Security management systems for the supply chain — Best practices for implementing supply chain security, assessments and plans — Requirements and guidance

Systèmes de management de la sûreté pour la chaîne d'approvisionnement — Meilleures pratiques pour la mise en application de la sûreté de la chaîne d'approvisionnement, évaluations et plans — Exigences et guidage

ICS 47.020.99
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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of technical committees is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the technical committees are circulated to the member bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the member bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO 28001 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 8, Ships and marine technology, Subcommittee SC 11, Intermodal and short sea shipping.

This second/third/... edition cancels and replaces the first/second/... edition (), [clause(s) / subclause(s) / table(s) / figure(s) / annex(es)] of which [has / have] been technically revised.
Introduction

Security incidents against international supply chains are threats to international trade and the economic growth of trading nations. People, goods, infrastructure and equipment, including means of transport, should be protected against security incidents and their potentially devastating effects. Such protection benefits the economy and society as a whole.

International supply chains are highly dynamic and consist of many entities and business partners. This standard recognizes this complexity. It has been developed to allow an individual organization in the supply chain to apply its requirements in conformance with the organization’s particular business model and its role and function in the international supply chain.

This standard provides an option for organizations to establish and document reasonable levels of security within international supply chains and their components. It will enable such organizations to make better risk based decisions concerning the security in those international supply chains.

This standard is multimodal and is intended to be in concert with and to complement the World Customs Organization’s Framework of Standards to secure and facilitate global trade (Framework). It does not attempt to cover, replace or supersede individual customs agencies’ supply chain security programmes and their certification and validation requirements.

The use of this standard will help an organization to establish adequate levels of security within those part(s) of an international supply chain which they control. It is also a basis for determining or validating the level of existing security within such organizations’ supply chain(s) by internal or external auditors or by those government agencies that choose to use compliance with this standard as the baseline for acceptance into their supply chain security programmes. Customers, business partners, government agencies and others may request organizations which claim compliance with this standard to undergo an audit or a validation to confirm such compliance. Government agencies may find it mutually agreeable to accept validations conducted by other governments’ agencies. If a third party organization audit is to be conducted, then the organization should consider employing a third party certification body accredited by a competent body, which is a member of the International Accreditation Forum (see Annex C).

It is not the intention of this standard to duplicate governmental requirements and standards regarding supply chain security in compliance with the WCO SAFE Framework. Organizations that have already been certified or validated by mutually recognizing governments are compliant with this standard.

Outputs resulting from this document will be the following.

— A Statement of Coverage that defines the boundaries of the supply chain that is covered by the security plan.

— A Security Assessment that documents the vulnerabilities of the supply chain to defined security threat scenarios. It also describes the impacts that can be reasonably be expected from each of the potential security threat scenarios.

— A Security Plan that describes security measures in place to manage the security threat scenarios identified by the Security assessment.

— A training programme setting out how security personnel will be trained to meet their assigned security related duties.
To undertake the security assessment needed to produce the security plan, an organization using this standard will

— identify the threats posed (security threat scenarios);

— determine how likely persons could progress each of the security threat scenarios identified by the Security Assessment into a security incident.

This determination is made by reviewing the current state of security in the supply chain and, based on the findings of that review, professional judgment is used to identify how vulnerable the supply chain is to each security threat scenario.

If the supply chain is considered unacceptably vulnerable to a security threat scenario, the organization will develop additional procedures or operational changes to lower likelihood, consequence or both. These are called countermeasures. Based upon a system of priorities, countermeasures should be incorporated into the security plan to reduce the threat to an acceptable level.

Annexes A and B are illustrative examples of risk management based security processes for protecting people, assets and international supply chain missions. They facilitate both a macro approach for complex supply chains and/or more discrete approaches for portions thereof.

These annexes are also intended to

— facilitate understanding, adoption, and implementation of methodologies, which can be customized by organizations;

— provide guidance for baseline security management for continual improvement;

— assist organizations to manage resources to address existing and emerging security risks;

— describe possible means for assessment of risk and mitigation of security threats in the supply chain from raw material allocation through storage, manufacturing and transportation of finished goods to the market place.

Annex C provides guidance for obtaining advice and certification for ISO 28001 if an organization using this standard chooses to exercise this option.
Security management systems for the supply chain — Best practices for implementing supply chain security, assessments and plans — Requirements and guidance

1 Scope

This standard provides requirements and guidance for organizations in international supply chains to

— develop and implement supply chain security processes;

— establish and document a minimum level of security within a supply chain(s) or segment of a supply chain;

— assist in meeting the applicable Authorized Economic Operators criteria set forth in the World Customs Organization Framework of Standards and conforming national supply chain security programmes.

NOTE Only a participating National Customs Agency can designate organizations as Authorized Economic Operators in accordance with its supply chain security programme and its attendant certification and validation requirements.

In addition, this standard establishes certain documentation requirements that would permit verification.

