore out of scope of the national accounts), to

moving within the production boundary and hence into scope.

• Movements across the production boundary can make understanding economic growth inherently

more complex. Given that in the UK, as with most other economies, labour inputs are the most

important factor of production understanding how they change and adapt is vital to understanding

whether more is being produced or simply more is being counted.

• ONS (2022a) estimated that the UK's inclusive net worth, including productive assets, environmental

assets, human capital, financial assets and financial liabilities was £36.2 trillion in nominal prices in

2020. Environmental assets, as measured in the natural capital accounts, were worth £1.7 trillion,

while human capital was worth £23.8 trillion or more than double the value of the traditional non-

financial capital stock captured in the national accounts.

Three broad measurement approaches

• Population statistics defines a person as a usual resident at their permanent address where they

spend most of their time. This usually has a residency requirement, or the intention to reside, for at

least twelve months. This includes those who migrate into or out of the UK.

• ILO labour statistics also capture a domestic resident population, including those who work

abroad, and excluding those who reside overseas and work in the domestic economy (e.g. those

who cross the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland)

• National Accounts requires labour statistics which align to the production boundary and therefore

capture those who work in the domestic economy, that is excluding those who work abroad, and

including those workers who reside overseas (such as those living in the Republic of Ireland and

working in the UK).

Those living domestically and working overseas are obviously included in Population Statistics and ILO measures, but excluded from National Accounts

Some concepts

• The current statistical guidance landscape requires us to produce data on

three different bases

Those living overseas

and working in the

domestic economy

Those working in the domestic

economy, but fewer than twelve

months residency

Those working in the domestic

economy, and more than twelve

months residency

Population

Statistics

Excluded Excluded Included

ILO Labour

Measures

Excluded Included conceptually, but

excluded in the weights as these

come from population statistics

Included

National Accounts Included Included conceptually, but

excluded in the weights as these

come from population statistics

Included

Impacts of different approaches

• In normal times, if rates of migration or cross-border working remain relatively consistent across time periods

then the growth rates should not be significantly biased, although the stock level may be more subject to bias.

• However, in circumstances when migration trends change this can result in three problems:

• Faster growth in net migration, where these individuals are allowed to work, will result in national accounts

capturing faster GVA growth in the first year whilst not observing labour inputs growth. This results in

accelerated growth in GDP per head and labour productivity measures.

• Wider discrepancies in dis-aggregations, both of industry and geography if migration relatively greater affects

some industries and regions than others, which can distort the appearance of where the drivers of growth can

be observed.

• If migration also has a greater or lesser impact than average on particular occupation classifications which are

used for cost of production type estimates, such as for intangible capital investment (e.g. software and

databases) this could distort perceptions of investment rates and again the drivers of growth in the national

accounts. The impact will also be dependent on the relative size of the sector of the economy.

The population statistics discussion

• International guidance on population statistics is governed by ‘UN Principles and Recommendations for

Population and Housing Censuses’, (2017). They make clear the need to measure a “usually resident

population” which requires a threshold of 12 months when considering place of usual residence.

• There is a reasonable argument for a ‘usual’ resident population. Having an accurate distribution of the population

supports long-term planning, particularly in small geographic areas to avoid short term volatility. This is also

important for projecting future population estimates and is crucial for producing high quality sampling frames for

surveys which draw on population or households, such as the Labour Force Survey.

• On the other hand, the rise of global mobility has changed the way countries need to provide services. A usual

resident population doesn’t consider those who live in a country for shorter periods but still needs access to

schools, hospitals and other public services, and might be engaged in meaningful employment. The Final Report

on Conceptual frameworks and Concepts and Definitions on International Migration, (April 2021), calls on a need

for a “present population” comprised of both the resident population and a temporary population component.

The temporary population can make a significant contribution to both the economy and society and attributing this

contribution to the usually resident population (often the denominator) misrepresents the reality.

The economic statistics problem Broadly four types of conceptual adjustment are required to align with national accounts requirements if one begins with household

survey data, such as the LFS:

• Territoriality – the issues of cross-border work have to be adjusted for in a household survey, whereas a business survey, which

only covers domestic businesses does not face the same biases.

• Seasonal work adjustments where the population weights which are used to derive whole economy estimates are generated

from a population estimate which fails to take account of short-term economic migration, which we have already observed is of

more significance in particular industries, biasing the geographical or industrial distribution of potentially both estimates of output

and productivity.

• Alignment with industry groupings. As Ward et al (2018) describes ‘industry coding is often conducted on the basis of

information given by the respondent about the type of product, service or function provided by his/her place of work, which may

not align with the industry coding of that firm in the business register, and hence national accounts (although in some countries

this alignment is improved by matching respondents information, such as the name and address of the firm with equivalent

information on the business register)’. In the UK, LFS data is reweighted using the STES to address this distributional issue,

which would otherwise serve to bias measures of productivity derived from the national accounts.

• Coverage – Ward et al (2018) note that ‘the LFS does not cover some groups of the population such as persons below or above

certain age thresholds (which varies by country), those living and working in communal establishments (such as prisons or long-

term care facilities), collective households (such as religious institutions) and the armed forces, all of whose output is included, at

least in theory, in estimates of GDP.’

Conclusions • Waiting twelve months to confirm usual residency, in addition to collecting and processing data,

creates an inevitable time lag, which reduces the timeliness of population and migration statistics.

This is important for many statistical systems and political debate, including economic statistics.

• The issues around the conceptual alignment between the three treatments described above indicate

clearly that economic measures can be differentially affected both when migration patterns change,

but could also shift if one or more of the three definitions of population and migration statistics

methods are revised.

• In a fast moving, modern, digital economy, with more readily available data the prospect of moving to

a system where issues of population and migration do not need to wait for the twelve-month

threshold, and can be measured within a shorter period present as increasingly feasible options.

• Noting any revised definition of migration would need to meet the needs of a variety of population and

migration statistics and above all be coherent between stocks and flows, it would also be the case

that economic measurement would need to consider the potential for any such change to impact key

measures of GVA, investment, GDP per head and productivity measures, as well as human capital

and education satellite accounts. SNA 2025 presents the perfect opportunity to consider this issue.

Publication and analysis of real-time indicators in the United Kingdom

Publication and analysis of real-time indicators in the United Kingdom

Languages and translations
English

Publication and analysis of real-time indicators in the United Kingdom

Craig McLaren, National Accounts Division, UK

Andrew Walton, Tom Williams, Bethan West and Charlie Harland [email protected]

27 April 2023

Click to add textClick to add text

Context

• Quest for faster and more accurate economic indicators

• Faster Indicators of UK Economic Activity project (2019)

• Aims: identify close-to-real-time big data and administrative datasets, enable early

identification of significant economic changes, and provide insight into economic

activity with timeliness and granularity not possible with official economic statistics

• COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 resulted in a need for more timely data

• Now have three main products:

• Suite of real-time indicators

• Fortnightly Business Impact of Coronavirus Survey (BICS)

• Opinions and Lifestyle survey (OPN)

2

Example: Real-time and COVID-19

3

Coronavirus and the social impacts on Great Britain

- Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk)

Economic activity and social change in the UK, real-time

indicators - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk)

Meeting user needs and working in partnership

• Real-time information helps policy makers assess the current state of the economy

• Acquiring real-time data involves working in partnership with data suppliers

• Challenge: Difficulties in establishing partnerships due to legal, regulatory constraints,

data privacy, and security concerns

• Benefits of working across public and private companies

• Public sector organisations have access to data not available to private sector firms,

and private sector firms may have access to proprietary data that can provide unique

insights

• Working together and sharing data can develop a more complete picture of the

economy

4

Example: CHAPS data from the Bank of England

• Access to BoE daily clearing house data

• Track daily payments made by credit and

debit card payment processors to around 100

major UK retail corporates

• Gives an incredibly timely picture of spending

habits within the UK

• Breaks down aggregate spending into

interesting and related categories

• Can now compare this with the official

monthly Retail sales

5

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/bulletins/ec

onomicactivityandsocialchangeintheukrealtimeindicators/14april2023

Weekly publication

• Release every Thursday

• Content varies based on

indicator availability and

frequency

• Have flexibility in publication

• 19 indicators

• 14 datasets

• Grouped by 4 themes

• “Data only” for some indicators

6

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/bulletins/ec

onomicactivityandsocialchangeintheukrealtimeindicators/14april2023

Consumer behaviour • Selected indicators

• CHAPS spending on credit and debit

cards (Bank of England)

• Revolut card spending (Revolut)

• Demand for fuel per transaction

(VISA/BEIS)

• Retail footfall (Springboard)

• Weekly transactional data for Pret A

Manger (Pret A Manger)

• Restaurant seated diners (OpenTable)

7

Energy and housing

• Selected indicators

• Energy Performance

Certificate lodgements

(MHCLG)

• System Average Price

of gas (National Grid)

• System Price of

electricity (Elexon)

8

Business and workforce

• Selected indicators

• Online job adverts (Adzuna)

• Redundancies (Insolvency Services)

• Company incorporations, voluntary

dissolutions, and compulsory

dissolutions (Companies House)

• Data on sales and jobs in small

businesses (Xero)

• VAT new businesses and business

turnover (HMRC)

9

Transport

• Selected indicators

• UK flights (EUROCONTROL)

• Traffic camera activity (Regional

LG bodies)

• Shipping visits (exactEarth)

• Flights passenger number (Civil

Aviation Authority)

• Road traffic in Great Britain

(Department for Transport)

10

Our weekly publication

• The production team faces tight deadlines and receives data on Mondays and

Tuesdays, which is then processed and formatted for publication on Thursdays at

9:30 am.

