



Skagerrak Chemical Oil Spill Pollution Exercise 2017

# **SCOPE 2017**

ECHO/SUB/2016/742253

Langesund / Grenland Area, NO

25 – 29 September 2017

## **EVALUATION REPORT**

SCOPE 2017 Evaluation Team

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## A PREFACE

The Skagerrak Chemical Oil Spill Pollution Exercise 2017 (SCOPE 2017) is a joint project of the Norwegian Coastal Administration as the coordinator with its partners, the Swedish Coast Guard, Defence Command Denmark, the Environment Agency of Iceland, South-East Police District Norway and Intermunicipal Emergency Response Organisation (IUA) in Telemark county of Norway.

The core portion of the project was a 3-days, full-scale exercise preceded by an approximately 9-months planning process. It was conducted in the southern Norwegian area of Grenland, in the general area of Langesund from 26 - 28 September 2017. SCOPE 2017 was based on a scenario of a product tanker and a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tanker colliding in the area south of Langesund in Telemark County (south-east coast of Norway; Skagerrak) on 26 September 2017. The consequences of the accident were an oil spill at sea with consequences to the shore line and a gas leak with consequences for the population in the surrounding coastal areas. The field exercise portion of SCOPE 2017 covered therefore the following operations: chemical incident at sea, oil spill recovery operations at sea, oil spill recovery operations on the shoreline, investigation and evacuation / chemical incident at berth.

The field exercise portion of SCOPE 2017 brought together mainly assets from the host nation Norway as well as Sweden and Denmark. Overall, the exercise brought together approx. 700 participants and staff.

Other features of the project include a notification and request for assistance (NaRA) workshop, a claims workshop and a place of refuge table-top exercise. The latter was co-located and synchronized with SCOPE 2017 at the end of the field exercise, but organised outside the SCOPE project.

SCOPE 2017 is co-financed by the organising / participating countries and organisations and the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) in the framework of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).

For the main objectives of the exercise see Chapter B "Executive summary, best practices and key recommendations" below.

The evaluation report for exercise SCOPE 2017 describes observations from the project SCOPE 2017 according to the defined evaluation focus areas. It allows insight in the analysis of these observations and provides recommendations pertaining to these focus areas and beyond. The exercise also allowed the identification of a number of best practices. Both, **recommendations** and **BEST PRACTICES** are described in the executive summary as well as in the referring chapters of this report.

This report is part of a bigger evaluation system implemented for the SCOPE 2017 project and exercise. Evaluation has taken place / is taking place on several levels:

- Many of the participating organisations shared their internal organisational evaluation reports with the organizers; the Norwegian Coastal Administration is the repository for these reports.

- Certain features and phases of the project / exercise SCOPE 2017 have produced evaluation reports for their respective activities (e. g. the Notification and Request for Assistance (NaRA) exercise which took place in early September 2017 and the Claims Management Workshop which was part of the overall exercise on 27/28 September 2017) (See appendix 1 and 2).
- Academic research and evaluation conducted by the Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Crisis Management of the University College of Southeast Norway (USN).
- On higher level, all evaluation results will be included in the overall report for the project SCOPE 2017.

The evaluation process for SCOPE 2017 finds its continuation in a way forward process which will cumulate in a way forward workshop in September 2018 and a way forward plan.

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## **B EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, BEST PRACTICES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**

Measured against the main objectives of SCOPE 2017 which were to:

- Contribute to improved national and international coordination of vessel accidents involving hazardous and polluting cargoes; and
- Strengthen the collaboration between the signatories to the Copenhagen agreement, Bonn agreement and, with EU support, make best possible use of resources, services and guidelines offered through the EU

and the defined further aims of the exercise:

- Preparing a scenario and arrangements for the exercise which contribute to realistic challenges for all participants in such areas as coordination, information management and other conditions of significance for effective management of the incident;
- Implement correct notification measures nationally and internationally, including activation of the mechanism and the mobilization of international support (Copenhagen agreement, EU, Bonn agreement) by using the CECIS marine pollution platform;
- Have arrangements for host nation support which contribute to receiving and following up foreign entities in accordance with the EU's host nation support guidelines, national guidelines and the NCA's plans;
- Train and exercise on collaboration between Norwegian (local, regional and national) players and between national and international players over conditions involving serious oil and chemical pollution, based on the description in the available emergency preparedness plans;
- Train and exercise plans for claims management;
- Train and exercise plans for place of refuge pursuant to the new guidelines from the EU and national plans; and
- Train and exercise an EU Civil Protection Team (EUCPT) to a marine pollution incident.

**the exercise fulfilled its purpose.**

In their feedback and evaluations, participating and organizing countries, organisations, organisational units and individuals expressed their satisfaction with the achievements related to the main objectives as well as with the planning, preparation and conduct of the exercise.

### **BEST PRACTICES:**

- Use of real-life, historical events: on several levels of the exercise, the "Full City"-accident from July 2009, which caused a major pollution exactly in the area where SCOPE 2017 took place, was used as a background to the scenario which added to the realism for the exercise.
- Evaluation was brought into the process at an early stage of the exercise planning.
- The preparation for safety (especially work safety) was done in an exemplary manner in SCOPE 2017.

- At the end of the field-portion of exercise SCOPE 2017, the organizers foresaw a dedicated demobilisation-phase of approximately three hours in order to allow for a planned and organized winding down of operations and transition into the after-exercise phase.
- Contents and documentation for SCOPE 2017 were developed in time, all the necessary stakeholders were integrated in the planning and the results were communicated widely on a need-to-know basis.

### **Key recommendations:**

#### **SCOPE 2017 project related recommendations:**

- *Whereas a close regional cooperation, as exercised in SCOPE 2017, benefits its partners particularly because of the familiarity with each other's procedures, processes, way of communicating and acting, personnel and equipment, a widening going beyond the region could be considered in order to increase the access to more resources (expertise, equipment, knowledge and experience, etc.). If the integration of modules, teams, experts, etc. appears not practical, the further establishment of bi- and multilateral agreements on the provision of equipment could be examined. As a secondary effect this would probably positively impact on interoperability in marine incident response operations.*
- *The better integration of the notification and request tools (SafeSeaNet and CECIS MP) or decision for one of them depending on the underlying situation as well as improvement suggestions for both of them could be part of the way forward process after SCOPE 2017.*
- *Whilst some organisations do have their respective evaluation methodology / system, others do not. Additionally, evaluation is conducted on several levels as described in the preface of this report. The possibility of a national (or potentially even regional) evaluation methodology might be examined in order to increase the comparability of evaluation results of exercises. In turn, this might lead to an increase in impact of recommendations by better implementation into the (supra-) organisational memory.*

#### **SCOPE 2017 exercise proper related recommendations:**

- *Despite the fact that the openness and transparency in the planning process should be kept, a more stringent division in exercise planning and control staff on one hand and exercise participants on the other could be considered.*
- *Acknowledging the fact that a complex marine pollution (and related) exercise with a sea, air and land component leaves limited room for free-flow in the exercise, ways to allow for more participants-induced action and flexibility could be explored.*
- *As the "Full City" – accident of 2009 is well documented (and possible response exercised), it could be taken as a basic scenario for further marine pollution exercises and exported into other geographical regions and national / regional systems.*
- *While the advantages of controllers coming from the organisational unit he / she belongs to in their day-to-day function are unquestionable (subject matter expertise, knowledge of systems, language, etc.), it could be considered to rather assign neutral and independent controllers (= from another organisation) in order to avoid undue involvement in the practical work of the operational units.*

- *Strengthening of the feedback-loop from controllers to exercise control in future exercises in order to allow for better situational awareness and reaction possibilities.*
- *In future regional, very specialized marine pollution exercises the possibilities of a) not engaging an EUCPT at all (contractual obligations need to be changed), b) reducing the EUCPT to a mere expert liaison element (focussing on the exchange of expertise) or c) increased planning for the integration of an EUCPT could be examined.*
- *For regionally focussed exercises it could be considered, mainly for language reasons, to assign also the main responsible for evaluation (team leader) from the region, but outside the participating organisations.*

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## C EVALUATION FOCUS AREAS, METHODOLOGY AND ORGANISATION

This chapter describes methodology and organisation used to evaluate defined focus areas of the exercise SCOPE 2017 in line with the aim and objectives of SCOPE 2017, the terms of reference of the Evaluation Manager, the provisions for exercise evaluation in the exercise instructions and discussions with the Core Planning Team (CPT) and Project Group (PG) of SCOPE 2017.