Users of this standard will

— define the portion of an international supply chain they have established security within (see 4.1);

— conduct security assessments on that portion of the supply chain and develop adequate countermeasures;

— develop and implement a supply chain security plan;

— train security personnel in their security related duties.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents may be required for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/PAS 20858, Ships and marine technology — Maritime port facility security assessments and security plan development

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
3.1 appropriate law enforcement and other government officials
are those government and law enforcement personnel that have specific legal jurisdiction over the
international supply chain or portions of it

3.2 asset(s)
are plant, machinery, property, buildings, vehicles, ships, aircraft, conveyances and other items of
infrastructure or plant and related systems that have a distinct and quantifiable business function or service

NOTE This definition includes any information system that is integral to the delivery of security and the application of
security management.

3.3 authorized economic operator
is a party involved in the international movement of goods in whatever function that has been approved by or
on behalf of a national customs administration as complying with WCO or equivalent supply chain security
standards

NOTE 1 Authorized Economic Operator is a term defined in the World Customs Organization Framework of Standards.

NOTE 2 Authorized Economic Operators include inter alia manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers, carriers,
consolidators, intermediaries, ports, airports, terminal operators, integrated operators, warehouses, and distributors.

3.4 business partner
are those contractors, suppliers or service providers that an organization contracts with to assist the
organization in its function as an “Organization in the Supply Chain” (see definition below).

3.5 cargo transport unit
means a road freight vehicle, railway freight wagon, freight container, road tank vehicle, railway tank wagon or
portable tank

3.6 consequence
refers to the loss of life, damage to property or economic disruption, including disruption to transport systems,
that can reasonably be expected as a result of an attack on an organization in the supply chain or by the use
of the supply chain as a weapon

3.7 conveyance
means a physical instrument of international trade that transports goods from one location to another

EXAMPLES Box, pallet, cargo transport unit, cargo handling equipment, truck, ship, aircraft and railcar.

3.8 countermeasures
are actions taken to lower the likelihood of a security threat scenario succeeding in its objectives, or to reduce
the likely consequences of a security threat scenario

3.9 custody
means the period of time an organization in the supply chain is directly controlling the manufacturing,
processing, handling and transportation of goods and their related shipping information within the supply chain

3.10 downstream
refers to the handling, processes and movements of goods when they no longer are in the custody of the
organization in the supply chain
3.11 **goods**
are those items or materials that upon the placement of a purchase order, are being manufactured, processed, handled or transported within the supply chain for usage or consumption by the purchaser.

3.12 **international supply chain**
a supply chain that at some point crosses an international or economic border

NOTE 1 All portions of this chain are considered international from the time a purchase order is concluded to the point where the goods are released from customs control in the destination country or economy.

NOTE 2 If treaties or regional agreements have eliminated customs clearance of goods from specified countries or economies, the end of the international supply chain is the port of entry into the destination country or economy where the goods would have cleared customs if the agreements or treaties had not been in place.

3.13 **likelihood**
refers to the ease or difficulty with which a security threat scenario could progress to become a security incident

NOTE Likelihood is evaluated based on the resistance the security processes in place pose to a security incident involving the security threat scenario being examined and is expressed either qualitatively or quantitatively.

3.14 **management system**
refers to the organization's structure for managing its processes or activities that transform inputs of resources into a product or service, which meet the organization's objectives

NOTE It is not the intent of this standard to specify a specific management system or require the creation of a separate security management system. ISO 9001 (Quality Management Systems), ISO 14001 (Environmental Management Systems), ISO/PAS 28000 (Security management systems for the supply chain), and the International Maritime Organization's International Safety Management (ISM) Code are examples of management systems.

3.15 **organization in the supply chain**
is any entity that

--- manufactures, handles, processes, loads, consolidates, unloads or receives goods upon placement of a purchase order that at some point cross an international or economy border;

--- transports goods by any mode in the international supply chain regardless of whether their particular segment of the supply chain crosses national (or economy) boundaries; or

--- provides, manages or conducts the generation, distribution or flow of shipping information used by customs agencies or in business practices.

3.16 **risk management**
is the process of making management decisions based on an analysis of possible threats, their consequences, and their probability or likelihood of success

NOTE A risk management process is normally initiated for the purposes of optimizing the organization's resource allocation necessary to operate in a particular environment.

3.17 **scope of service**
is the function(s) that an organization in the supply chain performs, and where it performs this/these functions
3.18 **security declaration**
is a documented commitment by a business partner, which specifies security measures implemented by that business partner, including, at a minimum, how goods and physical instruments of international trade are safeguarded, associated information is protected and security measures are demonstrated and verified.

**NOTE** It will be used by the organization in the supply chain to evaluate the adequacy of security measures related to the security of goods.

3.19 **security plan**
are the planned arrangements for ensuring that security is adequately managed.

**NOTE 1** It is designed to ensure the application of measures that protect the organization from a security incident.

**NOTE 2** The plan can be incorporated into other operational plans.

3.20 **security**
means the resistance to intentional acts designed to cause harm or damage to or by the supply chain.

3.21 **security incident**
means any act or circumstance that produces a “consequence” as defined in 3.6.

3.22 **security personnel**
are those people in the organization in the supply chain that have been assigned security related duties.

**NOTE** These people may or may not be employees of the organization.

3.23 **security sensitive information; security sensitive materials**
is information or materials, produced by or incorporated into the supply chain security process, that contain information about the security processes, shipments or government directives that would not be readily available to the public and would be useful to someone wishing to initiate a security incident.

3.24 **supply chain**
is the linked set of resources and processes that upon placement of a purchase order begins with the sourcing of raw material and extends through the manufacturing, processing, handling and delivery of goods and related services to the purchaser.