• The production team has 11 full-time equivalent staff members, including a

development team of four people who are instrumental in creating and improving

automated data processing systems (R and Python, Power BI, time series

analysis)

• Quality assurance is comprehensive including passing written sections to data

suppliers/stakeholders for quality assurance

• Key: automation of tasks and reproducible statistical pipelines

11

Our statistical production

• Python / R: data transformation; partial quality assurance automation; data

outputs; .html outputs; tkinter applications; gptables accessible datasets;

• Git: version control; documentation

• Power BI: Reports and dashboards; data checking; charts; summary

statistics; tables

• Power Query: data modelling; sharepoint work flow; automation

• Automation approach

• Incremental Developments (GitLab massive help here)

• Exploring new ideas

• Communication between production analysts and developers

12

Power BI Dashboard

13

National Accounts and real-time indicators

• UK publishes monthly and quarterly GDP

• Access now to a large range of real-time data with different frequencies

(e.g. weekly, fortnightly, and also detailed management information used

internally)

• Policy approach: Need to consider the relationship of real-time data

alongside official indicators

• Issues to consider

• Publication strategy for different frequencies and outputs

• Signal v noise (high frequency data)

• …

14

National Accounts and real-time indicators

• Some examples

• For restaurant sector in mGDP compare with

the Opentable restaurant reservation dataset

• For air transport, and for elements of retail

spending we will look at the spending

categories within the various consumer

spending indicators, e.g. CHAPS (BoE data)

and Revolut spending.

• Can construct turnover balance indicators from

fortnightly source (Business survey) and

compare to a modified mGDP; and compare

Retail sales to card data.

15

The future

• Ambition for the UK is to have real-time real-time indicators; e.g. publish

indicators when they are ready onto a dynamic and interactive data portal

for users

• Currently exploring: seasonal adjustment for high-frequency data; now-

casting techniques in partnership with our Data Science Campus and

academics

• Researching new indicators: anonymised and aggregated utility bills;

granular geographical data; renting affordability; cargo manifests;

composite indicator, …

• Real-time indicators are here to stay!

16

Impact of high inflation on national accounts, United Kingdom

Languages and translations
English

Impact of high inflation on National Accounts

United Kingdom

Craig McLaren, National Accounts Division, UK 27th April 2023

1

GDP measurement in the UK • Monthly GDP since 2018

• Output measure (Services, Production, Construction) • Published around 40 days after the reference month

• Quarterly GDP is Output led for most recent 2 quarters • First Quarterly Estimate, mainly Output content, but includes some

expenditure and income components • Quarterly National Accounts updates all three approaches

• Double deflation also used

2

Deflation approach in the UK • Annual deflation is done via the supply and use framework with 112 products and 112 industries and

balanced in current and constant prices • For monthly and quarterly GDP, national accounts compilers use consistent set of deflators • The deflator for each product is built up from lower-level price data for each transaction wherever

data are available • A deflator gateway has been introduced as an entry point for deflators into the national accounts

production process to ensure consistent use of deflators • We publish a data sources catalogue for all our monthly GDP data which also covers deflators used • How much of each type of deflator is used in UK monthly GPD

• Note that the PPI includes domestic and export prices weighted together

PPI SPPI CPI AWE HHFCE Other Derived 18% 10% 21% 8% 12% 14% 18%

3

Energy example: Large price changes • Energy products have seen large

price changes in recent times • ONS uses direct volume data in short

term estimates real of GDP • Nominal GDP for these industries is

created by reflating the volume • Data are provided by Department for

Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ)

4

Importance of direct volume measures • The Eurostat Price and Volume Handbook refers to the issue of high inflation and notes (p33): • “The use of output volume indicators might also be necessary in cases of high inflation. When prices change very

rapidly, price indices become increasingly unreliable. To describe the real economic developments in such situations volume indicators might give better results.“

• They also reference "Inflation Accounting: A Manual on National Accounting Under Conditions of High Inflation", published by the OECD in 2003. The main gist of the OECD manual is that where the whole system is subject to high inflation (i.e. not just some products), transactions that are correctly valued as they take place, will be valued at much higher prices at the end of the period than at the beginning. The manual advocates use of inter- temporaral indicators and benchmarking.

• In practice higher frequency measurement (i.e. monthly GDP) is a solution [although if you are benchmarking to a simple annual you are likely to need to adjust the annual volume] and the use of direct volume indicators can improve this issue

• For monthly UK GDP: Direct volume measures make up 44% of the volume estimate (about 50% of this comes from government and households)

5

Case study: Supply-Use and annual deflators • Annual deflators for some series are formed using simple averages • In normal times, and if the product to deflate is not highly seasonal, this is ok • In 2020 prices and activity changed at the same time • Example on next slide, for restaurants and catering household deflator,

(Quarter 2 2020) • Moral of the story: when inflation is changing rapidly, “short-cuts” such as

simple annual averaging can be exposed if price and activity are changing at the same time.

• Methodological challenges for traditionally “safe” outputs

6

7

Price spike and change in activity can cause simple average deflators to behave erratically

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Food and beverage serving activities (CPA_I56) household final consumption deflator

Quarterly deflator

Weighted annual IDEF

Simple average annual IDEF

Case study: Movements of implied price of GDP • The implied gross domestic product (GDP) deflator is the

broadest measure of inflation in the domestic economy • In the UK, the implied price of GDP has increased by 6.4% in

the year to Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2022, while UK CPI has been 10.0% over the same period, as the UK is a net importer of energy goods so these higher UK import prices bring down the change in the implied price of UK GDP.

• Higher import prices of energy and non-energy goods have pushed consumer prices higher over the last year.

• Implied price of GDP is a more appropriate proxy for broader domestic inflationary pressures, so changes in import prices have implications for the implied GDP deflator, particularly at times of large energy price movements or movements in the exchange rate.

Office for National Statistics (ONS), released 8 February 2023, ONS website, article, Measuring price changes of the UK national accounts

8

Case study: Movements of implied price of GDP • The UK is a net energy importer • There has been a lot of focus on price movements

in household consumption, exports and imports over the last year – UK and internationally (comparison to USA on this chart)

We looked at our UK trade gas imports deflator to understand the extent that rising wholesale gas prices was being captured • Changes in prices • Changes in volumes

Office for National Statistics (ONS), released 16 February 2023, ONS website, article, Measuring price changes of the UK national accounts

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

Households Government Gross capital formation

Exports Imports GDP

Pe r c

en t

Contributions to the annual change in implied GDP deflator, Quarter 3 2022

UK USA

9

Single extrapolation vs Double deflation In the UK, early estimates of GVA produced on ‘single extrapolation’

As data is revised with the move to ‘double deflation’ this can lead to some revisions • Captures any change in the level and

composition of production inputs to higher input prices

• Correction of single deflation bias in capturing price change of inputs

10

Conclusion • Importance of understanding changes in the price and volume of goods

and services – direct and indirect effects of higher energy prices • Use of direct volume measures • Improving public understanding of the cost-of-living, and its impacts, has

been a priority for the UK • Dashboard:

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/costofliving/latestinsights

11

  • Impact of high inflation on National Accounts��United Kingdom���Craig McLaren, National Accounts Division, UK�27th April 2023
  • GDP measurement in the UK
  • Deflation approach in the UK
  • Energy example: Large price changes
  • Importance of direct volume measures
  • Case study: Supply-Use and annual deflators
  • Price spike and change in activity can cause simple average deflators to behave erratically
  • Case study: Movements of implied price of GDP
  • Case study: Movements of implied price of GDP
  • Single extrapolation vs Double deflation
  • Conclusion

Impact of Migration on National Accounts: A UK Perspective

Languages and translations
English

1

Economic Commission for Europe Conference of European Statisticians Group of Experts on National Accounts Twenty-second session Geneva, 25-27 April 2023 Item 8 of the provisional agenda Impact of migration on national accounts

Impact of Migration on National Accounts: A UK Perspective

Prepared by the Office for National Statistics of United Kingdom1

Summary

Official statistics come in many shapes and forms. Economic statistics are generally governed by the System of National Accounts (2008), whilst many social statistics are governed by separate manuals and guidance. As we move into a period where migration is increasingly important, alongside other population and demographic trends such as aging and urbanisation, the need to ensure national accounts and other economic measures reflect a modern understanding of these concepts is increasingly vital to ensure statistics remain relevant and reflect society as it is.

