

NERC

NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY CORPORATION

Security Integration

Integrating Security with Engineering Practices

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RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY




Security Integration: The integration of cyber and physical security aspects into conventional planning, design, and operations engineering practices.

- Can we *plan* a grid more resilient to cyber and physical attack?
- Can we *design* a grid with security as a critical consideration up front rather than at the end?
- Can we *operate* the grid in a way that can easily identify, detect, and respond to security incidents?
- Can we *restore* the grid effectively following any compromise?
- No more “bolt on” security measures – integrate them up front



[Source: National Review]



Cyber-Informed Transmission Planning

Cyber Contingency
Mapping

Cyber Informed Studies
and Modeling

Coordinating Risk
Mitigation

Adequate Level of
Reliability and Security

Security Integrated Design and Operations

Cyber Security
Investments

Technological Challenge
Assessments

Defense in Depth

Securing Blackstart
Plans

Grid Transformation

Assessments of
Aggregate Risks

DER and DER
Aggregator
Cybersecurity

Securing the Changing
Resource Mix

Infrastructure
Interdependence and
Fuel Supply

Emerging Technologies and Security Practices

Identifying Emerging
Technology Risk Areas



Cloud Technology in OT
Space


Advanced Security
Concepts


Guidance and Industry Support through Collaboration

Internal: E-ISAC / RSTC / Technical Sub-Groups

External: Industry Forums / Stakeholder Engagements / Federal and Private Partners







- Leverage multi-value projects that help reduce the number *critical* facilities on the grid
 - Critical = those facilities that could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading outages
 - Challenges with confidentiality across regulatory spectrum
- Combination of protecting the “crown jewels” and eliminating their criticality in the first place
- Requires concerted “cyber-informed planning” rather than focusing solely on environmental contingencies in the planning horizon

- Scaling of attack surface
 - More distributed assets on bulk power grid
 - Internet-connected assets on the distribution system
- Decentralized control
 - Remotely accessibility and controlled, unmanned facilities – by operator, contractors, equipment manufacturers, etc.
- Predominately power electronic-based response (room for risk)
- Need coordinated effort to secure resources from cyber attack
 - Equipment standards (IEEE, IEC, etc.) and operational security standards



[Source: SMA]





[Source: GE]



[Source: MISO]

- Differentiate security by design for new systems versus managing security risk for existing systems
 - Conflict of new security controls, tools, and practices versus complexity and rigidity of existing systems
- Inherent risks moving from serial-based systems on private networks to IP-based protocols with new technologies
 - Virtualization, cloud computing, IoT devices, emerging technologies
- Growing security vulnerabilities requires both IT and OT resources – from monitoring to mitigation



- Grid edge devices = Internet-connected
 - Internet of Things
 - Smart thermostats
 - Electric vehicles
 - Building management
 - Microgrids
 - Energy storage and DERs
- Virtual power plants and distributed energy resource (DER) aggregators
- Growth of large power consumption loads – both aggregate and individual
 - Aggregate impact of electric vehicles
 - Individual impact of data centers and crypto mining facilities
- Lack of standards (equipment or performance) across the board



[Source: Home Appliances World]



[Source: Electrive]



- Rapidly increasing penetration of inverter-based resources
- Growth of distributed energy resources (DERs)
- Introduction of DER Aggregators and virtual power plants
- Large load interconnections – data centers, crypto mining, etc.
- Rise of electric vehicles
- Continued connectivity of end-use loads to Internet




- Wide range of emerging technologies
 - Virtualization
 - Cloud computing
 - Zero trust network access
 - Artificial intelligence
 - Grid edge technology
 - 5G communications
 - Blockchain
 - Mobile resources
 - Virtual power plants
 - Quantum computing
- Present boundary-spanning risks – span multiple organizations and segments of the energy sector
- Require coordinated efforts to fully leverage benefits yet mitigate risks
- Some we will have ability to “manage” the emergence; others we will be driven by external factors



[Source: QAD]

- Operational benefits
 - Redundancy and reliability of data
 - Remote vendor support and services
 - Increased resilience and reduced costs
- Operational concerns
 - Availability and reliability
 - Communications links
- Potential risks and challenges
 - Compliance audits of cloud service providers
 - Layered complexity of cloud service offerings (understanding dependencies)
 - Roles and responsibilities of provider versus customer
 - Ensuring sufficient security controls in the overlay
- Great for offline applications and services (e.g., system studies)
- Technology readiness and maturity for real-time operational critical infrastructure



- Need to upskill and train existing workforce
- Need blended security/engineering curricula in academia (“cyber engineering”)
- Need workforce expertise in:
 - OT network security, not just IT expertise
 - Utility experience and understanding of engineering practices
 - Blended cybersecurity and engineering background
 - Protocols, network architectures, tools, engineering needs
- Covers the full spectrum – generation, transmission, distribution; system operators, utilities, regulators, policymakers, government agencies
- Need range of experience levels; build a strong bench

- [NERC Security Integration Strategy](#)
- [ERO Enterprise Cyber-Informed Transmission Planning Paper](#)
- [IEEE Technical Report 105 on Security Integration](#)
- [INL Cyber-Informed Engineering \(CIE\)](#)
- [Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering](#)
- [ISA/IEC 62443 Series of Standards](#)
- [NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3](#)

A stylized map of North America, including the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The map is rendered in shades of blue and grey, with the United States and Canada in a darker blue and Mexico in a lighter grey. The map is positioned in the background, partially obscured by a horizontal blue band that contains the title.

Questions and Answers

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