Working draft for amendments to UN Regulation No. 13

I. Introduction

At the 13th session of GRVA the UK presented an informal document (GRVA/13/19) with the purpose of starting discussion on the content of UN Regulation 13, Annex 18. The proposal was made in recognition of the inconsistent understanding of the current text, identified during the discussions leading to the 03 Series of Amendments to UN Regulation 79 which shared common language. It is intended that using harmonised text between Regulations, as far as is practicable, will deliver more consistent application of the requirements and avoid unnecessary changes in procedures and documentation for different vehicle systems.

GRVA advised the United Kingdom to review its proposal with members of OICA and CLEPA. There have been three meetings so far and this document sets out the current position regarding those discussions. The whole Annex 18 is shown here to aid understanding of the proposed changes. By convention, proposed insertions are shown in **Bold and underlined** and proposed deletions are shown in **Bold and Strikethrough**. Items shown in **[Bold Italics]** have either not yet been discussed or require further discussion.

In general, the proposed changes reflect the text in Annex 6 of UN Regulation 79, as amended by the 03 Series of Amendments. Selective additional text from Supplement 2 to the 03 Series of amendments being reviewed and it will be considered whether text from UN Regulation 157 will add benefit. The objective is to use established text wherever possible.

The intention is for these changes to be implemented in parallel to the adoption of changes to UN Regulation 13 in regard to the introduction of electromechanical braking systems. It is understood that the Annex 18 assessment is concerned with the analysis of "The System" as defined in new paragraph 2.1., and not with the associated hardware of the braking system.

Industry has raised concerns about the impact changes may have on existing systems approved under this Regulation or, systems that are close to market. It is considered that the proposal should provide for these systems using Transitional Provisions.

Industry has also highlighted a concern that this proposal may be interpreted as requiring certain analytical techniques required by other Regulations where there is a degree of vehicle automation or a risk of user misuse (UN Regulation 157 for example). This is not the intention, and it is planned to provide clarity on this point in the final proposal.

Further discussion is scheduled with the intention of submitting a formal proposal for consideration at the 15th session of GRVA. Comments from Contracting Parties are welcome.

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II. Working Draft for a proposal to amend UN Regulation 13.

Contents, Annex 18 title, amend to read:

"18. Special requirements to be applied to the safety aspects of complex electronic vehicle control systems."

Annex 18, amend to read:

"Special requirements to be applied to the safety aspects of complex electronic control systems.

1. General

This annex defines the special requirements for documentation, fault strategy and verification with respect to the safety aspects of <u>Electronic System(s)</u> (paragraph 2.3.) and Complex Electronic Vehicle Control Systems (paragraph 2.4. below) as far as this Regulation is concerned.

This annex may also be called, by special paragraphs in this Regulation, for safety related functions which are controlled by electronic system(s).

This annex does not specify the performance criteria for "The System" but covers the methodology applied to the design process and the information which must be disclosed to the Technical Service, for type-approval purposes.

This information shall show that "The System" respects, under normal non-fault and fault conditions, all the appropriate performance requirements specified elsewhere in this Regulation [and that it is designed to operate in such a way that it does not induce safety critical risks].

2. Definitions

For the purposes of this annex,

- 2.1. The System" means an electronic control system or complex electronic control system that provides or forms part of the control transmission of a function to which this Regulation applies. This also includes any other system covered in the scope of this Regulation, as well as transmission links to or from other systems that are outside the scope of this Regulation, that acts on a function to which this Regulation applies.
- 2.2. "Safety Concept" is a description of the measures designed into the system, for example within the electronic units, so as to address system integrity and thereby ensure safe operation <u>under fault</u> [and non-fault] conditions; including in the event of an electrical failure.

The possibility of a fall-back to partial operation or even to a back-up system for vital vehicle functions may be a part of the safety concept.

2.3. "Electronic Control System" means a combination of units, designed to co-operate in the production of the stated vehicle control function by electronic data processing.

Such systems, **often commonly** controlled by software, are built from discrete functional components such as sensors, electronic control units and actuators and connected by transmission links. They may include mechanical, electropneumatic or electro-hydraulic elements.

"The system", referred to herein, is the one for which type-approval is being sought.

2.4. "Complex Electronic Vehicle-Control Systems" are those electronic control systems <u>in</u> which <u>are subject to a hierarchy of control in which a controlled</u> a function controlled by an electronic system *[or the driver]* may be overridden by a higher-level electronic control system/function.