The proposal to include labour accounts in the System of National Accounts from 2025 (UN, 2021) provides the opportunity for the economic statistics community to reflect not just on how to best take account of migration in economic data, but also to consider whether economic statistics has a voice which needs to be heard whilst the social statistics community discusses the definition of migration. The question is if it is necessary to consider a wider alignment of definitions across both economic measures of labour and social measures of population.

1 Prepared by Richard Heys, Sonia Carrera, David Freeman, Craig McLaren, and Chris Stickney, ONS UK. This paper is the work of the authors and not necessarily the views of the Office for National Statistics or the UK Government.

United Nations ECE/CES/GE.20/2023/12

Economic and Social Council Distr.: General 6 April 2023 English only

ECE/CES/GE.20/2023/12

I. Migration and the National Accounts

1. Migration across the globe has become a more complicated picture since the Covid- 19 pandemic. Countries were more likely to have international travel restrictions than school closures, restrictions on gatherings or stay at home measures. In the case of the United Kingdom (UK), the pandemic caused enormous volatility in the resident population, which the existing method of population projections (which rely on a stable, predicted growth rate) and weights used in social and economic surveys derived from these estimates were not designed to cope with. In the year to June 2020 UK net migration was 88,000, which rose to 504,00 in year to June 20222. In addition, there were an estimated 137,000 excess deaths in the UK between March 2020 and June 20223. This has resulted in a substantial change in the structure of the UK’s population.

2. The UK is not alone in this experience. Migrants make a huge contribution to economies across the globe. As of 2020 there were an estimated 281 million migrants who live outside the country they were born, comprising 3.6% of the world’s population4. The scale of these numbers and their capacity to stimulate rapid changes in the population of a country highlight the importance of developing more frequent and timely information about this group and how it changes over time, which are reflected in the ongoing transformation of population statistics in many NSIs, including the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS), to make use of more timely data from a range of sources including administrative, commercial, surveys and other sources.

3. Given this, it is imperative, at a time when the national accounts community are considering once-in-a-generation changes to its methods, that national accountants should be taking active account both of this phenomenon and the efforts of population statisticians and demographers to keep pace through changes to their methods and data sources.

4. National Accounts serve two functions: they present a view of the size and composition of the whole economy, and they present a way to perceive the change happening at the innovative frontier. Whilst one can simplify this to understanding stocks and flows, the nature of change in the accounts is of fundamental importance. Growth can occur either through the process of more output being generated by the factors of production within the production boundary, or it can occur by activity, or factors of production moving from outside the production boundary (and therefore out of scope of the national accounts), to moving within the production boundary and hence into scope.

5. Movements across the production boundary (and for capital assets the equivalent asset boundary) can make understanding economic growth inherently more complex. Given that in the UK, as with most other economies, labour inputs are the most important factor of production5 understanding how they change and adapt is vital to understanding whether more is being produced or simply more is being counted. As we observe with an aging population that unpaid work undertaken in the household is now nearly equivalent in value terms, when estimated in the UK Household Satellite Account, to GVA generated from paid employment in the private sector6 the importance of understanding how labour effort is deployed, how it moves across the production boundary, and how we should conceptualise and track its change are increasingly vital. As a commentator at a UK seminar on Beyond GDP7 recently articulated their perception of the national accounts excluding human capital: “Trying to understand the UK economy without taking account of human capital is like trying to understand the Himalayas without taking account of the mountains.”

2 See ONS (2022b) 3 See ONS (2022c) 4 See UN DESA, (2021) 5 ONS (2022a) estimated that the UK's inclusive net worth, including productive assets, environmental assets, human capital, financial assets and financial liabilities was £36.2 trillion in nominal prices in 2020. Environmental assets, as measured in the natural capital accounts, were worth £1.7 trillion, while human capital was worth £23.8 trillion or more than double the value of the traditional non-financial capital stock captured in the national accounts 6 See Bucknall, Christie, Heys, and Taylor (2021) 7 https://www.betterstats.net/november-2022-conference/

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6. Of course, changes in the labour allocated to productive work within the national accounts is not merely a domestic issue: movements of inputs across national boundaries are equally as important as movements of goods and services in terms of international trade. A failure to account for either would fundamentally bias measures of productivity and gross value added. Migration, in so far as it characterises this movement of labour, has to be a primary consideration in ensuring economic statistics are meaningful and accurate. As we move into a period where migration is increasingly important, alongside other population and demographic trends such as aging and urbanisation, the need to ensure national accounts and other economic measures reflect a modern understanding of these concepts is increasingly vital to ensure statistics remain relevant and reflect society as it is.

7. Nevertheless, despite the centrality of this concept, it is not the case that there is universal agreement on how flows of labour between countries should be measured. The Office for National Statistics (ONS), for example, compiles social and economic statistics for the UK which have a perspective on population and migration. The current statistical guidance landscape requires us to produce data on three different bases:

8. Nevertheless, despite the centrality of this concept, it is not the case that there is universal agreement on how flows of labour between countries should be measured. The Office for National Statistics (ONS), for example, compiles social and economic statistics for the UK which have a perspective on population and migration. The current statistical guidance landscape requires us to produce data on three different bases:

9. Population statistics defines a person as a usual resident at their permanent address where they spend most of their time. This usually has a residency requirement, or the intention to reside, for at least twelve months. This includes those who migrate into or out of the UK.

10. ILO labour statistics also capture a domestic resident population, including those who work abroad, and excluding those who reside overseas and work in the domestic economy (e.g. those who cross the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland)

11. National Accounts requires labour statistics which align to the production boundary and therefore capture those who work in the domestic economy, that is excluding those who work abroad, and including those workers who reside overseas (such as those living in the Republic of Ireland and working in the UK).

12. However, this landscape is changing. UN (2021) is a guidance note for the System of National Accounts 2025 which proposes the introduction of labour accounts into the national accounts. Whilst there is currently ambiguity on whether this new account will feature in the core sequence of economic accounts, or simply be a thematic satellite account, the question of how to achieve close consistency and alignment between ILO consistent and national accounts consistent data is clearly of key importance.

13. Many National Statistics Institutes (NSIs) will not have the resources to produce two sets of labour data on different bases and even if they are, previous experience in the UK suggests that users find such a model complex and challenging to interpret. Indeed, the availability of two labour series potentially showing different growth paths opens the door to less scrupulous politicians and commentators to ‘cherry-pick’ on a monthly basis whichever metric best fits the political narrative they wish to communicate. Runge and Hudson-Sharp (2020) identified that: ‘…large parts of the UK public have misperceptions about how economic figures, such as the unemployment and inflation rate, are collected and measured, and who they are produced and published by. This sometimes-affected participants’ subsequent views of the perceived accuracy and reliability of economic statistics.’

14. Within this work they identified that labour statistics were viewed by the UK population with a particular dubiousness, driven by historic political decisions to change the definitions underpinning labour market measures, such as the employment rate, which led many to view that these data were subject to political interference rather than produced by the independent NSI. This was mildly exacerbated by the UK previously giving greater prominence to both national accounts and ILO consistent series. Today the UK headlines its

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ILO consistent measures and publishes its national accounts consistent series within its productivity publications, where they are generally only accessed by ‘expert users’.

15. Clearly, clear transition tables between the new national accounts labour account and the ILO metrics will be key to attempting to circumnavigate such issues, whilst as a community we will also need to carefully consider the public presentation of such data, including which measures to prioritise as headline measures for the public.

16. However, simply ensuring consistency between ILO and national accounts measures is insufficient in a world where the definition of migration within population statistics is also under review. The current debate around the definition of migration emerges from a UN review of conceptual frameworks and concepts and definitions on international migration in 2021. Where previously definitions were rigid about length of stay and who to include, the upcoming amendments (UN (2021a)) to the 1998 Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration support the need to align statistical institutes’ measurement of resident populations.

17. The opportunity to consider whether wider alignment is possible is clearly open to the economic statistics community at present. In particular, is there merit in considering a wider alignment of definitions across both economic measures of labour and social measures of population?

18. This paper will consider these questions as follows. Sections two to four will provide headline detail on how each measure is estimated. Section five will comment on the conceptual alignment, or lack thereof of these three measures and section six will present some of the challenges this presents, particularly around survey design and data collection, the necessity of being able to access data from other countries whose residents work in the domestic economy and make proposals for how countries can co-operate to resolve these.