The key components of the evaluation methodology and organisation included:

### **Methodology:**

The methodology utilised was **observation, analysis and recommendation (OAR)** which enabled the capture of 'significant events' with consideration of causal factors, responding actions and consequences providing outcomes for further development.

a. On-site and remote **observation** / interviews: Evaluators carried out physical and remote observation of organisations, modules, teams, staff and individuals during the exercise. Evaluators assessed and documented the overall exercise structure and the conduction of the exercise as well as the coordination / cooperation performance of the exercise participants based on the main objectives of SCOPE 2017 without pinpointing individuals or specific organisations (unless explicitly requested to do so). Therefore, the focus was on processes and procedures.

Evaluators occasionally interviewed individuals to clarify observations and confirm the analysis of given situations without interfering in the exercise flow. These observation / interview results were collected on both, templates and free-text notes in order to allow for standardized and structured analysis on one hand and enough depth and individual observations / comments on the other.

Observations and interviews followed a detailed daily schedule which included (but was not limited to) on-site observations, participation in meetings and (de-) briefings (where appropriate), individual consultations with participants (see above) and directing staff.

b. **Analysis:** The evaluation team analysed the observations and findings as described above by comparing them against each other, exercise documentation, existing standards, manuals, methodologies, best practices, legislation, etc., putting them into a historical context (e. g. to describe developments) and / or cross-checking them.

c. **Recommendations:** Formulate possible ways forward, define areas for improvement, application of existing tools and / or suggest new approaches and developments on all levels related to the focus areas of evaluation for SCOPE 2017. Findings with an immediate impact on the on-going exercise will be shared with the exercise management immediately. Initial findings and recommendations were shared at the hot-wash at the end of the exercise whereas further developed recommendations are part of this evaluation report.

**Reporting and cooperation:** During the exercise the evaluation team reported to the Exercise Director (on organisational matters) and cooperated with all other exercise participants and directing staff. Before and after the exercise the evaluation team cooperated with the Project Manager and the CPT of SCOPE 2017. All evaluation activities were carried out in close cooperation



with the exercise management and the directing staff of SCOPE 2017 as well as the directing staff, role-players and exercise participants without interfering with the exercise conduct and flow (with the exception of work safety issues).

The evaluation team for SCOPE 2017 consisted of Andor Antonsen (Norwegian Coastal Administration / NO), Frank Liechti (Danish National Police / DK), Leif Inge Magnussen (University College of Southeast Norway / NO) and Wolfgang Krajic (Evaluation Team Leader, Synergies International Consulting / AT).

On 6 / 7 February 2018 an Evaluation Workshop hosted by Defence Command Denmark was held in Viborg / DK. 25 participants from the project management, CPT, PG, selected stakeholders and the evaluation team discussed topics around lessons identified from the evaluation of SCOPE 2017. The results of the discussions have been integrated in this report.

The evaluation team thanks all exercise participants and staff, organisations and individuals for their cooperation and contributions before, during and after the exercise.

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## **D EVALUATION RESULTS FOR THE FOCUS AREAS INCLUDING BEST PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1) Exercise planning, preparation and conduct**

#### **General**

The majority of exercise staff and participants stressed the fact that one important, possibly the most important, feature of SCOPE 2017 was the cooperation and coordination between all stakeholders in the exercise before, during and after the event. Going far beyond regular networking activities on organisational and personal levels, already the planning phase for SCOPE 2017 provided ample opportunities for all involved to:

- Cooperate across organisational boundaries with other agencies with whom no or little prior contacts existed on national and regional levels;
- Clarify responsibilities, borders and interfaces between different actors;
- Exchange expertise within and outside the narrow and wider scope of SCOPE 2017; and
- Increase the network of agencies familiar with each other's work, structures, personnel, etc.

The exercise planning and preparation process for SCOPE 2017 was characterized by timeliness, openness and transparency. Contents and documentation were developed in time, all the necessary stakeholders were integrated in the planning and the results were communicated widely on a need-to-know basis (**BEST PRACTICE**).

The downside of openness and transparency, paired with organisational necessities of organizing an exercise like SCOPE 2017, was that there were no significant surprise elements for participants in the field portion of the exercise. Timings, locations, tasks and expected outcomes were either known to the participants before the exercise or they were directed by exercise control during the exercise (see also below and "controller system"). From the start of the planning process, the organizers stressed the fact that the exercise SCOPE 2017 was intended to be a training and learning exercise. This led, in turn, to a reduction of testing (except on technical and very operational levels), exercise participants' induced decision-making and action, freedom to manoeuvre and flexibility. Testing was carried out on technical issues like oil spill simulation and aerial surveillance, the user-friendliness and technicalities of existing communication and information systems (SafeSeaNet vs CECIS MP, etc.). Partly owed to time, organisational, technical, safety and other constraints, the possibilities for decision making for exercise participants (incl. assessments, etc.), taking "windows of opportunity" and following up were rather limited. On some occasions constraints from legal provisions (working times, road and customs regulations, health and safety, etc.) were encountered as exercises are not exempt from these regulations whereas real-life operations (at least partially) are.

On several levels the "Full City"-accident from July 2009, which caused a major pollution exactly in the area where SCOPE 2017 took place, was used as a background to the scenario which added to the realism for the exercise (**BEST PRACTICE**). Several staff who were involved in the "Full City"-response operation and follow-up supported in the exercise and shared their experience.

**Recommendation:** *Despite the fact that the openness and transparency in the planning process should be kept, a more stringent division in exercise planning and control staff on one hand and exercise participants on the other could be considered.*

**Recommendation:** *Acknowledging the fact that a complex marine pollution (and related) exercise with a sea, air and land component leaves limited room for free-flow in the exercise, ways to allow for more participants-induced action and flexibility could be explored.*

**Recommendation:** *As the “Full City” – accident of 2009 is well documented (and possible response exercised), it could be taken as a basic scenario for further marine pollution exercises and exported into other geographical regions and national / regional systems.*

At the end of the field-portion of exercise SCOPE 2017, the organizers foresaw a dedicated demobilisation phase of approximately three hours in order to allow for a planned and organized winding down of operations and transition into the after-exercise phase (**BEST PRACTICE**).

### **Information management and information flow, participants preparation**

Overall, all levels and phases of information management worked well during the planning, preparation and conduct of exercise SCOPE 2017. The openness and transparency of the planning process (see above) and the proper use of available communication tools and channels (see below) contributed significantly to the fact that information needs were satisfied on all levels. On occasion, operational and technical personnel amongst the exercise participants lacked the “bigger picture” of the exercise as nowadays everyone wants to know everything (dilemma between “need-to-know” and “nice-to-know”). A commonly observed issue arose to some extent also in SCOPE 2017. Some participants arrived in the exercise without proper contextual and mental preparation (familiarity with the scenario, reading of the exercise handbook, “it is only a three-day exercise and then I can go home again”-mentality, etc.).

### **Exercise control**

Exercise control (in SCOPE 2017 referred to as “DISTAFF”) functioned flawlessly and appeared to be always on top of the situation due to a number of determining factors. The most important one was the continuity in personnel and functions. Members of the DISTAFF who had been in charge of planning and preparing the exercise in the CPT also kept these functions during the exercise which led to a minimum of information loss and maximum of knowledge about the overall exercise situation. DISTAFF had a complete operational picture of the exercise at all times due to a well-organized system of human and technical resources. A slightly increased number of scripted situations (“injects”) separated in “fixed” (absolutely necessary at a certain time for the proper continuation of the exercise) and “free” (only to be used if and when the need for additional activities arises, could have further enhanced the flow of the exercise. All of these situations (“injects”) in the Detailed Scenario Episode Catalogue (DSEC) need a description of the expected outcome in order to a) be able to measure participants’ reactions against these outcomes and b) to support the task of the controllers.

### **Controller system and choice of personnel**

In principle, the system of having controllers with the operational units participating in the exercise as a link between exercise control and exercise participants worked well. After the conclusion of the exercise, DISTAFF remarked that a tighter feedback-loop from controllers to exercise control would have been advantageous. On several occasions it could be observed that the controllers attributed to organisational units did not to the last extent understand their role. Particularly when the controllers organisationally belonged to the unit they were responsible for, they showed a tendency to get involved into the tactical work of the participating unit. At times, controllers brought in for the exercise only (not involved in the planning and preparation process) struggled with keeping the overview especially on tactical level and if they were assigned to more than one organisational units.