**NOTE** The supply chain may include vendors, manufacturing facilities, logistics providers, internal distribution centres, distributors, wholesalers and other entities involved in the manufacturing, processing, handling and delivery of the goods and their related services.

3.26 **target**
are personnel, means of transport, goods, physical assets, manufacturing processes and handling, control or documentation systems within an organization in the supply chain.

3.27 **security threat scenario**
are the means by which a potential security incident might occur.

3.28 **upstream**
refers to the handling, processes and movements of goods that occur before the organization in the supply chain takes custody of the goods.
3.29
World Customs Organization (WCO)
Is an independent intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs administrations

NOTE It is the only intergovernmental worldwide organization competent in customs matters.

4 Field of application

4.1 Statement of application

The organization in the supply chain shall describe the portion of the international supply chain that it claims to be in compliance with this standard in a Statement of Application. The Statement of Application shall at least include the following information:

a) details of the organization;
b) scope of service;
c) names and contact information of all business partners within the defined scope of service;
d) date the security assessment was completed and period of validity of the security assessment; and
e) signature of an individual authorized to sign on behalf of that organization.

Organizations in the supply chain may extend the Statement of Application to include other parts of the supply chain, e.g. including final destination.

4.2 Business partners

If within the supply chain described in the Statement of Application the organization is using business partners, the organization shall, subject to 4.3 and 4.4, require such business partners to provide a security declaration. The organization shall consider this security declaration in its security assessment and may require specific countermeasures to be enacted.

4.3 Internationally accepted certificates or approvals

Transportation companies and facilities, which hold internationally accepted certificates or approvals, issued pursuant to mandatory international conventions governing the security of the various transportation sectors, will have in place security practices, plans and processes that meet the applicable requirements of this standard and are not required to be audited to confirm such compliance. For shipping companies, ships and port facilities, the certificates or approvals shall be issued in accordance with SOLAS XI-2/4 or SOLAS XI-2/10, as applicable.

In conformance with Clause 1, national customs agencies may, in addition to possession of internationally accepted security certificates or approvals, require additional security measures and practices to be implemented by transportation companies and facilities as a condition for designation as an Authorized Economic Operator (AEO).

4.4 Business partners exempt from security declaration requirement

Those business partners that confirm to the organization that they

a) are verified compliant with this standard or ISO/PAS 20858;
b) are covered by 4.3; or
c) have been designated as AEOs in accordance with a national customs agency’s supply chain security programme which has been determined to be in accordance with the WCO SAFE Framework,

shall be listed on the Statement of Application. However, the organization does not need to conduct additional security assessments for such business partners or require them to provide security declarations.

4.5 Security reviews of business partners

Except for business partners covered by 4.3 or 4.4, the organization in the supply chain shall conduct reviews of their business partners’ processes and facilities to ascertain the validity of their declarations of security. The extent and the frequency of these reviews shall be determined through an analysis of the risks involved. The organization shall maintain results of these reviews.

NOTE To provide for ease of reading the organization claiming compliance, including those parts of its supply chain operated by business partners, whether compliant with this standard or not, is in the ensuing paragraphs referred to as the “organization” unless clarity demands otherwise.

5 Supply chain security process

5.1 General

Organizations in international supply chains that have adopted this standard are required both to manage security throughout their portion of the supply chain and to have a management system in place in support of that objective. This standard requires security practices and/or processes to be established and implemented in order to reduce the risk to the international supply chain from activities that could lead to a security incident.

Organizations in the supply chain claiming compliance with this standard shall have a security plan based on the output from the security assessment that documents existing security measures and procedures and incorporates countermeasures as applicable for the portion of the international supply chain that they have included in their Statement of Application.

5.2 Identification of the scope of security assessment

The scope of the security assessment shall include all activities performed by the organization as described in its Statement of Application (see 4.1). The assessment shall be periodically performed and the security plan shall be revised as appropriate. The results of the assessment shall be documented and retained.

The security assessment shall also cover information systems, documents and networks pertaining to the handling and movement of the goods while in the custody of the organization. Existing security arrangements shall, subject to 4.3 and 4.4, be assessed at all locations and for business partners where there are potential security vulnerabilities.

5.3 Conduction of the security assessment

5.3.1 Assessment personnel

The person or team conducting the security assessment shall collectively have skills and knowledge which include, but are not limited to, the following:

— Risk assessment techniques applicable to all aspects of the international supply chain from the point where the organization in the supply chain takes custody of the goods in to the point where the goods are no longer in the organization’s custody or leaves the international supply chain.

— Applying appropriate measures to avoid unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, security sensitive material.
— Operations and procedures involved in the manufacturing, handling, processing, movement and/or documentation of goods as appropriate.

— Security measures related to consignment, conveyance, personnel, premises, and information systems in that applicable portion of the supply chain.

— An understanding of security threats and mitigation methodologies.

— Understanding of this standard.

The name(s) of the person or team members conducting the assessment as well as their qualifications shall be documented.

5.3.2 Assessment process

The organization shall establish, implement and maintain (a) procedure(s) to identify existing countermeasures to mitigate security threats. The organization shall list applicable security threat scenarios, including those deemed necessary by appropriate government officials. If government officials have not participated, this shall be documented in the security assessment.