II. Population Statistics – their definition and scope

19. Population statistics are essential in underpinning nearly all social and economic statistics. Accurate population counts are important in their own right for planning services and developing policies. Equally they form the basis, or the denominator, of detailed statistics from vaccine rollout to GDP per head and to the UN 2030 agenda for sustainable development.

20. International guidance on population statistics is governed by ‘UN Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses’, 2017. They make clear the need to measure a “usually resident population” which requires a threshold of 12 months when considering place of usual residence according to one of the following two criteria:

(i) The place at which the person has lived continuously for most of the last 12 months (that is, for at least six months and one day), not including temporary absences for holidays or work assignments, or intends to live for at least six months;

(ii) The place at which the person has lived continuously for at least the last 12 months, not including temporary absences for holidays or work assignments, or intends to live for at least 12 months.

21. Similarly, the UN Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, 1998, records an international migrant as someone who changes their country of usual residence8 similarly suggesting a period of 12 months.

22. There is a reasonable argument for a ‘usual’ resident population. Having an accurate distribution of the population supports long-term planning, particularly in small geographic areas to avoid short term volatility. This is also important for projecting future population estimates and is crucial for producing high quality sampling frames for surveys which draw on population or households, such as the Labour Force Survey.

8 See paragraph 32 in particular

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23. On the other hand, the rise of global mobility has changed the way countries need to provide services. A usual resident population doesn’t consider those who live in a country for shorter periods but still needs access to schools, hospitals and other public services, and might be engaged in meaningful employment. The Final Report on Conceptual frameworks and Concepts and Definitions on International Migration, April 2021, calls on a need for a “present population” comprised of both the resident population and a temporary population component. The temporary population can make a significant contribution to both the economy and society and attributing this contribution to the usually resident population (often the denominator) misrepresents the reality.

24. A final question is whether data can meet the challenge of alternative population bases. Historical estimates of long-term international migration in the UK using the International Passenger Survey measured a person’s intention at the point of arrival rather than actual observed migration. ONS (2019) presents evidence people can change their intentions after entering or leaving the port facilities (both air and sea) where the survey takes place. Administrative data allows for the measurement of actual observed migrations. There are limitations with this too, however. For example, electoral roll data can provide insights on those populations who have a right to vote in certain elections (in the UK this eligibility can vary across local and national elections) given the caveat that registration is voluntary and so only those who apply to vote are captured, resulting in obvious biases (see, for example, de Coulon et al (2020)). Similarly accounting for a shorter period of migration using methods of “interactions” with administrative data risks wider reasons other than migration being the cause for why such interactions may stop, presenting an obvious potential bias.

25. However, the risks are greater with the continuation of an intentions-based survey which would fail to properly address the changes to migration behaviours following the recent shocks of the pandemic and exiting the EU. Using administrative data will allow for quick changes to policy that may affect migration. Given travellers intentions may subsequently change, their behaviour in the administrative data will generally capture this.

III. International Labour Organisation employment statistics – their definition and scope

26. The number of people in employment in the UK is estimated in line with international standards and definitions laid down by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), This measure consists of people aged 16 years and over who did one hour or more of paid work per week plus those who had a job that they were temporarily away from (for example, because they were on holiday or off sick).

27. The measure of employment, and related measures of unemployment and inactivity, alongside estimates of jobs are measured in line with many other developed economies, through a sample survey of households labelled the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS adheres to international standards and can be readily compared with equivalent surveys in other countries. The LFS is dependent on UK population statistics through the population weights which are applied to its sample which are derived from the decennial census of population undertaken in every year concluding with a 1. This dataset has been collected in the UK continuously save the Second World War since 1841. This measure consists of people aged 16 years and over who did one hour or more of paid work per week and those who had a job that they were temporarily away from (for example, because they were on holiday or off sick).

28. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines migrant workers (ILO (2018)) as someone in employment who has changed their country of usual residence. The information can be measured in two ways by looking at the recorded nationality or country of birth.

29. The main source for measuring migrant workers is through labour force surveys of households. However, there are some measurement issues to be considered when the data is confronted with national accounts data:

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• Labour force surveys often exclude communal establishments, and so will miss

some migrant workers. Communal settings, such as barracks and hospitals can obviously also capture domestic workers, but there is evidence that migrant workers can be disproportionately represented in certain types of households in rented and multiple occupation. As a result of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, the contact method for the LFS had to change from face-to-face interviewing to telephone-based. This change had an impact on the non-response bias of the survey, particularly for housing tenure with lower response rate for rented accommodations. This impacted on the estimates of non-UK born residents, who are more likely to live in rented accommodations. ONS (2020) explains how this was mitigated through adding a housing tenure variable into the LFS weighting methodology.

• Looking just at people in usual residence will miss those employed who have been in the country for fewer than six months. This can particularly affect those in seasonal employment. In the UK, there exists colloquial and media evidence that this can be disproportionately biased towards certain industrial sectors, such as agriculture, and sometimes particular sectors in particular geographies9.

• Household surveys can pick up people who are resident in one country but work in another. (This could be due to commuting across a border or working remotely.) Clearly this can cause ILO labour metrics to come out of alignment with the national accounts production boundary which focuses on domestic production and the inputs which feed into this.

• People can change their nationality, both whilst abroad and whilst resident in the domestic economy.

• Finally, there can be significant differences between an individual self-reporting their sector of employment and the industry which they would align to within the national accounts. A simple example is a van driver who works for a chain of shops. Whilst they may self-identify as being in the logistics industry their employer would be categorised within the retail sector. This challenge is addressed in the next section.

IV. National Accounts consistent labour statistics – their definition and scope

30. Chapter 19, ‘Population and Labour Inputs’ of the present System of National Accounts (UN (2008))10, provides the definitions of relevance to this paper. It defines the population in general terms11 as ‘all those persons who are usually resident in the country…. that is persons are resident in the country where they have the strongest links thereby establishing a centre of predominant economic interest. Generally, the criterion would be based on their country of residence for one year or more.’ This clearly is a definition with a direct antecedent in those used in population statistics, Para 19.11 caveats this by noting two particular groups– ‘usual residents who are living abroad for less than one year are included in the population but foreign visitors (for example, holidaymakers) who are in the country for less than one year are excluded from the measured population’. Clearly the first group are an erroneous inclusion from the perspective of alignment to the production boundary if their employment is not captured within the domestic economy, whereas the second group is correctly excluded from a production perspective but are clearly of importance in terms of tourism and trade statistics.

31. The SNA also outlines how the national accounts uses labour estimates:

19.5 Clearly, if a ratio is to be formed between measures of output and labour input, the concept of labour used must match the coverage of production in the SNA. The relevant standards … confirms that the economically active population is defined in

9 See, for example: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36258541 10 The Balance of Payments Manual aligns on the following definitions 11 Para 19.10

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terms of individuals willing to supply labour to undertake an activity included in the SNA production boundary12. 19.6 Not everyone who is economically active works for a resident institutional unit. It is therefore particularly important that the concept of residence underlying the population estimates be consistent with that for labour force estimates and that the residence of individuals included in employment estimates are consistent with the criterion of resident institutional unit in the SNA.

32. How to tackle the question of those who are in active employment with less than twelve months residency is addressed as follows:

19.18 Because the labour force is defined with reference to a short period13, the number of persons in the labour force at any time may be smaller than the economically active population. For example, seasonal workers may be included in the economically active population but not in the labour force at certain times of year.

33. As such, National Accounts looks to capture all labour involved in production, irrespective of length of tenure in the domestic economy, whilst also trying to align on the fundamental definition of the population for GDP per head type metrics.

34. The exact practice which countries use to calculate the national accounts consistent data can vary, as mapped by Ward et al (2018):

‘In most countries, labour force surveys (LFS) form a primary source of information for employment related statistics, such as persons employed, employees and hours worked. However, because the coverage of LFS does not fully align with the coverage of activities used to estimate GDP, additional adjustments relying on complementary sources, such as administrative or business statistics, are often applied to bridge conceptual differences, and in many countries, the use of these sources is often preferred to LFS data. Evidence from the 2018 OECD/Eurostat national accounts labour input survey shows that the adjustments made to align measures of labour input with the corresponding measures of production according to the domestic concept, vary considerably across countries, with many countries making no adjustments, in particular, for the measurement of hours worked.’

35. In essence countries can use three alternative methods to source the required data:

• Household surveys, such as the Labour Force Surveys

• Other surveys of employment, generally business surveys. In the UK these include: ­ The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), carried out in April each

year, is the most comprehensive source of information on the structure and distribution of earnings in the UK. ASHE provides information about the levels, distribution and make-up of earnings and paid hours worked for employees in all industries and occupations14.

­ The Short-Term Employment Surveys (STES). STES is a group of surveys that collect employment and turnover information from private sector businesses. In December of each year, the jobs estimates are "benchmarked" to the latest estimates from the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES).