**Recommendation:** *While the advantages of controllers coming from the organisational unit he / she belongs to in their day-to-day function are unquestionable (subject matter expertise, knowledge of systems, language, etc.), it could be considered to rather assign neutral and independent controllers (= from another organisation) in order to avoid undue involvement in the practical work of the operational units. An initial step could be a very clear distinction between communication channels in the operational chain of command on one hand and exercise control on the other.*

**Recommendation:** *Strengthening of the feedback-loop from controllers to exercise control in future exercises in order to allow for better situational awareness and reaction possibilities.*

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### **2) Integration in and use of existing systems and tools**

As per its main objectives and the contract with the European Commission / DG ECHO, the overall project SCOPE 2017 and its exercise were mainly based on the Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances ("Bonn Agreement"; members: BE, DK, EU (DG ECHO, EMSA), FR, DE, IE, NL, NO, SE, UK), the "Copenhagen Agreement" (on Nordic Cooperation for the Marine Environment, members: DK, IS, FI, NO, SE) and the European Union's Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). The first two regional agreements were the underlying and driving factors for the exercise SCOPE 2017. The majority of assets planned for and present in the exercise were based on these agreements which resulted in a strong regional focus. As a result, Norwegian, Danish and Swedish personnel, assets / equipment, processes and languages were strongly represented which supported the integrity and continuity of planning and operational activities. Many meetings, but also operational parts of the exercise, were conducted in the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish languages; only outside communication was conducted in English. Only the official exercise documentation was available in English, no exercise working documents.

**Recommendation:** *Whereas a close regional cooperation benefits its partners particularly because of the familiarity with each other's procedures, processes, way of communicating and acting, personnel and equipment, a widening going beyond the region could be considered in order to increase the access to more resources (expertise, equipment, knowledge and experience, etc.). If the integration of modules, teams, experts, etc. appears not practical, the widening of bi- and multilateral agreements on the provision of equipment could be examined. As a secondary effect this would probably positively impact on an increase in interoperability.*

Amongst experts on the exercise staff and participants, the necessity of updating / amending operational manuals of the Bonn and Copenhagen agreements were discussed intensively.

During the exercise phase of SCOPE 2017 (notification and request for assistance (NaRA) exercise (4 – 8 Sep 2017 and the field exercise portion of SCOPE 2017 (26 – 28 Sep 2017)), a number of tools and resources of the UCPM were used: the Common Emergency Communication and Information System / Marine Pollution (CECIS MP), an EU Civil Protection Team (EUCPT) and the Host Nations Support Guidelines (incl. the Norwegian national HNS concept as applicable). Assets of other Participating States (PS; other than signatories to the Copenhagen and Bonn Agreements) of the UCPM did not feature in the exercise.

Especially during the notification and request for assistance exercise, the differences in applicability, practicality, redundancy and integration between the two European tools used, SafeSeaNet and CECIS MP, were explored.

**Recommendation:** *As stated by the lessons identified workshop (25 September 2017) after the notification and request for assistance exercise, the better integration of the above mentioned notification and request tools (SafeSeaNet and CECIS MP) or decision for one of them depending on the underlying situation as well as improvement suggestions for both of them could be part of the way forward process after SCOPE 2017.*

Through the UCPM, an EUCPT was mobilized and present during the field portion of exercise SCOPE 2017. Whilst the members of the EUCPT undoubtedly benefitted from the experience of being a part of a marine pollution exercise, at times frustration could be sensed on both sides, the team not feeling utilized to the extent possible and the exercise participants not exactly being able to position an EUCPT correctly.

**Recommendation:** *In future regional, very specialized marine pollution exercises the possibilities of a) not engaging an EUCPT at all (contractual obligations need to be changed), b) reducing the EUCPT to a mere expert liaison element (focussing on the exchange of expertise) or c) increased planning for the integration of an EUCPT could be examined.*

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### **3) Other observations, best practices and recommendations**

#### **Exercise documentation and visibility**

The exercise documentation developed and provided as well as information sharing channels for SCOPE 2017 proved sufficient and of high quality to inform exercise participants and staff before and during the exercise. Besides the traditional information gathering and sharing tools like conferences and meetings, documentation, state-of-the-art communication channels like a dedicated webpage, pages and announcements on social media, social communication networks and applications were used. In a few instances, documentation (photo and video opportunities) impacted on operational exercise work. High attention was given to the visibility of the exercise (corporate design and appearance, etc.) which benefits the programme itself and the contributing (co-financing) partners.

### **Visitors and observers (VOB) programme and media relations**

Although a full-scale VOB programme took place during SCOPE 2017, hardly any negative impact on the exercise could be observed. During the VOB programme only very minor time adjustments and changes into “performance mode” were necessary due to thorough planning and strict synchronization (**BEST PRACTICE**). The presence of (real-life) media presence during SCOPE 2017 was hardly felt by exercise participants even though the exercise received substantial coverage. Main contributing factors were: proper channelling of media representatives, the easy availability of exercise key and PR personnel, and a pro-active, well-planned and timed media strategy. According to the media plan, SCOPE 2017 had a well-balanced and attractive presence on all available channels (traditional media and internet including social media channels).

### **Safety**

The preparation for as safe as can be exercise environment (especially work safety) was done in an exemplary manner in SCOPE 2017 (**BEST PRACTICE**). Before the exercise a very comprehensive “Health, Safety and Environment” concept and handbook were developed and made available to all exercise participants in time to familiarize themselves with the contents of the concept and handbook. Also owing to this, the exercise ended with no safety incidents worth mentioning. Exercise features that appeared to be too risky to be executed with the prevailing conditions (weather, etc.) were cancelled or adjusted. An occasional lack of safety awareness (improper or lacking use of personal protective equipment during technical operations on board participating vessels) could be observed with operational personnel. These safety infractions were not immediately reacted on by the safety and controlling staff present.

### **Evaluation and way forward**

High importance was attributed to the evaluation and way forward processes for SCOPE 2017. An external evaluator was brought into the process at an early stage of the exercise planning (**BEST PRACTICE**). With the project continuing for more than a year after the conduct of the full-scale exercise, significant time was allocated to the evaluation and way forward processes.

**Recommendation:** *For regionally focussed exercises it could be considered, mainly for language reasons, to assign also the main responsible for evaluation (team leader) from the region, but outside the participating organisations.*

**Recommendation:** *Whilst some organisations do have their respective evaluation methodology / system, others do not. Additionally, evaluation is conducted on several levels as described in the preface of this report. The possibility of a national (or potentially even regional) evaluation methodology might be examined in order to increase the comparability of evaluation results of exercises. In turn, this might lead to an increase in impact of recommendations by better implementation into the (supra-) organisational memory.*

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## **E LIST OF ACRONYMS**

CECIS	Common Emergency Communications and Information System
CECIS MP	CECIS Marine Pollution
CP	Civil Protection
CPT	Core Planning Team
DG	Director(ate)-general
DISTAFF	Directing staff
DSEC	Detailed Scenario Episode Catalogue
EC / DG ECHO	European Commission / Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EMSA	European Maritime Safety Agency
EU	European Union
EUCPT	European Civil Protection Team
EXCON	Exercise Control
NaRA	Notification and Request for Assistance
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host Nation Support
LPG	Liquefied petroleum gas
NaRA	Notification and request for assistance
NCA	Norwegian Coastal Administration
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAR	Observation, analysis and recommendation
PG	Project Group (= Core Planning Team of SCOPE 2017 + sub-group leaders)
PPE	Personal protective equipment
PR	Public relations
SCOPE	Skagerrak Chemical Oil Spill Pollution Exercise
SSN	SafeSeaNet
UCPM	Union Civil Protection Mechanism
VOB	Visitors and observers

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## Appendix 1

### Evaluation Report from the Claims Workshop





Norwegian Coastal Administration

# **CLAIMS MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP EVALUATION REPORT**

SCOPE 2017

Version 1.0



## Preface

Norway as well as all other countries, is exposed for the risk of serious accidents resulting in substantial consequences for both humans, the environment and material assets. Generally, the Skagerrak area is subject for the risk of vessel accidents that may influence both Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Amongst other, these countries are signatories in the Copenhagen Agreement and hence they are involved in annual cooperative exercises.

Together with the possibility and need for involving support from the EU, a full-scale exercise would improve cooperation and coordination between the involved parties, and strengthen the capacity and quality of the total pollution preparedness in the region.

Based on risk analysis, the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) decided to conduct a full-scale exercise in 2017, in the Grenland area. This exercise also incorporated the annual exercise between Norway, Sweden and Denmark as described in the Copenhagen Agreement. NCA decided to invite a broad range of exercise participants, and to seek partners and funding from the European Commission, in order to create a major oil- and chemical spill exercise in a European perspective.

Claims management is an important part of dealing with an accident, among other things based on the very expensive clean-up operations that often are the consequences of a spill. This is why NCA also decided to focus on Claims Management during this exercise and to arrange a claims workshop.