For each security threat scenario, the organization shall evaluate the existing countermeasures and determine likelihood and consequence relevant to each security threat scenario and evaluate the necessity of additional countermeasures to reduce the security risk to an acceptable level.

The organization shall review the security declaration(s) provided by each business partner, defined in 4.2, and apply professional judgment, knowledge of the entity(ies) and/or requirements of regulatory agencies. It may also obtain and use any other available information, in determining the acceptance of the security declaration.

Organizations shall consider both the detail and validity of each security declaration when conducting the security assessment and determining the overall vulnerability of the supply chain described in its Statement of Application.

Business partners that are covered by 4.3 or 4.4 should not need to be assessed further.

The following information shall be documented:

a) All security threat scenarios considered;

b) Processes used in evaluating those threats; and

c) All countermeasures identified and prioritized.

5.4 Development of the supply chain security plan

Organizations shall develop and maintain a security plan for the entire portion of the supply chain described in their Statement of Application. The plan may be separated into annexes in which each describes the security in place for a particular segment of the supply chain, including security measures that the organizations’ business partners, subject to 4.3 or 4.4, will maintain according to their security declarations. The plan/annexes shall also specify how the organization would monitor or periodically review such security declarations.

Organizations shall review and consider the use of the guidance in informative Annexes A and B when developing their security plans.
5.5 Execution of the supply chain security plan

The organization shall establish a management system to enable its specific supply chain security processes to be implemented.

5.6 Documentation and monitoring of the supply chain security process

5.6.1 General

The organization shall establish and maintain procedures to document, monitor and measure the performance of its management system referred to above. The organization shall carry out audits of the management system at planned intervals to ensure it has been properly implemented and maintained. The results of audits shall be documented and retained.

5.6.2 Continual improvement

The organization shall assess opportunities for improving its security arrangements as a means of enhancing the security of its portion of the supply chain.

5.7 Actions required after a security incident

The organization shall carry out a review of its security plan after the occurrence of any security incident that relates to any portion of the international supply chain the organization controls. This review shall

a) determine the cause of the incident and the corrective action;

b) determine the effectiveness of measures and procedures for security recovery; and

c) considering such determinations, re-assess those portions of the supply chain according to 5.3.2

In the event of a security breach, the organization shall follow reporting procedures to Customs and/or appropriate law enforcement agencies as appropriate, and as specified in the security plan and contractual relationships.

The organization shall retain consignment and other required supply chain data within the time limits prescribed in applicable laws and regulations.

5.8 Protection of the security information

Security plans, measures, processes, procedures and records of the organization shall be considered sensitive security information and protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Such information shall only be disclosed to individuals who have a “need to know”. In addition to appropriate law enforcement officials or their nominees, an individual has a “need to know” when

a) the individual requires access to specific sensitive security information to carry out security activities covered by the security plan;

b) the individual is in training to carry out activities covered by the security plan;

c) the information is necessary for the individual to supervise others carrying out security activities covered in the security plan; or

d) the individual is, or is acting on behalf of a party, who according to a contractual relationship with the organization has been granted access to security sensitive information controlled by the organization in accordance with agreed terms and conditions.

NOTE If the organization is certified compliant with ISO 28001 by a third party certification body accredited by a competent accreditation body or has been certified or validated compliant with ISO 28001 by mutually recognizing
governments, such contractually agreed access to the organization's security sensitive information may not be deemed necessary, and would in any event be dependent on the organization's explicit concurrence. The fact that its sensitive security information is protected from unauthorized access or disclosure does not prevent the organization from briefing business partners and others about its supply chain security arrangements and systems.
Annex A
(informative)

Supply chain security process

A.1 General

This annex provides guidance on the development of a supply chain security process that can be implemented in an organization with an existing management system. Figure A.1 provides a graphical description of such a process.

![Figure A.1](image-url)
A.2 Identification of the scope of the security assessment

A security assessment is an attempt to identify security risks present in that part of the supply chain the organization, in accordance with its Statement of Application, desires to bring into compliance with this standard. To accomplish this assessment the boundaries of the scope of coverage (both physically and virtually) need to be established.

A.3 Conduction of the security assessment

A.3.1 General

Using qualified personnel the existing security arrangements at all locations has to be assessed where there are potential security vulnerabilities, which should include but not limited to the following.

— Where goods are being manufactured, processed or handled prior to being loaded in a transport unit, palletized, or otherwise prepared for shipment.
— Where goods prepared for shipment are stored or consolidated prior to transportation.
— Where goods are being transported.
— Where goods are loaded into or unloaded from a conveyance.
— Where custody of the goods changes hands.
— Where documentation or information pertaining to goods being shipped is handled, generated or accessible.
— Inland transportation routes and means of conveyance used by the various modes of transportation.
— Other.

A.3.2 Performance review list

The following performance review list provides an example of a systematic approach for reviewing existing security arrangements.

Those portions of the performance review list that pertain to business partners, who have confirmed to the organization that they

a) are verified compliant with this standard or with ISO/PAS 20858;

b) are covered by 4.3; or

c) have been designated as AEOs in accordance with a national customs agency’s supply chain security programme which has been determined to be in accordance with the WCO SAFE Framework,

should contain a comment indicating how the factor has been addressed, e.g. compliant with this standard, ISO/PAS 20858, or the ISPS Code.