­ the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) captures employee and employment estimates at detailed geographical and industrial levels and is regarded as the official source of employee and employment estimates by detailed geography and industry15.

• Administrative sources

12 Bold text as contained in UN (2008). It should be noted that paras 19.17, 19.19 and 19.20 all replicate some version of this definition from slightly different perspectives 13 Noted as ‘usually a week’ in para 19.17 14 For more detail see https://www.ons.gov.uk/surveys/informationforbusinesses/businesssurveys/annualsurveyofhoursandearningsashe 15 For more detail see https://www.ons.gov.uk/surveys/informationforbusinesses/businesssurveys/businessregisterandemploymentsurvey

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­ Real-Time Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE RTI) Tax administrative data provides a

count of workers on employer payrolls that feed information into the tax system. This covers the vast majority of employees and can provide counts and earnings information by geographical area and can be matched with data that provide nationality information.

­ Other tax and benefits administrative data, for example from Self-Assessment tax returns, can provide a count of self-employed workers that feed information into the tax system, similarly to PAYE RTI.

36. As Ward et al note specific adjustments are generally required to be made to a) achieve conceptual alignment with the production boundary and b) address known biases in the data, in a fashion tailored to the limitations of the particular data source used.

A. Conceptual Adjustments 37. Broadly four types of conceptual adjustment are required to align with national accounts requirements if one begins with household survey data, such as the LFS:

• Territoriality – the issues of cross-border work have to be adjusted for in a household survey, whereas a business survey, which only covers domestic businesses does not face the same biases.

• Seasonal work adjustments where the population weights which are used to derive whole economy estimates are generated from a population estimate which fails to take account of short-term economic migration, which we have already observed is of more significance in particular industries. As with the other issues described in this section, the effect here is to bias the geographical or industrial distribution of potentially both estimates of output and productivity.

• Alignment with industry groupings. As Ward et al describe the challenge – ‘industry coding is often conducted on the basis of information given by the respondent about the type of product, service or function provided by his/her place of work, which may not align with the industry coding of that firm in the business register, and hence national accounts (although in some countries this alignment is improved by matching respondents information, such as the name and address of the firm with equivalent information on the business register)’. In the UK, LFS data is reweighted using the STES to address this distributional issue, which would otherwise serve to bias measures of productivity derived from the national accounts.

• Coverage – Ward et al (2018) note that ‘the LFS does not cover some groups of the population such as persons below or above certain age thresholds (which varies by country), those living and working in communal establishments (such as prisons or long-term care facilities), collective households (such as religious institutions) and the armed forces, all of whose output is included, at least in theory, in estimates of GDP.’

38. When administrative data or business surveys are used, alternative adjustments are required. This is specifically to convert the number of hours worked from usual or contracted hours to actual hours worked. This can be sufficient to bias productivity estimates directly or, if FTE numbers of staff in particular occupation classifications are used to derived estimates of output for particular products or assets (see for example own-account software and database assets), through biasing both the numerator and the denominator in productivity calculations.

B. Bias Adjustments 39. Of more general concern are the issues relating to LFS biases, specifically those which affect measures of actual hours worked. As Ward et al (2018) identify these can be significant, either due to cultural issues of deliberate mis-reporting (certain professions / societies over-report hours as an issue of personal pride), error (where self-declared actual hours cannot be replicated from self-declared ‘usual hours’ plus over-times minus absences of all types), or methods issues (rolling forward hours worked for survey respondents who are absent for a month who may be on leave can lead to over-estimation of key variables. These biases can all be expected to be relatively consistent through time.

40. Other biases which may be inconsistent through time result from periods of relatively high (or low) immigration or emigration of labour, specifically during the period up to twelve

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months of residency point where such individuals start to be included in population measures and hence LFS weights. In addition, survey weights, which often use projections, can be subject to time lags: changes in migration patterns can take a number of years to be reflected in survey weights. The UK method for adjusting weights in the Labour Force Survey, for example, requires updated annual population estimates, followed by biennial population projections, and finally new survey weights.

41. Administrative or business surveys of employment are less likely to suffer from such issues as it can be relatively safely assumed the survey respondent will be doing so from a staff list or wage report and are unlikely to differentiate in their report between those who have met the twelve-month residency threshold.

V. Conceptual alignment

42. As can be seen above, the two key issues relating to migration, taken at its widest to mean any movement of labour across borders, and those captured within the measurement of the economy are: a) around those in paid employment with fewer than twelve months tenure, and b) those who work in the domestic economy and live overseas or vice versa, as demonstrated in the following table:

Table1: Conceptual alignment of the three metrics

Those living overseas and working in the domestic economy16

Those working in the domestic economy, but fewer than twelve months residency

Those working in the domestic economy, and more than twelve months residency

Population Statistics

Excluded Excluded Included

ILO Labour Measures

Excluded Included conceptually, but excluded in the weights as these come from population statistics

Included

National Accounts

Included Included conceptually, but excluded in the weights as these come from population statistics

Included

43. Being able to have the clarity on where these differences lie allow us to then consider where these may lead to our metrics behaving differently as patterns of migration change. This aspect of change is vital to consider, as with many economic statistics this can wash through to different challenges in terms of levels and growth rates:

• In normal times, if rates of migration or cross-border working remain relatively consistent across time periods then the growth rates should not be significantly biased, although the stock level may be more subject to bias.

• However, in circumstances when migration trends change this can result in three problems:

• Faster growth in net migration, where these individuals are allowed to work, will result in national accounts capturing faster GVA growth in the first year whilst not observing labour inputs growth. This results in accelerated growth in GDP per head and labour productivity measures.

• Wider discrepancies in dis-aggregations, both of industry and geography if migration relatively greater affects some industries and regions than others, which can distort the appearance of where the drivers of growth can be observed.

• If migration also has a greater or lesser impact than average on particular occupation classifications which are used for cost of production type estimates, such as for intangible capital investment (e.g. software and databases) this could distort

16 Those living domestically and working overseas are obviously included in Population Statistics and ILO measures, but excluded from National Accounts

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perceptions of investment rates and again the drivers of growth in the national accounts.

• The impact will also be dependent on the relative size of the sector of the economy.

VI. Simple example of potential impact

44. It is possible to illustrate the impact of these challenges using the agricultural industry, which is one of those who are relatively intense users of migrant labour for short-term, often seasonal roles, particularly during the harvest season in late summer / early autumn. If one was to incorporate these seasonal workers in population estimates the following impacts could be observed:

• The population weights for this industry would be increased in the Labour Force Survey.

• Seasonal statistical adjustments applied to the Labour Force Survey would be applied. This would have the effect of spreading this workforce throughout the year. Overall number of workers and hours worked would however be affected

• National Accounts data on gross value added would remain unchanged, but where this is already seasonally adjusted the relationship over the year between employment should improve in accuracy. Growth rates should be relatively unaffected.

• Labour productivity measures which conflict gross value-added and measures of hours worked or workers would fall recognising the increase in the total number of employees and hours worked, more accurately capturing the true position. The present model where the same output is shared amongst the resident workforce naturally exaggerates their productivity levels, although again, if the number of seasonal workers remains constant over the years, annual growth rates will be relatively unaffected.

VII. Conclusions

45. Whatever the issues affecting economic measurement, it is important to be aware that this is not a conversation which occurs in isolation of wider challenges. Waiting twelve months to confirm usual residency, in addition to collecting and processing data, creates an inevitable time lag, which reduces the timeliness of population and migration statistics. This is an issue of increased salience for many statistical systems and political debate, and clearly has the ability to impact economic statistics.

46. The issues around the conceptual alignment between the three treatments described above indicate clearly that economic measures can be differentially affected both when migration patterns change, but could also shift if one or more of the three definitions of population and migration statistics methods are revised. This leads us to twin questions: 1) whether these conceptual differences aide or hinder the production of statistics and their improvement, and 2) if it does aide, are new data sources or methods available to permit us to consider viable alternatives?

47. In a fast moving, modern, digital economy, where data is becoming more readily available in ever-increasing quantities, the prospect of moving to a system where issues of population and migration do not need to wait for the twelve-month threshold, and can be measured within a shorter period obviously present themselves as increasingly feasible options. Where these may better align to user need, whether this concerns students, seasonal workers, cross-border workers or other groups, or may reduce mis-alignment between measures this should clearly be explored in greater depth to ensure we reach an end-state which is optimal for all users of these data. Noting any revised definition of migration would need to meet the needs of a variety of population and migration statistics and above all be coherent between stocks and flows, it would also be the case that economic measurement would need to consider the potential for any such change to impact key measures of GVA, investment, GDP per head and productivity measures, as well as human capital and education satellite accounts.