Our experience is that sharing of the best practice is very beneficial and important for persons working with these topics. Personal contact makes it easier to ask for advice when needed. Especially since accidents at sea often are very complicated and have many juridical aspects. Workshops like this is therefore an important arena. Overall, the NCA is satisfied with the arrangement, and there are several findings that we would like to highlight in different fora in 2018.



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## 1. Aims and Objectives

One of the main objectives of SCOPE 2017 was to strengthen collaboration between the signatories to the Copenhagen agreement, Bonn agreement and the EU. This included support, and to make the best possible use of the resources, services and guidelines offered through the agreements. This was also an important objective for the claims workshop.

The focus on the workshop was issues regarding liability and securing claims and on cooperation between different countries which are affected by pollution or threat of pollution following a shipping incident.



## 2. Agenda

The workshop covered the following topics:

- Liability, security and enforcement of claims following shipping incidents with pollution at sea
- EU States Claims Management Guidelines
- Compensation under the IOPC Funds regime
- The role of ITOPF during shipping incidents
- Presentation of cases involving international cooperation in claims management
- Joint session with the EU Place of Refuge TTX
- Group exercises related to liability and financial security in a scenario including PoR issues

See attached agenda for further details.

## 3. Conduct of workshop

The SCOPE2017 Claims Management workshop was a part of the exercise SCOPE2017 on 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> of September 2017 in Horten, Norway. The workshop organized by the NCA was also planned in cooperation with the EU Claims Management Working Group and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).

Forty-six participants from Norway, Iceland, EMSA, IOPC Funds, ITOPF and 15 EU member states attended the workshop.

The workshop was based on presentations and case studies focusing on cooperation between affected countries and group exercises.



#### **4. Joint session with Place of Refuge table top exercise and Claims WS Group exercise**

The first part of day two, there was arranged a joint session with the participants of the 3<sup>rd</sup> EU Table Top Exercise on the EU Operational Guidelines on Place of Refuge.

Following an update of the PoR TTX day 1 and presentations on claims management related to PoR issues by the Norwegian Coastal Administration and Gard, the following sub-jects were presented as a basis for the discussions in the following group exercise:

- the possible benefits and respective reasons for a harmonized adoption of international instruments by the countries involved in the coordination handover
- the role played by different limits of liability, where applicable, in the decision to offer a place of refuge
- the genuine weight of a Letter of Undertaking (LOU) from the P&I club issued only in respect of liabilities that are not already covered by Certificates provided in respect of the IMO Conventions
- the validity of LoU for beneficiary in another state, in case of handover and possible relation to conventions in force in the receiving state
- the question of request for open-end LoU or fixed sum LoU in line with standard LoU working in IMO PoR Guidelines
- the role played by the existence of a State Guarantee in the receiving state

Following the joint session, the participants of the Claims workshop were split in three groups for the exercise. The scenario for the exercise was based on the EU PoR TTX scenario. For further details, please see the attached group exercise scenario description (attached).

The discussion points for the group exercise was as follows:

1. Identify necessary actions related to the vessels request for PoR not covered by the coastal states ordinary claims management in relation to a ship incident
2. Is there any measures the ship owner could take to facilitate Denmark's assessment of the PoR request with regard to formal and financial considerations?
3. Which measures would you as coastal state take in Denmark's place to secure a possible cost recovery claim following the granting of the Place of Refuge?
4. Identify possible areas of cooperation that would mitigate the coastal states risk related to PoR requests and granting a PoR
5. Provided both states would like to request financial guarantee for possible expenses, is there any advantages of cooperation and what are the implications of a joint LoU
6. Identify the need for further guidelines or best practice related to formal matters in case of PoR, including financial security.

Based on the discussions during the group exercise we identified following findings:



- A number of questions related to claims management are of relevance to the coastal states in a PoR situation, in addition to the sole question of proof of insurance as covered by the principle stated in the PoR Guidelines.
- It may be considered by a coastal state to request a Letter of Undertaking or bank guarantee prior to offering a PoR, bearing in mind that under the VTMISS directive, the absence of proof of insurance in accordance to the insurance directive cannot in itself be sufficient reason to refuse PoR.
- The possibilities for joint Letter of Undertaking involving relevant countries should be further investigated. Challenges include differences in legal basis for compensation, mandates related to negotiations, jurisdiction and choice of law of the LoU.
- Possible means of cooperation to mitigate formal hindrances in the event of transfer of a PoR case should be further investigated. This could include a joint Letter of Undertaking or other cooperation related to security and claims management
- Further possibilities to establish routines to ensure financial security for coastal states in the event of PoR could be discussed. For example, offering of a LoU with a request for a PoR might contribute to a quick response from the coastal state. Such discussions could be arranged within the framework of the PoR CG and EU Claims Management Working Group.
- There is a need for further trainings or workshops highlighting the relationship between operational and formal considerations during incidents, preferable in joint trainings where claims and operational expertise can meet and exchange views and experience.
- Further questions related to the relationship between claims management and questions of PoR, hereunder the need for references between the EU PoR Guidelines and EU Claims Management Guidelines, could be considered to be discussed in joint ventures between the PoR CG and the EU Claims Management WG.
- Need for further review and references between relevant EU guidelines related to claims management in general could be considered, in order to establish a homogenous and well-functioning set of guidelines. This includes the EMSA Guidelines on Illegal Discharges, the EU PoR Guidelines and the possible future EMSA Oil Fingerprint (OSINET) guidelines and the EU Claims Management Guidelines. A review of the guidelines and possible need for cross-references or amendments might be carried out under the framework of the EU Claims Management WG in joint collaboration with the groups responsible for the other guidelines.
- Working for harmonised adoption of International instruments – in this case the HNS

## 5. Evaluation of the claims workshop in general

After the workshop, the NCA invited the participants to give an evaluation of the workshop. We sent a quest-back, and received answers from 21 participants. The overall aim of the evaluation was to get an impression of the benefit of arranging workshop like this and input to how we could improve similar workshops in the future.

The questions were:

1. What was your overall impression of the SCOPE 2017 Claims Workshop?
2. How would you rate the conference facilities at Best Western Hotel?
3. How would you rate the conference facilities at Sjømilitære samfund Hotel?
4. Which presentation(s)/topic(s) did you find the most relevant for you?
5. What have you learnt from this workshop that you will carry forward in your daily work and are there any topics that you will conduct further research on?
6. Are there need for further trainings or workshops on specific topics related to liability, security and claims management, and if so, which topics?
7. How would you rate the workshop with regard to possibilities to exchange experiences, build networks and establish focal point useful in your work?
8. What were the main findings or output from the group exercise relevant to you?
9. Is there anything that lacked or we could have done differently?

The answering options was:


- Very Dissatisfied
- Dissatisfied
- Indifferent
- Satisfied
- Very Satisfied

The questions on facilitations are only for NCA use.





## What was your overall impression of the SCOPE 2017 Claims Workshop?



Question	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Median
What was your overall impression of the SCOPE 2017 Claims Workshop?	21	4.43	0.58	4.00

Name	Percent
Very Dissatisfied	0.0%
Dissatisfied	0.0%
Indifferent	4.8%
Satisfied	47.6%
Very Satisfied	47.6%
N	21

### **Which presentation(s)/topic(s) did you find the most relevant for you?**

Participants found the information and debate on the relevance of available funds interesting.

The cooperation between the operational managers and legal advisors during an incident was of interest.

Several participants highlighted the presentations given by the insurance company Gard, IOPC Funds and ITOPF regarding their role in an incident when it comes to claims handling, and the outcome of such.

Case studies was also considered as relevant.

Group exercise following joint session with PoR was reported as relevant, though on feedback was that this session was based too much PoR and not on claims management.

### **What have you learnt from this workshop that you will carry forward in your daily work and are there any topics that you will conduct further research on?**

The participants reported that meeting and sharing of the best practice is of great value, included in this is getting to know other persons working with the same topics as oneself, and as a consequence of this work have the possibility to ask for advice when needed. Especially since accidents at sea often are very complicated and have many juridical aspects.

Gained insights into the role of other participants working with an incident, relevant to claims management, like IOPC funds, ITOPF and insurance companies was considered relevant, and a subject for further research/studies. There was also reported a need to identify the use of LOU and its possible transition.

Several participants reported a need to look further into this complex regulations, not only national law, but different conventions and also different guidelines.

The need for preparedness in the claim management process was highlighted because of the importance of starting building up the claim from the first moment, and also the requirements that are set for accepting documents for expenditures. There was also reported on a need to develop the national guidelines on claims management. The cost recovery process is complex and needs attention.