A function which is over-ridden becomes part of the complex <u>electronic control</u> system, <u>as well as any overriding</u> <u>system/function within the scope of this Regulation. The transmission links to and from overriding</u> systems/function outside of the scope of this Regulation shall also be included.

- 2.5. "Higher-Level Electronic Control" systems/functions are those which employ additional processing and/or sensing provisions to modify vehicle behaviour by commanding variations in the **normal** function(s) of the vehicle control system. This allows complex systems to automatically change their objectives with a priority which depends on the sensed circumstances.
- 2.6. "Units" are the smallest divisions of system components which will be considered in this annex, since these combinations of components will be treated as single entities for purposes of identification, analysis, or replacement.
- 2.7. "Transmission links" are the means used for inter-connecting distributed units for the purpose of conveying signals, operating data, or an energy supply. This equipment is generally electrical but may, in some part, be mechanical, pneumatic, or hydraulic.
- 2.8. "Range of control" refers to an output variable and defines the range over which the system is likely to exercise control.
- 2.9. "Boundary of functional operation" defines the boundaries of the external physical limits within which the system is able to maintain control.
- [2.10. "Safety Related Function" means a function of "The System" that is capable of changing the dynamic behaviour of the vehicle. "The System" may be capable of performing more than one safety related function.]
- [2.11. "Control strategy" means a strategy to ensure robust and safe operation of the function(s) of "The System" in response to a specific set of ambient and/or operating conditions (such as road surface condition, traffic intensity and other road users, adverse weather conditions, etc.). This may include the automatic deactivation of a function or temporary performance restrictions (e.g. a reduction in the maximum operating speed, etc.).]

3. Documentation

3.1. Requirements

The manufacturer shall provide a documentation package which gives access to the basic design of "The System" and the means by which it is linked to other vehicle systems or by which it directly controls output variables.

The function(s) of "The System", <u>including the control strategies</u>, and the safety concept, as laid down by the manufacturer, shall be explained.

Documentation shall be brief yet provide evidence that the design and development has had the benefit of expertise from all the system fields which are involved.

[For periodic technical inspections, the documentation shall describe how the current operational status of "The System" can be checked.]

The Technical Service shall assess the documentation package to show that "The System":

- (a) Is designed to operate, under [non-fault and] fault conditions, in such a way that it does not induce safety critical risks;
- (b) Respects, under [non-fault and] fault conditions, all the appropriate performance requirements specified elsewhere in this Regulation; and,
- (c) Was developed according to the development process/method declared by the manufacturer [and that this includes at least the steps listed in paragraph 3.4.4.]
- 3.1.1. Documentation shall be made available in two parts:
 - (a) The formal documentation package for the approval, containing the material listed in paragraph 3. (with the exception of that of paragraph 3.4.4. below) which shall be supplied to the Technical Service at the time of submission of the type-approval application. This will be taken This documentation package shall be used by the Technical Service as the basic reference for the verification process set out in paragraph 4. of this annex. The Technical Service shall ensure that this documentation package remains available for a period determined in agreement with the Approval Authority. This period shall be at least 10-years counted from the time when production of the vehicle is definitely discontinued.
 - (b) Additional material and analysis data of paragraph 3.4.4. below, which shall be retained by the manufacturer, but made open for inspection at the time of type-approval. The manufacturer shall ensure that this material and analysis data remains available for a period of 10-years counted from the time when production of the vehicle is definitely discontinued."
- 3.2. Description of the functions of "The System" **including control strategies**

A description shall be provided which gives a simple explanation of all the **control** functions **including control strategies** of "The System" and the methods employed to achieve the objectives, including a statement of the mechanism(s) by which control is exercised.

[Any described function that can be over-ridden shall be identified and a further description of the changed rationale of the function's operation provided.]

- 3.2.1. A list of all input and sensed variables shall be provided and the working range of these defined, <u>along with a description of how each variable affects system behaviour.</u>
- 3.2.2. A list of all output variables which are controlled by "The System" shall be provided and an indication given, in each case, of whether the control is direct or via another vehicle system. The range of control (paragraph 2.7.) exercised on each such variable shall be defined.
- 3.2.3. Limits defining the boundaries of functional operation (paragraph 2.8. above) shall be stated where appropriate to system performance.

3.3. System layout and schematics

3.3.1. Inventory of components.

A list shall be provided, collating all the units of "The System" and mentioning the other vehicle systems which are needed to achieve the control function in question.