A.3.3 Performance review

The following performance review list shown in Table A.1 can be completed and considered when conducting a security assessment for an organization in the supply chain. This list is not all-inclusive, and can be tailored to reflect the risk assessment and business model of the organization. If the factor indicated is already implemented by the organization in the supply chain the “Yes” block should be checked. If the factor is not
already implemented or is partially met the “No” block should be checked and, where applicable, an explanation added to the comment column describing other alternative measures utilized, or that the risk is very low. If the factor is not applicable or is outside the organization’s statement of coverage, Not Applicable (NA) should be noted in the “Comments” block. Items on the performance review list that cannot be performed due to applicable laws/regulations should be marked as prohibited in the comment column.
## Table A.1 — Performance review list

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Factor</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<td><strong>Management of Supply Chain Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Does the organization have a management system that addresses supply chain security?</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Does the organization have a person designated as responsible for supply chain security?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Plan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the organization have (a) current security plan(s)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the plan address the organization’s security expectations of upstream and downstream business partners?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the organization have a crisis management, business continuity, and security recovery plan?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asset Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the organization have in place measures that addresses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— the physical security of buildings,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>— monitoring and controlling of exterior and interior perimeters,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>— application of access controls that prohibit unauthorized access to facilities, conveyances, loading docks and cargo areas, and managerial control over the issuance of identification (employee, visitor, vendor, etc.) and other access devices?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are there operational security technologies which significantly enhance asset protection? For example, intrusion detection, or recorded CCTV/DVS cameras that cover areas of importance to the supply chain activity, with the recordings maintained for a long enough period of time to be of use in an incident investigation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are there protocols in place to contact internal security personnel or external law enforcement in case of security breach?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are procedures in place to restrict, detect, and report unauthorized access to all cargo and conveyance storage areas?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are persons delivering or receiving cargo identified before cargo is received or released?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the organization have procedures to evaluate the integrity of employees prior to employment and periodically relative to their security duties?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the organization conduct specific job appropriate training to assist employees in performing their security duties for example: maintaining cargo integrity, recognizing potential internal threats to security and protecting access controls?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the organization make employees aware of the procedures the company has in place to report suspicious incidents?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the access control system incorporate immediate removal of a terminated employee's company-issued identification and access to sensitive areas and information systems?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are procedures employed to ensure that all information used for cargo processing, both electronic and manual, is legible, timely, accurate, and protected against alteration, loss or introduction of erroneous data?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does an organization shipping or receiving cargo reconcile the cargo with the appropriate shipping documentation?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Does the organization ensure that cargo information received from business partners is reported accurately and in a timely manner?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is relevant data protected through use of storage systems not contingent on the operation of the primary data handling system (is there a data back up process in place)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do all users have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal and sole use, to ensure that their activities can be traced to them?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is an effective password management system employed to authenticate users and are users required to change their passwords at least annually?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is there protection against unauthorized access to and misuse of information?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goods and Conveyance Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are procedures in place to restrict, detect, and report unauthorized access to all shipping, loading dock areas and closed cargo transport unit storage?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are qualified persons designated to supervise cargo operations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are procedures in place for notifying appropriate law enforcement in cases where anomalies or illegal activities are detected or suspected by the organization?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are procedures in place to ensure the integrity of the goods/cargo when the goods/cargo are delivered to another organization (transportation provider, consolidation centre, intermodal facility, etc.) in the supply chain?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are processes in place to track changes in threat levels along transport routes?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factor | Yes | No | Comments
---|---|---|---
- Are there security rules, procedures or guidance provided to conveyance operators (for example, the avoidance of dangerous routes)? |  |  |  
Closed Cargo Transport Units

(WCO SAFE Framework includes a “Seal Integrity Program” described in the Appendix to Annex 1 that sets out procedures regarding the affixing and verification of high security seals and/or other tamper detection devices. Personnel filling in this form should review that section of the Framework).

- If a closed cargo transport unit is used, are there documented procedures for affixing and recording high security mechanical seals meeting ISO/PAS 17712 and/or other tamper-detection devices by the party stuffing the cargo unit? |  |  |  
- If a sealed closed cargo transport unit is used, are there documented procedures in place to inspect seals for signs of tampering when the custody of conveyances changes during the course of a shipment and to address detected discrepancies? |  |  |  
- If a closed cargo transport unit is used, is it inspected for contamination by the party stuffing immediately before stuffing? |  |  |  

If closed cargo transport units are used, are documented procedures in place for inspecting them immediately before stuffing by the party stuffing them to verify their physical integrity, to include the reliability of the unit locking mechanisms? A seven-point inspection process is recommended:

- Front wall
- Left side
- Right side
- Floor
- Ceiling/Roof
- Inside/outside closure
- Outside/Undercarriage