### **Are there need for further trainings or workshops on specific topics related to liability, security and claims management, and if so, which topics?**


It was a unison feedback from the participants that there is a need for regularly training and workshops on aspects of Claims Management between the EU Member states. In particular, a thorough and comprehensive workshop on liability and security was requested. Becoming familiar with member states representatives and other players involved, was also considered an important part of this kind of activities. Good communication will contribute to improve procedures and protocols.



Other topics highlighted:

- Case-studies on liability and security; discussing of incident with relevant stakeholders, sharing of best practices and national legal regimes
- Guidelines are “living documents” which should be continuously updated. Regularly workshops may contribute to good processes.
- Presentation and discussion of different incident and how claims management was carried out is highly relevant, i.e. the incident with Agia Zoni II that happened just before the workshop. A discussion of cases should be of interest, both for the country involved and other governments, especially since this incident involves the IOPC funds, which is not a very common situation.
- A deeper knowledge on how the relevant conventions supplement each other, and how to approach solutions where conventions do not prescribe rules/guidance.
- Further work into legal co-operation with neighboring countries on issues like joint claims, common LOU, forum shopping, limitation amounts etc.
- Workshop going more in details about the HNS protocol, depending on type of carriage at sea (gas, bulk etc.)
- How to best secure a claim
- Improving relationship between member states representatives and P&I Clubs in order to gain a better understanding of each other’s work and mode of operation.
- The claim, how to present it.
- The relations between Place of Refuge and the Claims Management to combine.

How would you rate the workshop with regard to possibilities to exchange experiences, build networks and establish focal point useful in your work?



Question	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Median
How would you rate the workshop with regard to possibilities to exchange experiences, build networks and establish focal points useful in your work?	21	4.24	0.75	4.00

Name	Percent
Very Dissatisfied	0.0%
Dissatisfied	0.0%
Indifferent	19.0%
Satisfied	38.1%
Very Satisfied	42.9%
N	21

## **What were the main findings or output from the group exercise relevant to you?**

The participants stated that the main findings or output relevant to them was related to inter-state cooperation and joint management, understating the limitations that might apply with regard to available funds. Further limitation procedures and how to address the responsible polluter and the insurance companies. The participants highlighted the value of discussions and sharing experience and national regimes. It was pointed out that many issues covered by the group exercise still are unclear, such as joint claims and Letter of Undertaking procedures. This is reflected in the output from the group exercise as referred to under chapter 4 above.

## **Is there anything that lacked or we could have done differently?**

Overall, the response is that participants were satisfied with the organizing of the workshop. Of issues mentioned:

- Used other P&I Clubs than two of the most reliable Nordic Clubs
- Provided more time for group work and provide a “classic example” of a solution to the discussed problems that could be basis for further discussions and a more concrete outcome.
- Presentation of the field case by video
- More legal discussions and handling claims
- Go more into details



## 6. Following up

Based on the above, the following actions could be considered:

- A review of the EU PoR guidelines to identify possible needs for references to guidelines related to claims management, including EU Claims Management Guidelines
- A review of other relevant EU operational guidelines (hereunder EU/EMSA OSINET and Illegal Discharges guidelines) and EU Claims Management Guidelines to identify possible needs for cross-references or amendments to establish a set of homogeneous and well-functioning guidelines
- Establish regular international practical training on claims management and liability under relevant international fora, and if possible under the working program of EMSA, covering both claims and operational expertise
- Explore possibilities to develop the role of EU Claims Management WG in order to facilitate a larger European network of claims handlers, hereunder explore the possibilities for EMSA to provide administrative platform for such network (reference to the North Sea Network for Prosecutors and Investigators under the BONN agreement).
- Investigate possibilities of enforcement of implementation of international legislation in EU to provide for a unified legislative basis for liability and security



## Draft agenda Scope 2017 – Claims workshop \*

Time	Agenda item 27th September 17	Speakers
1400-1420	Welcome  Opening by chairperson Experiences from the exercise – presentation and discussions	Johan Marius Ly, NCA Kjersti Tusvik, NCA Lill Veronika Benjaminsen and Wenche Stenvang, NCA
1420-1445	Presentation: Main issues regarding liability issues and security	Kjersti Tusvik and Lill Veronika Benjaminsen, NCA
1445-1530	Presentation: EU Claims Management Guidelines  Presentation: Mobilisation of EMSA Oil Spill Response Vessels and Equipment – formal requirements	Stephanie Guegan, European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
1530-1545	Coffee-break	
1545-1615	Case study: Golden Trader <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Claims management</li> <li>- Cooperation between Denmark and Sweden</li> <li>- Joint claims/Legal actions</li> <li>- Discussions</li> </ul>	Liselotte Sloth Brogner and Inger Corydon-Petersen, Danish Defence Command
1615-1700	Case study: MSC Flaminia <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Presentation of the incident including issues related to PoR</li> <li>- Claims Management, including cooperation between the affected countries</li> <li>- Discussions</li> </ul>	EU/EMSA (TBD) Germany (TBD) UK (TBD) Netherlands (TBD)
1700-1715	Coffee-break	
1715-1815	Presentation: Compensation regimes under IOPC Funds	TBD
1815-1900	Presentation: ITOFF	TBD



Time	Agenda item 28th September 17	Speakers
0930-1000	Opening of day 2 by chairperson Summary of the previous day and presentation of todays program	Kjersti Tusvik, NCA All
<b>Joint session with PoR TTX:</b>		
1000-1030	Presentation of case: Modern Express	Gard
10:30-11:30	Work in break-out groups on PoR TTX scenario .	Facilitators of break-up groups (TBD)
11:30-12:30	Plenary session: Compare results from break-out groups  Wrap-up and conclusions	Facilitators of break-out groups EMSA Kjetil Aasebø, NCA
<b>Claims Management Workshop session:</b>		
12:30-13:00	Summing up Closing by chairperson	All Kjersti Tusvik, NCA
13:00-14:00	Lunch and departure	

\*There may be changes to the program.



## SCOPE2017 Claims WS

### Case description:

On **September 26<sup>th</sup> 2017 at 02:14 local time**, the product tanker “NCA OIL”, IMO nr 9682978, westbound from Slagentangen, collided with the gas (LPG) tanker “NCA CHEM”, IMO nr 9744922 inbound for Herøya in Porsgrunn. The gas tanker was loaded with LPG and ammonia. The collision took place in the Skagerrak Strait, outside Norwegian territorial waters, south of Telemark county, on the south east coast of Norway.




Figure 1 – Location of the collision site.

Weather conditions was wind – SW force 3-4.

As a result of the collision, the two hulls were partly crumpled and stuck together, and approximately 40 m<sup>3</sup> of heavy fuel oil flowed into the sea. The winds were from the south at the time, and the leaked oil drifted north, mainly towards Krokshavn in the Langesund area.

A local tug and a rescue vessel responded to the accident. They managed to keep the two vessels in the same position. The cargo system on board the gas tanker was evidently damaged. Due to the potential for a large ammonia leakage from gas tanker, the masters decided it was imminent to separate the two vessels.

At **05:20** local time, the masters succeeded to separate the vessels by assistance from the tug. However, during the separation of the crumpled hulls, one cargo tank on the product tanker was punctured just above the waterline. A massive amount of oil flowed into the sea at this time.

The cargo system on the gas tanker was even more damaged as a result of the separation operation, and the potential for a gas leakage was even higher than before.

NCA CHEM was instructed by the Norwegian Coastal Administration to go to the Yara terminal, Porsgrunn, Norway, 25 nm from the collision site for hull inspection (on its own propulsion).

At 10 nm to the destination, the crew detected an ammonia odor, and notified the Norwegian authorities. Norwegian authorities gave orders for the vessel to stop immediately. During visual inspection the crew detected a small leak from tank number 1, carrying ammonia. The leak resulted in danger of toxic vapor cloud formation, putting at risk the health and safety of the population.

According to the weather forecast during the next 2 days, the wind was expected to blow from SW reaching 10 knots. Based on modelling results with these conditions an ammonia toxic vapor cloud may reach the harbor areas of Langesund, Larvik and Nevlnghavn within 24 hours.

Due to these circumstances, Norwegian authorities ordered the vessel to move away from shore. The ship could not restart the engines, and auxiliary engines and backup systems were not working. As a consequence, the re-liquefaction plant stopped working. This may result in increase of the temperature of the cargo, leading to safety relieve valves to open and more substance released to the atmosphere. The crew detected that the tank transporting LPG has been compromised due to the ammonia leak, and there was danger of explosion.