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48. As national statistics institutes continue to improve on the timeliness and quality of their population statistics, many looking to replace a decennial census, now is the opportunity to ensure the entire statistical system benefits from this. Users may no longer have the appetite to tolerate a large time lag in estimating a usual resident population that doesn’t reflect the entire population who still contribute to the economy and society.

49. To move this debate forward, it is clearly vital to understand the current debate within population statistics. The agenda at the 54th UNSC (see UN(2023a)) will consider the role of temporary mobility and its importance to economy and society. Having greater recognition and clear conceptual framework of this group enables wider possibilities of how international statistical institutes integrate these into future economic and social statistics. Much like the System of National Accounts, a new System of Population and Social Accounts/Statistics could give greater clarity to definitions and their use. In addition, the recent creation of a Friends of Chair Social and Demographic Statistics (see, UN(2023b)) can help accelerate progress on horizontal integration across social, economic and environmental statistics - and closer alignment.

50. However, even once we understand this debate, the next step has to be for the economic measurement community to consider how far do we want to align economic measures, how we wish to use population statistics in the future and whether wider alignment would allow users to transition across these datasets in a way which is more intelligible to the general public and relates better to their lived experience.

51. The current debate around including Labour Accounts into the updated SNA 2025 is the perfect opportunity to consider these points and to reflect on whether as a community we have sufficiently tackled this vital question. However, the draft annotated chapter outline circulated in December 2022 on Labour Accounts, did not mention the word ‘migration’, despite for many users and members of the public migration is a fundamental economic question, in terms of the impact on labour markets, but also their wider net contribution to society, if only through taxes and use of public services. Ensuring we tackle this question means we need to consider three fundamental questions:

• Does our reliance on population statistics on a different basis affect the validity of our data?

• Does our current data reflect real experience if we exclude migrants with fewer than twelve month’s residence?

• How should we consider inflows and outflows of human capital / education output, if we wish to consider the issue from a stocks perspective?

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ONS (2022b) ‘Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending June 2022’. Available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internatio nalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingjune2022

ONS (2022c) ‘Excess deaths in England and Wales: March 2020 to June 2022’. Available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/a rticles/excessdeathsinenglandandwalesmarch2020tojune2022/2022-09-20

Runge, J., and Hudson-Sharp, N. (2020) ‘Public Understanding of Economics and Economic Statistics’ (ESCoE Occasional Paper 03). Available at https://www.escoe.ac.uk/publications/public-understanding-of-economics-and-economic- statistics/

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), (2021) ‘International Migrant Stock 2020’. New York. Available at www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock

UN (1998) ‘1998 Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration Revision 1’. Available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_58rev1e.pdf

UN (2008): ‘System of National Accounts’. Available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/sna2008.pdf

UN (2017) ‘UN Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses’. Available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesM/Series_M67rev3en.pdf

UN (2021): ‘WS.4 Labour, Human Capital and Education’. Available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/RAconsultation.asp?cID=12

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UN(2021a): ‘The Final Report on Conceptual frameworks and Concepts and Definitions on International Migration, April 2021’ Available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic- social/migration-expert-group/task-forces/TF2-ConceptualFramework-Final.pdf

UN(2023a): ‘Report of the UN Expert Group on Migration Statistics on Indicators for

international migration and temporary mobility’. Available at https://unstats.un.org/UNSDWebsite/statcom/session_54/documents/BG-3b-EGMS-E.pdf

UN(2023b): 'Terms of Reference of the Friends of the Chair Group on Social and Demographic Statistics’. Available at https://unstats.un.org/UNSDWebsite/statcom/session_54/documents/BG-3b- ToR_FoC_Social-E.pdf

Ward, A., Zinni, M.B., Marianna, P., (2018) ‘International productivity gaps: Are labour input measures comparable?’ Available at: https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=SDD/DOC(2018) 12&docLanguage=En

  • Group of Experts on National Accounts
  • Twenty-second session
  • Impact of Migration on National Accounts: A UK Perspective
    • Prepared by the Office for National Statistics of United Kingdom0F
  • I. Migration and the National Accounts
  • II. Population Statistics – their definition and scope
  • III. International Labour Organisation employment statistics – their definition and scope
  • IV. National Accounts consistent labour statistics – their definition and scope
  • V. Conceptual alignment
  • VI. Simple example of potential impact
  • VII. Conclusions
  • Bibliography

Publication and analysis of real-time indicators in the United Kingdom context

Languages and translations
English

Economic Commission for Europe Conference of European Statisticians Group of Experts on National Accounts Twenty-second session Geneva, 25-27 April 2023 Item 7 of the provisional agenda Real-time indicators and nowcasting

Publication and analysis of real-time indicators in the United Kingdom context

Prepared by the Office for National Statistics, United Kingdom1

Summary The Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the United Kingdom (UK) publishes a

weekly real-time economic indicator suite, including datasets from government and commercial sources such as real-time spending data from the Bank of England's clearing system, traffic camera counts, flight data, shipping data, job advert indices, and gas prices. In this paper, we discuss challenges and opportunities in understanding and meeting user needs, data acquisition, developing partnerships with suppliers, and rotating our suite of indicators for high-pressure production. We also highlight how we use real-time data in the quality assurance of the UK National Accounts.

1 Prepared by Craig McLaren, Andrew Walton, Tom Williams, Bethan West, and Charlie Harland.

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I. Introduction

1. The quest for faster and more accurate economic indicators has long been a pursuit of policymakers and economic researchers.

2. In 2019, the ONS Data Science Campus took on this challenge through the ‘Faster Indicators of UK Economic Activity’ project. The project had ambitious aims, which were to identify close-to-real-time big data and administrative datasets that represented useful economic concepts, create a set of indicators that allowed early identification of significant economic changes, and provide insight into economic activity at a level of timeliness and granularity not possible with official economic statistics.

3. To achieve these objectives, the project explored three data sources: 1) HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) Value Added Tax (VAT) returns, 2) ship tracking data from automated identification systems (AIS), and 3) road traffic sensor data for England. The research findings revealed that VAT returns could provide a useful early indication of the direction of the economy, ship tracking data gave an early indication of trade, and road traffic sensor data provided insights into any logistics issues around the major ports of the UK. The ONS released these data on a regular basis throughout 2019, with VAT, road sensor and ship tracking data released monthly.

4. However, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 created an urgent need for more timely data to monitor the effects of the pandemic across a much wider range of activity in the economy and society. To meet this need, the ONS created a new fortnightly business survey called the Business Impact of Coronavirus Survey (BICS), and the existing Opinions and Lifestyle survey (OPN) shifted from monthly to weekly data collection. The results from these surveys were published as specific releases, and the headlines from each were included in the Faster Indicators release to bring related and real-time information together.

5. Over the next three years, the real-time project has continued to evolve and adapt to respond to other challenges being experienced in society and the economy. For example, there was a policy focus on the supply chain of products and goods to businesses and the cost-of-living crisis. The fortnightly BICS was adapted to encompass wider issues facing companies, and its name was changed to the Business Impacts and Conditions Survey2 (currently at Wave 78 as of March 2023).

6. Today, there is a large suite of real-time indicators, covering various areas such as business insights and workforce, consumer behaviour, transport, and energy. These indicators rotate in and out of publication according to policy need. In 2022, the name of the release was changed to Real-time Indicators to align with international terminology.

II. Meeting user needs

A. Introduction

7. Real-time information can be incredibly useful for policy makers in assessing the current state of the economy and making informed decisions.

8. In the UK, the Bank of England is one such policy user that relies on real-time data to monitor the economy and make decisions on monetary policy. Other policy users may include government departments responsible for economic policy and forecasting, as well as private sector firms that need to make strategic decisions based on economic trends.

9. Acquiring real-time data can be a complex process that involves working in partnership with data suppliers. In some cases, this may involve developing new data collection methods or tools that can provide real-time information. It may also involve negotiating with data suppliers to gain access to their data in real-time. To ensure that the

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https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/businessservices/bulletins/businessinsight sandimpactontheukeconomy/latest

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data is accurate and reliable, it is important to work closely with data suppliers to establish clear data quality standards and to regularly monitor the data for any anomalies or errors.

10. Opportunities to work with data suppliers and develop real-time indicators can arise quickly, but it can be more difficult to establish partnerships with different data sources. For example, some data sources may be more difficult to work with due to legal or regulatory constraints, or because of concerns around data privacy and security. Nonetheless, it is important to remain vigilant and to explore all possible partnerships in order to develop the most comprehensive real-time indicators possible.

11. One of the key benefits of working across public and private companies is that it can lead to more comprehensive and accurate real-time indicators. Public sector organisations, such as government departments, often have access to data that is not available to private sector firms, such as data on tax receipts or public spending. Conversely, private sector firms may have access to proprietary data that can provide unique insights into economic activity. By working together and sharing data, both public and private sector organizations can develop a more complete picture of the economy, which can be useful for policy makers and private sector decision-makers alike.

