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## Economic Commission for Europe

### Inland Transport Committee

#### Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods

##### 112th session

Geneva, 8-11 November 2022

Item 5 (b) of the provisional agenda

##### **Proposals for amendments to annexes A and B of ADR: miscellaneous proposals**

### Section 9.1.3 – Certificate of approval

#### Transmitted by the Government of the Republic of Poland\*

##### *Summary*

<b>Executive summary:</b>	Supplementing the provision in 9.1.3.3 to provide explicitly the possibility of adding security features to the certificates of approval for vehicles carrying certain dangerous goods
<b>Action to be taken:</b>	Modify the regulation in 9.1.3.3
<b>Related documents:</b>	Informal document INF.24 (Austria) – from 111th session Informal documents INF.27 and INF.27/Add.1 (Poland) – from 111th session ECE/TRANS/WP.15/258 – Report of the Working Party on its 111th session (points 55-58)

### Introduction

1. During the 111th session of the Working Party in May 2022, Austria presented informal document INF.24 in which it addressed the problem arising from the introduction of security features in the certificate of approval for vehicles issued in accordance with 9.1.3 of the ADR.

2. During the road control, it was found that the driver had certificate of approval for vehicles in accordance with the model specified in 9.1.3.5 of ADR with additionally applied security features against forgery.

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\* A/76/6 (Sect.20), para 20.76.

3. The first sentence in 9.1.3.3 states: “The certificate of approval shall have the same layout as the model shown in 9.1.3.5. Its dimensions shall be 210 mm × 297 mm (format A4). Both front and back may be used. The colour shall be white, with a pink diagonal stripe.”

4. Austria wanted to start a discussion on how to deal with those certificates that do not exactly match the requirements in 9.1.3. This concerned the application of additional security features to prevent forgery on the certificate of approval issued in accordance with the model given in 9.1.3.5.

5. In this case, Poland presented informal documents INF.27 and INF.27/Add.1, since the certificate in question was issued by the competent authority in Poland.

6. The documents explained that, in Poland, the certificate of approval for vehicles carrying certain dangerous goods specified in 9.1.3.5 has been classified as category 2 document which, in accordance with the regulations issued by the Polish Ministry of the Interior, require additional security features to prevent falsification.

7. In Poland, the Minister of the Interior has introduced rules on the categories of documents, these are national, internal rules that help to fight against counterfeiting of documents. To support prevention, in Poland, the certificate of approval for vehicles carrying certain dangerous goods specified in 9.1.3.5 ADR, in accordance with the regulations issued by the Ministry of the Interior, has been included in category 2 public documents, which require additional security measures (for example a guilloche).

8. Referring to the layout of the document, in the margin, the Polish certificate has a white background - only a guilloche pattern was applied to this document. The document is correctly issued and does not require any corrections. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we note that “Certificate of driver’s training”, according to provision 8.2.2.8.3 “(...) The colour shall be white with black lettering.”. Not every country issues a “white certificate”. However, in our opinion, it is not of a basic importance.

9. Informal document INF.27/Add.1 presented the certificate of approval for vehicles carrying certain dangerous goods issued in Poland, with explanations relating to the security features introduced in the issued certificate:

- A two-page document, A4 format, 210 × 297 mm, made on watermarked paper, showing no UV luminescence, having security fibres visible in daylight and ultraviolet radiation, and randomly distributed particles showing ultraviolet luminescence, having a pink strip running diagonally;
- Document security:
  - guilloche background made in the technique of iris printing;
  - relief print;
  - Microprints;
  - graphic elements made with ink active in ultraviolet radiation;
  - graphic element made with iridescent paint;
  - individual identification.

10. Please note that the security features introduced do not have any impact on the format of the document and its content.

11. In informal document INF.27, Poland proposed to amend the provision in 9.1.3.3 of ADR, which allows for the voluntary introduction of additional security, such as a hologram, UV printing or a guilloche background, in the certificate of approval for vehicles carrying certain dangerous goods specified in 9.1.3.5.

12. The result of the discussion was published in the Report of the Working Party on its 111th session, ECE/TRANS/WP.15/258 (points 55-58).

13. During the discussion in the 111th session of the Working Party, the delegations that spoke thought that it was possible to add security features such as holograms, UV printing or guilloche patterns to certificates of approval for vehicles without affecting their validity

regarding the requirements of 9.1.3.3. ADR regulations do not prohibit and do not require additional security features to be applied to this document.

14. Several delegations confirmed that it would be desirable, in the future, to amend 9.1.3.3 to explicitly provide those countries that wish to do so with the possibility of adding security features to the approval certificates they issue.

15. Poland undertook the duty to present an official document on this matter at the next session of WP15.

16. Poland would like to offer opportunity of adding security features to the issued certificate of approval for vehicles by those States that wish to do so. The problem of counterfeit certificate can affect any country. Therefore, Poland is convinced that prevention is more efficient than fighting with forged documents. At the same time, Poland would not like to introduce mandatory security for “Certificate of approval for vehicles carrying certain dangerous goods”.

17. We propose to amend the provision in 9.1.3.3 of the ADR as follows.

## Proposal 1

18. In 9.1.3.3, at the end of the first indent, we propose adding the following sentence:

“The certificate may contain additional security features, such as a hologram, UV printing, guilloche background, etc.”

## Proposal 2

19. In 9.1.3.3, at the end of the first paragraph, we suggest adding the following text:

“The certificate may contain additional security features, such as a hologram, UV printing, guilloche background, etc.

Contracting Parties that have introduced additional security features in the certificate of approval shall provide the UNECE Inland Transport Committee Secretariat with an example of the national model for any certificate intended for issue in accordance with this section. Contracting Parties shall also provide explanatory notes to enable the verification of conformity of certificates against the examples provided. The Secretariat shall make this information available on its website.”

## Justification

20. This topic is only related to the ADR and does not relate to RID/ADN and does not conflict with the European Union regulations.

21. The modification of the provision in 9.1.3.3 does not involve any costs. The purpose is to enable the application of additional protection against forgery of the certificate of approval for vehicles carrying certain dangerous goods, the specimen of which is given in 9.1.3.5 of ADR.

22. The introduction of security features against forgery is voluntary, and it allows introduction of such security features only by those countries that deem it necessary.

**Safety:** Improves safety.

**Feasibility:** Avoids any confusion when interpreting the ADR texts.

**Enforceability:** Facilitates the application of the provisions and will avoid possible misinterpretations.