The vessel was considered to be safe, with sufficient stability and strength to be kept in open seas. One cargo tank containing ammonia was punctured. However, the vessel suffered a black-out, and lack of cooling lead to further ventilation from all tanks, increasing the risk of explosion.

The cargo was estimated to be safe on board vessel for several days. The toxic risk was considered to be higher than risk of explosion (continuously outflow of ammonia). Towing operations was considered only possible downwind due to the toxic cloud from the disabled vessel. There was low risk for oil pollution, as no bunker tanks was damaged.

The toxic cloud represented a danger for coastline inhabitant, and the government decided the vessel should be towed further away from populated areas. To minimize risk for explosion the cargo should be offloaded.

The vessel requested a Place of Refuge in Norway. The Norwegian assessment of the PoR request was that the public safety was severely threatened by toxic gases and potential explosions, but the vessel constituted low risk of environmental damage to vulnerable areas and of oil pollution. Due to the foreseeable escalation of the situation, the continuously release of toxic gases to the atmosphere, increasing risk for explosion and threat to public safety where public evacuation is necessary, it was not acceptable to grant the vessel a Place of Refuge in Norway due to the outflow of ammonia and wind direction.

Based on this, Norway refused the request for PoR and forwarded the request to Sweden and Denmark. After careful assessment of the situation, Denmark is considering to grant the vessel Place of Refuge in Denmark. The plan is to tow the vessel from the current place in Norway to the appointed PoR as soon as possible.

Denmark has implemented the bunker oil convention and the wreck removal convention. Norway has implemented the bunker oil convention, but the wreck removal convention is not yet in force. The global limitation limits under LLMC are implemented in Denmark. Norway have higher limitation limits for clean-up costs and wreck removal costs due to national regulations.

Discussion points:

1. Identify necessary actions related to the vessels request for PoR not covered by the coastal states ordinary claims management in relation to a ship incidents
2. Is there any measures the shipowner could take to facilitate Denmark's assessment of the PoR request with regard to formal and financial considerations?
3. Which measures would you as coastal state take in Denmark's place to secure a possible cost recovery claim following the granting of the Place of Refuge?
4. Identify possible areas of cooperation that would mitigate the coastal states risk related to PoR requests and granting a PoR
5. Provided both states would like to request financial guarantee for possible expenses, is there any advantages of cooperation and what are the implications of a joint LoU
6. Identify the need for further guidelines or best practice related to formal matters in case of PoR, including financial security.

## Appendix 2

### Evaluation Report from the Notification and Request for Assistance Exercise



# DRAFT After Action Report

## Notification and Request for Assistance (NaRA)

### Exercise SCOPE 2017

Final – January 31, 2018

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## 0. Preface

The notification and request for assistance exercise, which was a part of exercise SCOPE 2017, was led by Norway, Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA), the Department for Emergency response.

This after action report is prepared by NCA with input, advice and assistance from Denmark. The draft report was submitted to the countries and organizations involved in the exercise to ensure that their views are captured.

## 1. Executive Summary

Prior to the field exercise of Exercise SCOPE 2017 a notification and request for assistance exercise was conducted. The exercise included participation from the members of the Copenhagen agreement and the Bonn agreement. The purpose of this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017 was to validate and update the Manual of Copenhagen Agreement and the Bonn Agreement, in addition to procedures for using SSN and CECIS.

An Exercise Directive for this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017 was drafted, providing the participants with all the necessary information outlining their roles.

The exercise was divided into three different stages;

- Stage 1: Notification
- Stage 2: Request and offers for assistance
- Stage 3: Workshop

The first notification was submitted from Norway Monday 4<sup>th</sup>. of September 2017. During this week the notification with updated information from Norway and a request for assistance. The different countries responded to the notification and request for assistance accordingly.

To capture lessons learned from the exercise a workshop was arranged September 25<sup>th</sup>. In the workshop presentations from the following countries and organizations were given: Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Germany, Netherland, Norway (as host country) Belgium, Ireland, UK and EU. A few nations had forwarded presentations but did not attend.

The following recommendations is from the workshop:

- CECIS should be the only tool for notification and request for assistance
- The use of Training environment for notifications through SSN seems to create challenges that most likely will not occur when using the real version of SSN. The real version should be used, but it must be clear instruction on how exercises should be highlighted in the system
- E-mail must be a back-up if no response through SSN og CECIS
- The lack of sufficient space to write information in POLINF was not according to how this originally was described by the Bonn Agreement
- E-learning tools for both SSN and CECIS should be made available for the operators to use



- The systems for notification and request for assistance should regularly be tested through exercises
- CECIS should be improved, ref. some of the detailed feedback from the country presentations.
- If SSN, despite above recommendation, should be used for POLWARN and POLINF in the future, the Marine Pollution Authorities should be involved in the work with SafeSeaNet IR Guidelines – Guidelines for exchanging incident reports through SSN.



## 2. Scenario and background

The main scenario was an incident where two ships collided in the Skagerrak Sea off Telemark County or in the approaches to Grenland Harbour on the south-east Norwegian coast. One vessel was carrying HNS (hazardous and noxious substances), while the other carried oil products.

The oil tanker suffered of extensive damage, and what appeared to be heavy oil is reportedly leaking from the damaged vessel. The apparent oil spill drifted towards the nearest islands as well as towards the open sea.

The overall aim of the Skagerrak Chemical Oilspill Pollution Exercise (SCOPE) 2017 was to:

- contribute to improved national and international coordination of vessel accidents involving hazardous and polluting cargoes
- strengthen the collaboration between the signatories to the Copenhagen Agreement, the Bonn Agreement and with the EU, especially concerning different forms of support, and to make the best possible use of the resources, services and guidelines offered through the EU.

To achieve these aims, the Notification and Request for Assistance part of Exercise SCOPE 2017 included the implementation of correct notification measures nationally and internationally by using SafeSeaNet (SSN), including activation of the EU CP mechanism and the mobilisation of international support through the Copenhagen Agreement and the Bonn Agreement by using the CECIS marine pollution platform.

An Exercise Directive for this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017 was drafted, providing the participants with all the necessary information outlining their roles. The exercise was specifically directed to improve collaboration across the countries bordered by the North Sea (Members of the Copenhagen Agreement and the Bonn Agreement), while enhancing marine oil spill and HNS preparedness. The exercise was completed with a workshop involving all participating countries, including the EU. This collaborative partnership provided maritime agencies with a channel to discuss their communication and coordination processes, in the event of a marine oil and/or hazardous material incident that might impact the marine environment.

## 3. Objectives

### 3.1 Overall objectives

The objective of this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017 was to ensure that the point of contact in each country and ERCC would receive the notification and request for assistance and that they would act upon, according to the procedures for the different agreements, as well as the use of SafeSeaNet- and CECIS protocols.



### 3.2 Sub-objectives

The following sub-objectives describe the specific goals (and expected outcomes) that was expected to be accomplished during this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017.

**Objective 1: Test and evaluate the incident notification by using SSN**

Test conducted under the Copenhagen - and Bonn Agreement with acknowledgements occurring within 4 hours of initiation of the exercise.

**Objective 2: Test and evaluate the request for assistance procedures by using CECIS Marine Pollution Database** under the Copenhagen - and Bonn Agreement with response occurring within 24 hours after the request was submitted.

**Objective 3: Test and evaluate country specific internal procedures for offering assistance.**

- Execute or replicate a deployment of resources to the requesting nation.
- Identify and document best practices, challenges, and lessons learned to share during the workshop.

**Objective 4:** Submit updates (through the respective secretaries) for all applicable sections and forms within the manuals/plans/guidelines, after exercising internal national protocols specific to notification and request for assistance.

To achieve these goals a prescriptive timeline for this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017 was developed. This is attached as Appendix 1.

## 4. Preparations of the notification and request for assistance exercise

NCA appointed a task leader for this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017, which was responsible to plan and organise the exercise. Experience from best practices from previous notification and request for assistance exercises was incorporated in the planning process. The exercise was conducted three weeks before the field exercise of Exercise SCOPE 2017.

The notification was expected to be submitted in **SafeSeaNet Training Environment**. The request for assistance was through **CECIS Command Post Exercise**.

To share experience from the exercise, a workshop was arranged September 25 with participants from all involved countries and the EU, which were engaged in this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017. A copy of the exercise guidelines is attached as appendix 1 and the agenda for the workshop as appendix 3.



## 5. Purpose

The purpose of this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017 was to validate and update, as appropriate, the Manual of Copenhagen Agreement and the Bonn Agreement, in addition to procedures for using SSN and CECIS. Specifically, the exercise should evaluate the notification, request, and offer of assistance protocols for each Copenhagen and Bonn Agreement member state, in order to enhance collaboration in the event of a real-world incident.