B. Case study 1: Example of how we worked in partnership with the Bank of England

12. The Bank of England (BoE) monitors daily CHAPS (Clearing House Automated Payments System) payments made by credit and debit card payment processors to approximately 100 major UK retail corporations. This dataset is considered a reliable indicator of consumer spending in supermarkets and large stores, especially during the pandemic when cash transactions decreased, and card payments became more prevalent. To ensure accurate and appropriate use of the data, ONS collaborated with BoE to establish protocols for data delivery. Aggregated data, rather than unit level data, were provided to ONS, and BoE reviewed and approved the final commentary and wording used in the ONS release. BoE also supplied a comprehensive background document3 on the methodology to help users understand the strengths and limitations of the data.

13. The CHAPS data are now published weekly and include daily indices by five spending categories: aggregate, delayable, social, staple, and work-related. These indices are indexed to February 2020 as a pre-pandemic baseline and presented as a seven-day rolling average to smooth out volatility around weekends. Additionally, a monthly indicator is produced and used to track the official monthly ONS Retail Sales Index. However, it is important to note that the data has limitations, such as the lack of seasonal adjustment and the impact of inflation, which is not removed from current prices. These limitations can result in a large increase in spending at the end of each month and around bank holidays. As the indicators continue to develop, efforts will be made to address these limitations, such as adding elements of seasonal adjustment and deflation where possible.

C. Case study 2: Example of how we worked in partnership with private providers

14. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in significant restrictions on travel, particularly international air travel. As a result, there was a need to monitor flights entering and leaving the UK for statistical purposes, both during and after the implementation of restrictions. To this end, ONS identified a freely available source of daily flight figures from EUROCONTROL, a pan-European, civil-military organization that supports European aviation. EUROCONTROL's Aviation Intelligence and Performance Review Unit provides independent collection and validation of air navigation services performance-related data and intelligence gathering. ONS collaborated with EUROCONTROL to republish daily flight numbers for the UK, alongside other countries, from their dashboard, with added

3 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/payment-and-settlement/chaps-faster-indicator

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commentary and comparisons to pre-pandemic levels to ensure the data was relevant to UK users.

15. However, the flights data from EUROCONTROL have some limitations. They include international arrivals and departures to and from the UK (including crown dependencies) and domestic UK flights but exclude overflights (flights that pass over UK territory). Additionally, the dataset captures all flight movements that operate under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), including commercial flights carrying passengers and cargo, as well as non-commercial flights such as private and military flights. Finally, the data from EUROCONTROL do not include information on the volume of passengers or cargo carried on UK flights, which is important to understand, especially in the context of the pandemic, where flights might not be operating at full capacity or could be empty.

16. To address these issues, ONS decided to also publish data on air passenger numbers at Heathrow airport from the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) monthly bulletin4. The CAA is the statutory corporation responsible for overseeing and regulating all aspects of civil aviation in the UK. Most UK airports5 report the number of passengers arriving and departing to the CAA, but ONS focused on Heathrow data as it is routinely available earlier in the collection cycle than the full dataset of all airports and represents almost a third of all UK air passengers. This indicator includes only passengers on commercial airlines on passenger- only or combined passenger and cargo flights.

17. By using these two datasets, ONS has been able to build a comprehensive picture of the airline industry in the UK, tracking changes in flights and passenger numbers over time.

III. Current status of our suite of real-time indicators

18. As we have moved into the post-COVID-19 world, the weekly publication has adapted to provide insights into emerging economic and social trends within the UK. This has resulted in the continued expansion to the published suite of indicators, but also the continuous review of our users' needs in terms of each indicators frequency of publication.

19. Our suite of real-time indicators is actively monitored to ensure continued relevance to users. Table 1 shows the full list of real-time indicators we have available. These are published according to different scheduling, reflecting the frequency of the indicator and the demand.

20. Our indicators are grouped into 4 key themes: 1) Business insights and workforce; 2) Transport; 3) Consumer behaviour; 4) and Housing and Energy.

4 https://www.caa.co.uk/ 5 https://www.caa.co.uk/data-and-analysis/uk-aviation-market/airports/uk-airport-data/

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Table 1 Summary of the UK real-time indicators grouped by four main themes

Indicator Source Frequency Description

Business insights and workforce Online job adverts Adzuna Weekly Experimental online job advert indices

covering the UK job market, using a snapshot of data from job advert aggregating website Adzuna

Redundancies Insolvency services Weekly Advanced notification of potential redundancies from HR1 forms submitted by employers to the Insolvency Service's Redundancy Payments Service

Company incorporations, voluntary dissolutions, and compulsory dissolutions

Companies House Weekly Data for company incorporations, voluntary dissolutions, and compulsory dissolution first gazettes in the UK

Data on sales and jobs in small businesses

Xero Monthly This is used to provide data on both sales and jobs in these small businesses. Sales are measured based on the face value of invoices issued by firms within each month (including via apps attached to the Xero account). Jobs are measured by the number of unique employees of a business who are issued a payslip in a month.

VAT new businesses and business turnover

HMRC Monthly Value Added Tax (VAT) diffusion indexes and new VAT reporters. Diffusion indices show changes in business turnover (total value of all sales and other outputs excluding VAT) and expenditure (total value of purchases and all other inputs excluding VAT) for both quarter- on-quarter and month-on-month.

Online job adverts Adzuna Weekly Experimental online job advert indices covering the UK job market, using a snapshot of data from job advert aggregating website Adzuna

Transport UK flights EUROCONTROL Weekly Daily flights data comprising international

arrivals and departures to and from the UK (including Crown dependencies) and domestic UK flights, but excluding overflights (flights that pass over UK territory)

Traffic camera activity Regional LG bodies Weekly Daily traffic camera counts data for mobility indices covering the UK developed by ONS Data Science Campus (DSC)

Shipping visits exactEarth Weekly Weekly and daily shipping data using the UN Global Platform and developed by DSC

Flights passenger number Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)

Monthly Air passenger numbers from Heathrow, only passengers on commercial airlines (on passenger only or combined passenger and cargo flights) are included in this indicator

Road traffic in Great Britain Department for Transport

Monthly The data is based on around 275 automatic traffic count sites across Great Britain. The samples of automatic traffic counters are stratified by area, road classification, and road management and have been designed to be representative of national traffic

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Indicator Source Frequency Description

Consumer behaviour CHAPS spending on credit and debit cards

Bank of England Weekly / Monthly

Weekly and monthly CHAPS payments made by credit and debit card payment processors to around 100 major UK retail corporates

Revolut card spending Revolut Weekly Card spend data from Revolut, a financial technology company with around 4.8 million users in the UK

Demand for fuel per transaction VISA/BEIS Weekly Estimated quantity of automotive fuel demand per average transaction used to isolate real demand after adjusting for growth in fuel prices. This indicator captures how consumer demand for fuel changes in response to rising fuel prices per visit at pumps over time.

Retail footfall Springboard Weekly Daily indices include footfall within three main types of retail destination – high streets, shopping centres and retail parks

Weekly transactional data for Pret A Manger

Pret A Manger Weekly Weekly transactional data, comparing weekly in-store transactions against the average level of the first four weeks of 2020. Used to give early indications of UK mobility and commuting trends.

Housing and energy Energy Performance Certificate lodgements

MHCLG Weekly Data for new and existing dwellings in England and Wales, used to give early insights into the UK housing market.

System Average Price of gas National Grid Weekly Daily and weekly changes in gas prices, using the system average price (SAP)

System Price of electricity Elexon Weekly Daily average of the half-hourly system prices and averaged again over the preceding seven days to bring out the trends and smooth volatility.

IV. Weekly production approach

A. Introduction

21. Producing weekly real-time statistics comes with the challenge of working to tight deadlines. The team receives data throughout Monday and Tuesday each week, which is then processed and formatted to allow for the publication of datasets and analysis by 9:30am each Thursday. Table 2 provides a high-level overview of the weekly schedule.

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Table 2 High level summary of the weekly production schedule

Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday

AM Selection and confirmation of the indicators for this week.

Processing the chosen indicators through statistical pipelines; and quality assurance of indicators

Internal Stakeholders feedback on draft reviewed and addressed. Additional checks with data suppliers to ensure they are happy with content. Quality assurance. Submit to internal Publishing Team

Bulletin published at 9:30am. Review live publication and answer any media and user queries.

Team administration day

PM Processing the chosen indicators through statistical pipelines; and quality assurance of indicators

Send written sections to data suppliers and stakeholders. Prepare data for charts and dashboards. Draft circulated to internal stakeholders for comment and feedback.

Further changes and quality assurance are made via our preview site. Final proofread made by the team and senior sign-off.