An outline schematic showing these units in combination, shall be provided with both the equipment distribution and the interconnections made clear.

3.3.2. Functions of the units

The function of each unit of "The System" shall be outlined and the signals linking it with other units or with other vehicle systems shall be shown. This may be provided by a labelled block diagram or other schematic, or by a description aided by such a diagram.

3.3.3. Interconnections

Interconnections within "The System" shall be shown by a circuit diagram for the electric transmission links, by an optical-fibre diagram for optical links, by a piping diagram for pneumatic or hydraulic transmission equipment and by a simplified diagrammatic layout for mechanical linkages. The transmission links both to and from other systems shall also be shown.

3.3.4. Signal flow, operating data, and priorities

There shall be a clear correspondence between these transmission links and the signals and/or operating data carried between Units.

Priorities of signals and/or operating data on multiplexed data paths shall be stated wherever priority may be an issue affecting performance or safety as far as this Regulation is concerned.

3.3.5. Identification of units

Each unit shall be clearly and unambiguously identifiable (e.g., by marking for hardware and marking or software output for software content) to provide corresponding hardware and documentation association.

Where functions are combined within a single unit or indeed within a single computer but shown in multiple blocks in the block diagram for clarity and ease of explanation, only a single hardware identification marking shall be used.

The manufacturer shall, by the use of this identification, affirm that the equipment supplied conforms to the corresponding document.

- 3.3.5.1. The identification defines the hardware and software version and, where the latter changes such as to alter the function of the Unit as far as this Regulation is concerned, this identification shall also be changed.
- 3.4. Safety concept of the manufacturer
- 3.4.1. The Manufacturer shall provide a statement which affirms that the strategy chosen to achieve "The System" objectives will not, under non-fault conditions, prejudice the safe operation *[of the vehicle operation of systems which are subject to the prescriptions of this Regulation.]*
- 3.4.2. In respect of software employed in "The System", the outline architecture shall be explained, and the design methods and tools used shall be identified. The manufacturer shall be prepared, if required, to show some evidence of the means by which they determined the realisation of the system logic, during the design and development process.
- 3.4.3. The Manufacturer shall provide the Technical Service with an explanation of the design provisions built into "The System" so as to generate safe operation under fault conditions. Possible design provisions for failure in "The System" are for example:
 - (a) Fall-back to operation using a partial system.
 - (b) Change-over to a separate back-up system.
 - (c) Removal of the high-level function.

In case of a failure, the driver shall be warned for example by warning signal or message display. When the system is not deactivated by the driver, e.g., by turning the ignition (run) switch to "off", or by switching off that particular function if a special switch is provided for that purpose, the warning shall be present as long as the fault condition persists.

- 3.4.3.1. If the chosen provision selects a partial performance mode of operation under certain fault conditions, then these conditions shall be stated, and the resulting limits of effectiveness defined.
- 3.4.3.2. If the chosen provision selects a second (back-up) means to realise the vehicle control system objective, the principles of the change-over mechanism, the logic and level of redundancy and any built-in back-up checking features shall be explained and the resulting limits of back-up effectiveness defined.
- 3.4.3.3. If the chosen provision selects the removal of the Higher-Level Function, all the corresponding output control signals associated with this function shall be inhibited, and in such a manner as to limit the transition disturbance.
- 3.4.4. The documentation shall be supported, by an analysis which shows, in overall terms, how the system will behave on the occurrence of any individual hazard or fault which will have a bearing on vehicle control performance or safety.

This may be based on a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or any similar process appropriate to system safety considerations.

The **chosen** analytical approach(es), **chosen by the Manufacturer**, shall be established and maintained by the Manufacturer and shall be made open for inspection by the Technical Service at the time of the type-approval.

The Technical Service shall perform an assessment of the application of the analytical approach(es). The audit assessment shall include:

- (a) <u>Inspection of the safety approach at the concept (vehicle) level with confirmation that it includes consideration of interactions with other vehicle systems.</u> [This approach shall be based on a Hazard / Risk analysis appropriate to system safety.]
- (b) <u>Inspection of the safety approach at the system level. This approach shall be based on a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or any similar process appropriate to system safety.</u>
- (c) <u>Inspection of the validation plans and results. This validation shall use, for example, Hardware in the Loop (HIL) testing, vehicle on-road operational testing, or any means appropriate for validation.</u>

The assessment shall consist of checks of hazards and faults chosen by the Technical Service to establish that the manufacturer's explanation of the safety concept is understandable, logical and that the validation plans are suitable and have been completed.