## 6. Assumptions and Artificialities

In any exercise a number of assumptions and artificialities may be necessary to complete play in the time allotted.


Since the exercise was conducted three weeks prior the field exercise the following points were highlighted as important for the exercise:

- Allow time for national systems to be internally exercised.
- Exercise stages are pre-defined (i.e. Stage 1 – 4 duration). A copy of a more detailed text about the exercise stages is attached as appendix 5.
- The spill exceeds national or regional response capabilities, warranting a request for assistance in accordance with the respective plans and manuals.
- Countries could choose to participate in the stages to varying levels of involvement (i.e. notification only). However, to maximize the success of the entire process, it was recommended that all involved countries participated across all three stages.
- The scenario was national and resources should not be physically deployed.



## 7. Exercise Planning Cycle

The following exercise planning cycle is the basis for the exercise and the follow up actions.






## 8. Exercise Structure

Players participated in the following three distinct stages:

- Stage 1: Notification
- Stage 2: Request and offers for assistance
- Stage 3: Workshop





## 9. Summary and finding from workshop September 25, 2017

The workshop was conducted in Langesund, Norway with 20 participants, ref. attached list of participants, appendix 3.

The agenda for the workshop is attached, appendix 4

As an introduction to the workshop, Norway as organizer of the exercise, informed that SSN and CECIS was used to test possible new procedures, although the Copenhagen Agreement normally uses alternative procedures as not all members have SSN/CECIS. (For further details about this, see objectives)

It was also informed that Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland conducted initial training just to be prepared to the challenges of this part of Exercise SCOPE 2017.

In the workshop, presentations from the following countries and organizations were given: Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Germany, Netherland, Norway (as host country) Belgium, Ireland, UK and EU. A few nations had forwarded presentations but did not attend. Attendees of the workshop gave those presentations. The text below under each country is based on the country presentation.

### 9.1 Country presentations

#### Norway as host country initiating the notification through SSN

- Briefed on the timeline for POLWARN, POLINF and POLFAC/CECIS (Timing for messages sent was actual time for sending from NCA in Horten to VTS Vardø as the SSN operator, not when the message was available in SSN/CECIS)
- Important to be clear about time zone (local time, UTC, CET, CEST), we were not consistent
- Is SSN TRAINING ENVIRONMENT relevant to test the real system in a real situation?
- Have the different countries established contact between the SSN contact point and the competent authority for oil spill response?
- Raised the question on which authorities are within the group "European Bodies" (in SSN). This was not clarified during workshop. It should be explanatory in the system.
- Not all countries replied in SSN. They had to be informed by e-mail before paying attention. (Probably because it was ordered that training environment should be the media)
- The ACKNOWLEDGE on the POLWARN message did not create an e-mail to the SSN operator. For POLINF, they received an e-mail
- There is lack of sufficient space to write information in POLINF through SSN. This is not according to how this originally was described by the Bonn Agreement when POLWARN/POLINF/POLFAC messages were created. The similar forms are taken over by EU and described in SafeSeaNet IR Guidelines – Guidelines for exchanging incident reports through SSN.





- It was also raised the question whether oiled wildlife information had been omitted in the SSN layout.

## Norway – request for assistance through CECIS

- Raised the question whether the equipment categories were the same as used by IMO in the International Offers of Assistance Guidelines.
- The POLINF information was not transferred automatically to CECIS
- Many nations may have several addresses that receive the CECIS notification. That requires some national coordination, so only the competent authority is mandated to acknowledge receipt.

## Denmark

- Limited knowledge about usage of SSN/CECIS due to lack of experience in using the systems for pollution information exchange.
- Authority reporting incident (see dias) should be the POC reporting. (SSN)
- Default position should be lat/lon (SSN)
- In “update messages” the new information should be highlighted / marked.
- POLINF does not allow the full information text to be read.
- Pointed out some errors and recommended changes to the systems’ layout. See country presentation for details.
- Initiated discussions on training/exercise mode vs. live mode for alarm exercises.
- Requested that a set of training lessons were provided by EMSA to allow training for operators.
- Informed that it was important that the changes that the workshop agreed on SSN should be effective in the upcoming SEG.

## Sweden

- Difficult to improve the knowledge about the systems due to log-in problems
- Challenges because of the use of the training environment since not all users had access to training environment
- Continuous training is necessary like we conducted during the summer SSN is not an easy-to-use system for “seldom-users”. Education and training 1-3 countries at a time is necessary
- Important for all of us is to answer the requesting party and not answering all.  
If I need/want to see what is going on, use the logbook

## Iceland

- Limited knowledge of the system, internal communication not effective
- The connection did not function as expected. Clearer rules for internal communication regarding the use of SSN are needed
- Need to sharpen the procedure of internal communication.
- Clearer rules of procedure for all involved actors.



- Too few trained in the use of the CECIS system
- Central question: Why do we need two systems (SSN+CECIS) instead of one system?

## Netherlands

- The SSN POLWARN and POLINF, was received, but in the “training environment” and because of that neglected
- Admitted lack of training
- Sending personnel with assets depends on what is sent. No reason to send personnel with a boom. When sending an aircraft or ship the crew is included.
- Illustrated that prices depend on whether the equipment is actually used, needs cleaning or replacement.
- SSN should not be the system for POLWARN/POLINF. All messages in CECIS
- More attention to SSN and CECIS in peace time
- SSN should not run exercises in a training environment, but in live situations as all messages have the prefix: EXERCISE (3 times)
- Education and training is required and a one staff member will have to be responsible for the data-base.

## Belgium

- Knowledge of the system: Operators in the Belgian operational centres (MRCC and MIK) dealing with marine pollution emergencies are trained for using SSN. However they don't receive such notification frequently enough to be completely familiar with the specific functionalities of the system. Therefore they would welcome some additional practical guidance and training in order to make sure that they are doing things right.
- Challenges because of the use of the training environment: Operators of the MIK didn't knew well how to access to the SSN training environment but managed to find a way to get the SSN messages with the assistance of the MRCC.
- Knowledge of the CECIS and requests for assistance process: Operators in the Belgian operational centre (MIK) dealing with marine pollution emergencies are trained for using ‘CECIS Marine Pollution’. However they don't receive such notification frequently enough to be completely familiar with the system. Therefore they would welcome some additional practical guidance and training in order to make sure that they are doing things right.

## Finland

- The duty officers are trained to use SSN.
- We had straight contact between user and response body.
- We have not used SSN enough – so far.



- We have knowledge of the CECIS and requests for assistance process.
- In real situations, we have ability to offer assistance.
- In this SCOPE process, we had earlier decided not to offer assistance/participation with vessels or equipment.

## France

Norway have not received any response from France.

## Germany

- Employees of Maritime Emergency Reporting and Assessment Centre (MERAC) have good knowledge of the system and react within time limit.
- MERAC is a section of the Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) which is oil spill preparedness and response body in Germany.
- The training environment is a good platform for such exercise, no problems in use.
- MERAC-Employees have good knowledge of the CECIS and acknowledged requests for assistance prompt.
- Germany answered four of twelve requests. *Should negative reports be sent next time for the eight "not answered requests"?*
- Use of database (add offer button) in request overview after advice from ERCC → *Will training intensify regarding this option.*
- A lot of e-mails (negative reports) without increase of information → *Necessary?*

## Ireland

- Lessons identified notification
  - Ireland's first indication within the MRCC Dublin was e-mail received 04 Sept at 12:51 from organiser of the exercise
  - MRCC Dublin did not receive an email from SafeSeaNet Training indicating a POLINF. E-Mail acknowledged.
  - There has been a reorganisation within Ireland's Maritime Administration since 2015 and this has meant that previous structures, practices and procedures have been adjusted. Further work in this area requires attention and also MRCC Staff will receive instruction within SSN.
  - Good communication between MRCC Dublin and Pollution Response Section. Pollution Response Offices are located within MRCC.
  - There is no dedicated user of SSN within the MRCC as MRCC staff use SSN as another tool during incidents.
  - The incident was monitored closely by MRCC Staff as it progressed.
  - As requests for resources came in there were monitored and passed to Pollution Response Section.