A.3.4 Security threat scenarios

During the security assessment consider security threat scenarios, including but not limited to those listed in Table A.2. The security assessment should also consider other scenarios that may be determined by government authorities, the organization’s management or the security professional(s) conducting the assessment.
Table A.2 — Security threat scenarios to the supply chain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security threat scenarios</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Intrude and/or take control of an asset (including conveyances) within the supply chain.</td>
<td>Damage/destroy an asset (including conveyances). Damage/destroy outside target using the asset or goods. Cause civil or economic disturbance. Take hostages/kill people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Use the supply chain as a means of smuggling</td>
<td>Illegal weapons into or out of the country/economy Terrorist into or out of the country/economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Information tampering</td>
<td>Locally or remotely gaining access the supply chain's information/documentation systems for the purpose of disrupting operations or facilitating illegal activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cargo Integrity</td>
<td>Tampering, sabotage and/or theft for the purpose of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Unauthorized use</td>
<td>Conducting operations in the international supply chain to facilitate a terrorist incident including using the mode of transportation as a weapon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A.4 Development of the security plan

A.4.1 General

The security plan and/or annexes may be incorporated into operational plans or procedures and need not be stand-alone documents. If the security plan is incorporated into other plans the organization should maintain a cross-reference table to enable verification that all the security plan requirements have been met.

The plan may be separated into annexes in which each describes the security in place for a particular segment of the supply chain, including security measures that their business partners will maintain according to their security declarations (if applicable). The plan/annexes should also specify how the organization would monitor or periodically review their security declarations. The security plan/annex should include, but should not be limited to, descriptions of the following.

- The portion of the supply chain that is covered by the plan or annex.
- The security-related duties of all security personnel.
- The security management structure including the name of the person designated as manager of security.
- Internal and external emergency security contact information to be used by personnel in reporting a security incident.
- The skills and knowledge that personnel with security responsibilities are required to possess.
- Security training programmes.
- The qualification process for people assigned security duties that ensures they possess the necessary skills and knowledge to perform their security duties.
- How elements of the security plan are exercised. Participation in government run security drills or exercises by organization personnel can be used to meet these requirements.
Processes to meet, at a minimum, security requirements imposed by government for contingencies or heightened security levels.

The Security Plan should contain procedures including but not limited to the arrangements that do the following.

- Ensure that information on a shipment of goods is received before the goods being shipped are accepted by the organization for further transportation.
- Ensure goods/cargoes received for consolidation/deconsolidation are accurately reconciled against information on goods/cargo manifests/lists. Departing goods/cargo units should be verified against purchase or delivery orders.
- Ensure drivers delivering or receiving goods/cargo are positively identified before goods or cargo units are received or released.
- Ensure occupants of vehicles other than drivers are positively identified.
- Ensure all shortages, overages, and other significant discrepancies or anomalies are resolved and/or investigated appropriately and appropriate law enforcement agencies be notified if illegal or suspicious activities are detected as appropriate.
- Describe any countermeasures that have been implemented in that portion of the supply chain.
- Describe any measures and procedures that have been implemented in that portion of the supply chain for security recovery in the event of a security incident.
- Describe any measures and procedures that have been implemented when custody of the goods/cargo is transferred to another organization.
- Describe procedures for releasing additional information on the goods being shipped to authorized personnel. This should include both how the user will determine if the request for additional information is legitimate and how/what information is released.
- Describe procedures established according to A.4.3.

A.4.2 Documentation

The organization should maintain the most recent documentation of the following at a secure retrievable location.

- Statements of coverage.
- The completed security assessment.
- Names and qualifications of the personnel conducting the security assessment.
- Listing of all countermeasures that were considered.
- Security declarations.
- Security plan and, if applicable, annexes.
- Records of training sessions and exercises conducted, personnel who attended, subjects trained, and date(s).
- Other as prescribed by regulation or management.
A.4.3 Communication

The organization should where practicable establish contact with appropriate law enforcement and other government officials for the purposes of the following.

— Establishing procedures to be followed in the event of or suspicion of goods/cargo tampering, emergencies related to, or the receipt of threats concerning the international supply chain. These procedures should, if provided, include specific telephone numbers to be called at the appropriate government agencies. These procedures should be incorporated into the organization’s supply chain security plan.

— Participating in consultations lead by appropriate government officials at both the national and local levels (as appropriate) to discuss matters of mutual interest including custom regulations and procedures and requirements for premise and consignment security.

— Being responsive to government outreach efforts and to contribute to a dialog that provides meaningful insight to ensure that the organization’s security plan remains relevant and effective.

If the appropriate law enforcement and other government officials do not wish to participate in such a dialog, the organization should document their attempt(s) and state that appropriate law enforcement and other government officials did not participate at that time.

A.5 Execution of the security plan

The implementation of the new or revised security plan represents a change to operational practices and needs to be undertaken in accordance with the organization’s management system to ensure that adequate resources are available, the impact on other operations in managed and the effectiveness of the plan is monitored and evaluated.

A.6 Documentation and monitoring of the security process

The organization should establish and maintain procedures to monitor and measure the performance of its security management system to ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy and effectiveness. The organization should consider the associated security threats and risks, including potential deterioration mechanisms and their consequences, when setting the frequency for measuring and monitoring the key performance parameters.