The Technical Service may perform or may require to perform tests as specified in paragraph 4. below, to verify the safety concept.

- 3.4.4.1. This documentation shall itemize the parameters being monitored and shall set out, for each fault condition of the type defined in paragraph 3.4.4. **above**, the warning signal to be given to the driver and/or to service/technical inspection personnel.
- [3.4.4.2. This documentation shall describe the measures in place to ensure the "The System" does not prejudice the safe operation of the vehicle when the performance of "The System" is affected by environmental conditions e.g., climatic, temperature, dust ingress, water ingress, ice packing.]
- 4. Verification and test
- 4.1. The functional operation of "The System", as laid out in the documents required in paragraph 3. above, shall be tested as follows:
- 4.1.1. Verification of the function of "The System"

The Technical Service shall verify "The System" under non-fault conditions by testing a number of selected functions from those declared described by the manufacturer in paragraph 3.2. above.

For complex electronic systems, these tests shall include scenarios whereby a declared function is overridden.

As the means of establishing the normal operational levels, verification of the performance of the vehicle system under non-fault conditions shall be conducted against the manufacturer's basic benchmark specification unless this is subject to a specified performance test as part of the approval procedure of this or another Regulation.

- 4.1.1.1. The verification results shall correspond with the description, including the control strategies, provided by the manufacturer in paragraph 3.2.
- 4.1.2. Verification of the safety concept of paragraph 3.4. above

The reaction of "The System" shall, at the discretion of the type-approval authority, be checked under the influence of a failure in any individual unit by applying corresponding output signals to electrical units or mechanical elements in order to simulate the effects of internal faults within the unit. The Technical Service shall conduct this check for at least one individual unit but shall not check the reaction of "The System" to multiple simultaneous failures of individual units.

The Technical Service shall verify that these tests include aspects that may have an impact on vehicle controllability and user information (HMI aspects).

4.1.2.1. The verification results shall correspond with the documented summary of the failure analysis, to a level of overall effect such that the safety concept and execution are confirmed as being adequate.

5. Reporting by Technical Service

Reporting of the assessment by the Technical Service shall be performed in such a manner that allows traceability, e.g., versions of documents inspected are coded and listed in the records of the Technical Service.

An example of a possible layout for the assessment form from the Technical Service to the Type Approval Authority is given in Appendix 1 to this Annex."

Insert a new Annex:

"[Annex 18 - Appendix 1

Model assessment form for electronic systems

	Test report No:
1.	Identification
1.1.	Vehicle make:
1.2.	<i>Type</i> :
1.3.	Means of identification of type if marked on the vehicle:
	Location of that marking:
1.5.	Manufacturer's name and address:
1.6.	If applicable, name and address of manufacturer's representative:
1.7.	Manufacturer's formal documentation package:
	Documentation reference No:

	Date of latest update:
2.	Test vehicle(s)/system(s) description
2.1.	General description:
2.2.	Description of all the control functions of "The System", and methods of operation:
2.3.	Description of the components and diagrams of the interconnections within "The System":
<i>3</i> .	Manufacturer's safety concept:
3.1.	Description of signal flow and operating data and their priorities:
3.2.	Manufacturer's declaration: The manufacturer(s) affirm(s) that the strategy chosen to achieve "The System", objectives will not, under non-fault conditions, prejudice the safe operation of the vehicle.
<i>3.3</i> .	Software outline architecture and the design methods and tools used:
<i>3.4</i> .	Explanation of design provisions built into "The System" under fault conditions:
3.5.	Documented analyses of the behaviour of "The System" under individual hazard or fault conditions:
<i>3.6.</i>	Description of the measures in place for environmental conditions:
<i>3.7.</i>	Provisions for the periodic technical inspection of "The System":
3.8.	Results of "The System" verification test, as per para. 4.1.1. of Annex 18 to UN Regulation No. 13:
3.9.	Results of safety concept verification test, as per para. 4.1.2. of Annex 18 to UN Regulation No. 13:
3.10.	Date of test:
3.11.	This test has been carried out and the results reported in accordance with UN Regulation No. 13 as last amended by [Supplement [18] to the 11 series of amendments].
	Technical Service ¹ carrying out the test
	Signed:
3.12.	Type Approval Authority ¹
	Signed:
Comn	nents:]"

To be signed by different persons even when the Technical Service and Type Approval Authority are the same or alternatively, a separate Type Approval Authority authorization is issued with the report.