Weekly wash-up and review with entire team

Team administration day

22. Each indicator listed in Table 1 is assigned to a member of the production team who takes the lead on receiving the data, processing it through the pipeline, and creating or updating any accompanying outputs. The data is received by ONS through secure email or open-source platforms provided by the supplier. Most indicators can be processed through internally developed automated scripts such as Python or R, which will be further explained in section 3.1.

23. After the data processing is completed, another team member is assigned to quality assure all elements of the indicator and provide feedback. Once both team members are satisfied with the accuracy and quality of the outputs, it is reviewed and signed off by the head of the team. Some indicators are sent out to the data supplier for comments and feedback prior to Thursday's release.

24. At the close of play each Tuesday, the draft publication is shared internally with key stakeholders to allow for feedback, which is then incorporated by lunchtime on Wednesday. Wednesday morning is utilized for another round of quality assurance on all outputs, which are proofread internally by ONS's publication team. Final quality assurance checks are completed Wednesday afternoon, and the publication and its outputs are reviewed by the nominated senior sign-off officer, who approves the release for publication.

25. Overall, the production team consists of 11 full-time equivalent (FTE) staff members, including five staff members (FTE) who facilitate the weekly round and a development team of four people (FTE). An additional staff member works between the two teams to enable the branch to respond to emerging challenges and shifting priorities. Both teams are overseen by a head of the branch to ensure smooth running of the entire Real-time indicators team. The development team has been instrumental in creating and improving automated data processing systems, which allows for large quantities of outputs to be produced quickly and accurately. Without these developments, ONS would not be able to continue expanding its suite of real-time indicators without an unsustainable investment of resources.

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26. The real-time indicators team has a diverse set of skills and experiences, ranging from data scientists, statistical officers, to economists. The team also includes economic apprentices who learn on the job with ONS while completing their degree in tandem. The team serves as a hub within ONS for innovative methods and practices, utilizing skills such as R and Python coding, Power BI, time series analysis, and stakeholder management.

B. Automation and data assurance

27. To ensure the sustainability and accuracy of the real-time indicators outputs, the team aimed to automate statistical data processing pipelines wherever possible.

28. The primary approach to achieving this goal was to move data processing away from Microsoft Excel and towards a programming language like Python and/or R. To follow best practices, the team strived to meet as many criteria as possible within the principles of Reproducible Analytical Pipelines (RAP), as defined in the “Quality Assurance of Code for Analysis and Research document”6 published by the UK Government Analysis Function.

29. Before sharing any code with the production team, it undergoes a peer review process, and the outputs are quality assured, providing multiple data scientists with the opportunity to provide feedback on the code. Another benefit of using a programming language in the fast- paced production round is the significant time saved when processing data. For example, replacing Excel with Python for one of the more intensive indicators reduced data processing time from approximately 3 hours each week to approximately 10 minutes.

30. These time-saving measures have two main benefits. Firstly, time previously spent manually processing the data can now be spent on analysis, resulting in more in-depth written sections included in the publication. Secondly, it enables the suite of indicators to expand. These two benefits combine to create a publication that contains more detailed written analysis on a broader range of topics, making it a more valuable tool for both policy makers and the enquiring citizen.

31. The team recently introduced the Power BI tool to visualize the data. Each indicator has its own Power BI 'report', which allows analysts to examine that data source in depth. Power BI 'dashboards' are also utilized, bringing together data for each of the publication's themes and providing an additional method of quality assurance. Figure 1 provides an example of the Power BI dashboard, which is currently an internal tool to ensure quality assurance.

Figure 1 Example of the Power BI Dashboard for quality assurance

6 https://analysisfunction.civilservice.gov.uk/policy-store/quality-assurance-of-code-for-analysis-and-

research/

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32. Combining reproducible analytical pipelines and Power BI has also enabled the team to partially automate the quality assurance process. In both systems, console messages (or in some cases html files) are generated, which inform the analysts whether the checks have passed or failed, and in the case of failure, the likely cause and who is best to be contacted for the issue to be resolved.

V. Embedding real-time indicators into National Accounts quality assurance and production

33. As well as being used by a wide range of policy and decision makers, academics and the public, real-time indicators have a role to play within the ONS as well. For instance, when compiling monthly GDP (Gross Domestic Product) for the UK7 the ONS will look at the real-time indicators within any given industrial sector as evidence for any movements we are seeing in the aggregated UK monthly GDP data. For example, if we are looking at the restaurant sector we will compare the movements we are seeing in monthly GDP with the Opentable restaurant reservation dataset, the comparison of air transport, and for elements of retail spending we will look at the spending categories within the various consumer spending indicators we have on a real-time basis including CHAPS and Revolut.

Figure 2 Monthly GDP estimates for air transport are quality assured using real-time indicators for the industry

34. This innovation has progressed to such a degree that we now publish within the weekly real-time indicators release a chart showing how the fortnightly BICS data on business turnover (compiled into a standardised balance estimate) compares with an equivalent aggregation of monthly GDP (excluding those sectors which BICS does not sample such as the government dominated industries of health and education, denoted by GDP*). We do the same with the CHAPS monthly data and the Retail Sales Inquiry datasets as well, and the correlation has proved to be reliable.

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https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpmonthlyestimateuk/january 2023

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Figure 3a The Business Insights and Conditions Survey (BICS) standardised turnover balance estimate and monthly GDP* estimates follow similar trends, full span June 2020 until February 2023. Note change in question in February 2022

Figure 3b Zoomed in: the Business Insights and Conditions Survey (BICS) standardised turnover balance estimate and monthly GDP* estimates follow similar trends, February 2022 until February 2023 (after change in question)

97.5

98.0

98.5

99.0

99.5

100.0

100.5

Feb 22 Mar 22 Apr 22 May 22

June 22

July 22 Aug 22 Sept 22

Oct 22 Nov 22 Dec 22 Jan 23 Feb 23

BICS turnover balance Wave 55 + GDP*

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Figure 4 Retail sales data follow a similar trend to the CHAPS index of aggregate credit and debit card spending Indices: February 2020 = 100, monthly average, non-seasonally adjusted, nominal prices and retail sales values, January 2020 to February 2023

35. All of this leads ONS to believe that there is a role for real-time indicators to enhance or supplement the data collection of ONS indicators, providing we are aware of the limitations of the real-time indicators which can be in their collection methods, their coverage, or their compilation methods.

VI. Further developments

36. ONS is committed to further improvements of our current suite of real-time indicators. One area which is of particular importance is the application of seasonal adjustment to our high-frequency indicators and we are now reaching a point whereby there exists a long enough back series to start undertaking this process.

37. There are also internal projects underway within ONS to provide additional enhancements for our current indicators, both as a result of user feedback and also methodological reviews into the collection and processing to ensure our outputs are as robust as they can be.

38. Separate research is ongoing on how best to apply nowcasting techniques in the context of economic indicators, including the creation of composite indicators which can bring together strength of signal from related indicators.

39. In tandem with continuing to improve current suite of real-time indicators, we are also expanding to add new data sources to our release in response to emerging economic and social challenges within the UK. Table 3 gives a brief overview of possible future indicators.

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Table 3 Development work plan for real-time indicators

Scope item Category

Onboarding of anonymised utility bill data, with the objective of publishing aggregated data on gas and electricity usage and analysis to assess cost of living.

New indicator

More granular geographical data (e.g., for online job adverts and other labour market indicators)

New indicator

Monthly regional renter affordability New indicator Enhancing indicators for shipping to use cargo manifests and the port of origin

New indicator

Aggregated insights from anonymised telecoms data New indicator Standalone interactive data dashboard Bulletin improvement Increased regularity of dataset publication (datasets to be published throughout the week when they are available, rather than being tied to a set weekly bulletin)

Bulletin improvement

Application of seasonal adjustment for high frequency series Bulletin improvement

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Appendix

40. Office for National Statistics, “Economic activity and social change in the UK, real- time indicators” landing page. Link: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/bulletins/econom icactivityandsocialchangeintheukrealtimeindicators/latest

41. Office for National Statistics, “Economic activity and social change in the UK, real- time indicators methodology”. Link: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/methodologies/co ronavirusandthelatestindicatorsfortheukeconomyandsocietymethodology

  • Group of Experts on National Accounts
  • Twenty-second session
  • Publication and analysis of real-time indicators in the United Kingdom context
    • Prepared by the Office for National Statistics, United Kingdom0F
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Meeting user needs
    • A. Introduction
    • B. Case study 1: Example of how we worked in partnership with the Bank of England
    • C. Case study 2: Example of how we worked in partnership with private providers
  • III. Current status of our suite of real-time indicators
  • IV. Weekly production approach
    • A. Introduction
    • B. Automation and data assurance
  • V. Embedding real-time indicators into National Accounts quality assurance and production
  • VI. Further developments
  • Appendix