A.7 Continual improvement

Management in operational control of that portion of the supply chain should review the organization’s security management system to assess opportunities for improvement and the need for changes to the security management system.
**Annex B**

(informative)

**Methodology for security risk assessment and development of countermeasures**

**B.1 General**

This Annex gives a methodology that may be used by organizations in international supply chains to make an assessment of the risk that their operations may suffer from security incidents, to determine the appropriate countermeasures, effective for the type and size of their supply chain operations. This methodology uses the following sequence.

a) List all activities as covered in the Scope.

b) Identify security controls presently in place.

c) Identify security threat scenarios.

d) Determine consequences if the security threat scenario was completed.

e) What is the likelihood of this happening considering current security.

f) Are control security measures adequate.

g) If not develop additional security measures.

Figure B.1 is a graphical representation of a process.
B.2 Step one – Consideration of the security threat scenarios

The security assessment should consider as a minimum the security threat scenarios listed in Table B.1. The security assessment should also consider other scenarios identified by government authorities, supply chain management or the security professional conducting the assessment.
### Table B.1 — Security threat scenarios to the supply chain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example security threat scenarios</th>
<th>Application example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Intrude and/or take control of an asset (including conveyances) within the supply chain.</td>
<td>Damage/destroy the asset. Damage/destroy outside target using the asset or goods. Cause civil or economic disturbance. Take hostages/kill people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Use the supply chain as a means of smuggling</td>
<td>Illegal weapons into or out of the country/economy Terrorist into or out of the country/economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Information tampering</td>
<td>Locally or remotely gaining access to the supply chain's information/documentation systems for the purpose of disrupting operations or facilitating illegal activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Cargo Integrity</td>
<td>Tampering, sabotage and/or theft for the purpose of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Unauthorized use</td>
<td>Conducting operations in the international supply chain to facilitate a terrorist incident (e.g. using the means of transport as a weapon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the assessment consider the following.

— **Access control**
  - on premises of the organization in the supply chain, including the neighbourhood;
  - on the means of transportation (truck, rail, air, barge, ship, etc.);
  - on information;
  - others.

— **Means of transportation (trucks, railway, barges, aircraft, ships, etc.), taking into account**
  - normal operation;
  - maintenance shops (e.g. yards);
  - changes due to e.g. break downs;
  - change of means;
  - conveyances while at rest;
  - using means of transport as a weapon;
  - other.

— **Handling**
  - loading;
• manufacturing;
• storage (including intermediate storage);
• transfer;
• unloading;
• deconsolidation/consolidation;
• other.

— Transportation of goods by
• air;
• road;
• rail;
• inland waterway shipping;
• ocean shipping;
• other.

— Intrusion detection/prevention applied to shipments.

— During inspections, e.g. vehicle inspections.

— Employees
• level of competence, training and awareness;
• integrity;
• other.

— Use of business partners.

— Communication internal/external:
• information exchange;
• emergency situations;
• other.

— Handling or processing of information about cargo or transport routes
• data protection;
• data assurance;
• other.

— External information
• legal;
• orders by authorities;
• industry practices;
• accidents and incidents;
• first response capability and response times;
• other.

B.3 Step two – Classification of consequences

An evaluation of consequences should consider potential loss of life and economic loss. The consequences of each security incident evaluated in the supply chain should be classified as high, medium, or low (see Table B.2). A numerical system may be used in the assessment process, as long as the numerical results are converted to a qualitative system.

Rationales for the classifications of consequences for each security incident should be documented.

Care should be taken in establishing values of “high”, “medium” and “low” consequences. The use of excessively low threshold values may result in the requirement that countermeasures be considered for more security threat scenarios than are needed. However, using excessively high threshold values may omit countermeasures for security threat scenarios involving consequences that the organization or government under which it is operating cannot tolerate.

A “high” consequence classification may be considered as a consequence that would be unacceptable in all but low likelihood situations.

A “medium” classification of consequence may be considered as a consequence that would be unacceptable in a high likelihood situation.

A “low” classification of consequence may be considered as a consequence that is normally acceptable.

Acceptability should not be confused with desirability or approval. Rather, acceptability could be considered as a judgment of the amount of possible damage that the organization or government under which it is operating is willing to accept under certain conditions related to probability. An organization or government may determine that the possibility of a certain level of damage may be undesirable yet acceptable.
Table B.2 — Classification of consequence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assign a rating</th>
<th>Consequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Death &amp; Injury - loss of life on a certain scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and /or Economic Impact - major damage to a asset and/or infrastructure preventing further operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and /or Environmental Impact - complete destruction of multiple aspects of the ecosystem over a large area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td>Death &amp; Injury - for example loss of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and /or Economic Impact -- for example damage to asset and/or infrastructure requiring repairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and /or Environmental Impact -- for example long term damage to a portion of the ecosystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>Death &amp; Injury – injuries but no loss of life,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and /or Economic Impact - minimal damage to a asset and/or infrastructure and systems,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and /or Environmental Impact – some environmental damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B.4 Step three – Classification of likelihood of security incidents**

The status of physical and operational security measures in the supply chain as documented in the security performance review list and other documentation provided should be taken into account in classifying potential security incidents. Physical security measures include objects that impede or detect unauthorized access to a target. Operational security measures include people and procedures that impede or detect unauthorized access to a target. The likelihood of each security incident occurring at a particular asset should be classified as high, medium and low.

— **High likelihood** should be used when the security measures in place offer little resistance to the security incident occurring. If a numerical system is used in the assessment process, the numerical results should be converted into this qualitative system.

— **Medium likelihood** should be used when the security measures in place offer moderate resistance to the security incident occurring.

— **Low likelihood** should be used in cases where the security measures in place offer substantial resistance to the security incident occurring.

The rationale for the classification of likelihood assigned to each security incident should be documented.
B.5 Step four – Security incident scoring

The security incident scoring chart given in Table B.3 is an example that may be used to determine when countermeasures should be considered for specific security incidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIKELIHOOD CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Countermeasures</td>
<td>Countermeasures</td>
<td>Consider*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Countermeasures</td>
<td>Countermeasure or Consider as appropriate</td>
<td>Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>Document</td>
<td>Document</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identification of countermeasures is required for security incidents that score high in both likelihood and consequences, as well as for those scoring at medium likelihood and high consequences. Other security incidents need not include countermeasures, unless they are considered advisable by evaluator. The person assessing the security should list each security incident required to be considered for countermeasures.

NOTE Appropriate law enforcement and other government officials may specify countermeasures for certain extremely high consequence scenarios to be enacted regardless of likelihood as a matter of national policy. Countermeasures developed as a result of this exception should be reviewed by the government requiring them for effectiveness.

B.6 Step five – Development of countermeasures

If the development of a countermeasure is required or considered advisable by the evaluator both the consequences and/or likelihood of the security threat scenario should be considered for mitigation. Reducing the likelihood of the security threat scenario succeeding or reducing the harm that can be caused by the security threat scenarios to a level in which additional countermeasures are no longer required is the objective.

Countermeasures may come under the following actions.

— **Treat**: may be organizational and/or physical measures.

— **Transfer**: transfer of the risk may be subcontracting, physical transfer to other locations, time, etc.

— **Terminate**: it is possible that due to the level of risk the organization decides not to continue the activities.

In certain circumstances an organization may have to tolerate (see note) a risk due to impracticality of the countermeasures needed, lack of authority to impose the countermeasures needed or other insurmountable factors.

NOTE Tolerate the situation is such that no action can be taken by the organization. These activities and evaluations should be documented and under periodic review.
B.7 Step six – Implementation of countermeasures

New countermeasures represent a change to operational practices and need to be enacted in accordance with the organization’s management system to ensure that adequate resources are available; the impact on other operations is managed and the change has the support of management.

B.8 Step seven – Evaluation of countermeasures

Using the methods specified in this standard, each countermeasure should be assessed for effectiveness in lowering the likelihood or consequences (or a combination of them) until the security risk no longer requires that additional countermeasures be considered. The countermeasure achieving this is considered to be effective, and should be listed in the security assessment report.

B.9 Step eight – Repetition of the process

After countermeasures have been developed and evaluated as effective continue the process for the next security threat scenario until the scenario list is depleted.

B.10 Continuation of the process

The process of assessment is continual. As Figure B.1 illustrates, security must be monitored continually to ensure security measures are performing as intended and the assessment process should be performed as needed.
Annex C
(informative)

Guidance for obtaining advice and certification

C.1 General

Organizations intending to implement ISO 28001 are not obliged to obtain the services of an outside consultant. If an organization determines that it needs advice or help with; carrying out security assessments, developing security plans, or implementing the necessary requirements, it may seek external consulting services. It is, however, the responsibility of the organization seeking advice to check and verify the competence of consultants offering advisory services, for example by seeking recommendations, following up references or by reviewing work carried out. Consultants that provide services to the organization would be precluded from participating in third party audits of the same organization.

C.2 Demonstrating conformance with ISO 28001 by audit

ISO 28001 is a requirements specification intended to help organizations, which opt to voluntarily implement the requirements, establish and demonstrate an appropriate level of security within those part(s) of the international supply chain(s) they control. It therefore serves as a basis for determining, validating or demonstrating the level of existing security within organizations’ supply chain(s) through a first, second or third party audit process, or by any government agency that choose to use compliance with this standard as the basis for acceptance into their supply chain security programmes.

Types of audit:

— A first party audit is the self determination of conformance by the organization itself.

— A second party audit is the determination or verification of an organization’s conformance to agreed criteria by another organization, agency or body which has a vested interest in the organization’s operations in the supply chain.

— A third party audit is a determination or verification of conformance to agreed criteria by an organization independent of all parties.

Validation and certification by government or government agency.

Government agencies that choose to use compliance with this standard as the basis for acceptance into their supply chain security programmes may wish to certify and validate such compliance themselves or to avoid duplication they may choose to rely on audits by other parties. The WCO sets guidelines for Customs administrations regarding validation and certification requirements for national Customs supply chain security programmes in conformance with the WCO SAFE Framework, and for mutual recognition of such programmes.

C.3 Certification of ISO 28001 by third party certification bodies

If demonstration of compliance is sought through the third party audit process then the organization seeking certification should consider selecting a third party certification body accredited by a competent accreditation body, such as those which are members of the International Accreditation Forum Inc. (IAF) and subject to the IAF Multilateral Recognition Arrangement (MLA). Such accredited certification bodies comply with internationally recognised rules, codes of practice and audit protocols, such as ISO 17021 and ISO 19011. See section on notes.
Bibliography

[1] ISO 17021:2006, Conformity assessment — Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of management systems


[8] World Customs Organization, SAFE Framework of standards — Appendix to Annex 1