- Ireland declined three requests. It was decided not to acknowledge, declined other to avoid unnecessary talk/log overload. Ireland is unclear if some/all should be acknowledged and actioned or only if a positive response is coming should a country become make contact. If every message is acknowledge and actioned by every other Member State the message log will become very cluttered. Point to discuss.
- Lessons identified Request for assistance
  - There is a reasonable working knowledge of CECIS and its capabilities. Staff monitored the exercise as it progressed and were reasonably informed of the main points of the exercise. The exercise was monitored during normal operating conditions as staff had to monitor their normal workloads.
  - As Ireland is a distance from the incident event the decision not to commit frontline assets in the first wave was taken. This would allow Ireland to offer some replenishment resource capability at a later date if required.
  - The CECIS system was considered to be very useful in the event of a real emergency
  - No major issues came to light at this stage but further training – more in-depth and greater use etc. has been identified as a learning issue for Ireland

## United Kingdom

- Knowledge of the System: Monitoring of some alerting systems is devolved to assigned CGOCs. Safe Sea Net is monitored by 2 GCOCs on an alternating weekly basis. They have responsibility for information flow following an alert.
- Contact between daily user of SSN and MCA: There is routine daily contact between CGOCs and the MCA on SAR and counter pollution issues, such as: spills, vessels not under command, EMSA satellite 'hits', groundings etc
- Challenges associated with Notification and the Training Environment: SCOPE 17 has highlighted a shortfall in identifying an initial alert through SafeSeaNet (SSN) via the UK CERS system. Although SSN is monitored 24/7 it does not provide automatic alerting to the Coastguard operators, thus acknowledgement of alert messages can be delayed. In this instance, once the alert was identified, subsequent response to requests for assistance were actioned. It is recommended that future real-world and training notifications on SSN should be accompanied by a call to the MCA's Duty Counter Pollution and Salvage Officer (tel +44 7000 405 415) and followed up by email to: [CounterPollution@mcga.gov](mailto:CounterPollution@mcga.gov). This will guarantee swift response and action
- UK was able to provide assistance to Norway.

## Spain

- Knowledge of the SSN system: Good enough to fulfil the obligations, although always training is welcome. It has to be taken into account the few activations of the system, even considering exercises. The system is integrated in the internal procedures and in the operations national system for managing emergencies



- Contact between the daily user of SSN and the oil spill preparedness and response body in Spain: Daily contact between the daily user of SSN (MRCCs of the Spanish Maritime Safety & Rescue Agency) and the oil spill preparedness and response body (Maritime Authority). Internal procedures establish this information flow.
- Knowledge of the CECIS and requests for assistance process: Good enough (The National MRCC's chief, deputy chief and a few operators have received training). Always training is welcome as a large number of operators are working in the National MRCC due to cover 24/7. Exercises are performed to improve knowledge of CECIS. It has to be taken into account the few activations of the tool.
- Validate your country's role and ability to offer assistance. Identify best practices and challenges during this process: Spain is able to offer assistance as the Spanish Maritime Safety & Rescue Agency owns oil spill response vessels, surveillance planes and oil pollution equipment. Experts are also available. In the SCOPE exercise no specific notification was received as no full right access was given to Spain. The BA was selected by Norway but Spain is just observer. Spain maybe could have offered experts (requested by Norway). Talking about experts, distance is not so important! Maybe this could be considered in the future.
- Any challenges with the CECIS command post exercise module compared with the "original" version: CECIS has been improving with the users' inputs. Maybe the system has become a bit more complex. The CECIS command post exercise module is very useful.

## EMSA

- Informed about functionality of the two systems
- CECIS- Interface allows only for limited number of attachments (max. two), thus requiring additional actions for multiple attachments (e.g. archiving);
- CECIS- Interface does not allow for insertion of tables with detailed information;
- Follow-up of the event in CECIS was more complicated due to receipt of many emails informing of not being able to provide any resources (approx. 30% of all communications);
- In CECIS, the EMSA equipment categories are not consistent and may create misinterpretation, i.e. Speed Sweep vs. Desmi High Speed System;
- NCA used the appropriate communication channels and environments for the request of assistance;
- Good overall reaction time from reception of request for assistance until support offer is placed in CECIS;

## EC-ERCC

- CECIS MP early warning was not used in SCOPE but it is possible to open an Early Warning status emergency in CECIS Marine before opening a request for assistance. This would activate the use of logbook. Emergency status can be changed to 'Request for assistance' at a later stage.



- Highlighted that it is no need to select individual countries if they already belong to the selected Regional Agreement
- No need to select individual countries if they already belong to the selected Regional Agreement
- All offers must be made in the Request Overview window and not in the Logbook by replying to an automatic notification (common mistake with just a few exceptions)
- Selection of a resource directly from the database when making an offer was hardly used (although resources database has been updated recently). *It was asked the following question: Is this due to the lack of awareness of the functionality or is there another reason?*
- Communication of (non)assistance:
  - Use Request overview window for actual offers only.
  - Information that assistance is not available can be transmitted through the logbook in one message (rather than responding to individual notifications for each request).
  - Those steps would allow to:
    - keep the Request overview more operational,
    - minimise the number of automatic notifications and messages in the logbook as well
- CECIS MP: Offering Country. Making an offer
  - When applicable, use dedicated fields like "offer value" and "transport cost" instead of putting all into the "Offer information".
  - Opened for a discussion on whether CPH Agreement was organised in CECIS

## 9.2 plenary discussion

Following the country/EU presentations, the group discussed lessons identified and possible findings.

Below you will find a short summary of the discussion.

- Nations to check their log-in procedures as many nations report problems in either login to SSN or to Exercise module.
- POLREP messages medium
  - Should POLREP be sent via SSN or CECIS or should the present modus by using SSN (POLWARN/POLINF) and CECIS (POLFAC) stay?
  - One system would reduce training requirements for nations where SSN and CECIS are used by separate offices. Important to check the requirements in the EU Directive (Directive 2002/59/EC (Consolidated Version - 16/03/2011) whether notifications could be submitted from CECIS to SSN, not as today from SSN to CECIS. The group was in favour of moving POLREP messages to CECIS. SSN would contain the maritime incident and have a feature to provide early warning for CECIS audience.





- There is not enough space in the POLINF forms in SSN to fill in all necessary information. The form should also include information as the original POLINF developed and approved by the BONN contracting parties.
- Training environment mode in SSN compared with “live” environment of the tools: The use of training environment in SSN seems to make problems for many countries since the system do not behave as the SSN “live” environment. CECIS exercise mode seems to be as the real version.
- The use of the “live” environments of CECIS and SSN was not recommended by representatives of DG ECHO / EMSA. It was expressed by EMSA that they have collected all relevant feedback on the SSN user experience as reported by the MS representatives, and shall implement appropriate preventive / corrective measures where possible, including further training sessions to the users in the MS.
- If training environment and command post exercise should be used, these tools have to be as the “live” version. E-mail seems to be necessary as a back-up if the other systems fail.
- When using the CECIS system, the system created a lot of e-mails which disturb the inbox in the different response centres. It should be even easier to understand the system to avoid an overload of e-mails.
- All participating nations supported E-learning tools for both SSN and CECIS should be made available for the operators to use. It was suggested to continue or re-use the one pager guide for the use of the CECIS system.
- All training sessions should be validated towards the common operating systems (E.g. Explorer, Chrome, Firefox)

Copy of the text from the country presentations is uploaded on the web-page of exercise SCOPE 2017 - <https://scope2017.com/>. Please see the presentations for any further inputs to the systems layout and GUI.

### 9.3 Lessons identified - recommendations

Based on the discussions at the workshop, we will recommend:

- CECIS should be the only tool for notification and request for assistance
- The use of Training environment for notifications through SSN seems to create challenges that most likely will not occur when using the real version of SSN. The real version should be used, but it must be clear instruction on how exercises should be highlighted in the system
- E-mail must be a back-up if no response through SSN og CECIS
- The lack of sufficient space to write information in POLINF was not according to how this originally was described by the Bonn Agreement
- E-learning tools for both SSN and CECIS should be made available for the operators to use



- The systems for notification and request for assistance should regularly be tested through exercises
- CECIS should be improved, ref. some of the detailed feedback from the country presentations.
- If SSN, despite above recommendation, should be used for POLWARN and POLINF in the future, the Marine Pollution Authorities should be involved in the work with SafeSeaNet IR Guidelines – Guidelines for exchanging incident reports through SSN.





## Appendix 1 Prescriptive timeline for the Notification and Request for Assistance part of Exercise SCOPE 2017

Stage	Date / Duration	Description
Stage 1 – Notification and Communications	4 <sup>th</sup> . and 5. September	Norway to initiate Stage 1 with the notification of an incident. Acknowledgement of this notification should have been made, by each state, within 4 hours. Notifications will be submitted by <b>SafeSeaNet Training Environment</b> .
Stage 2 – Requests for Assistance	6 <sup>th</sup> . to 8 <sup>th</sup> . September	Since the incident exceeded Norway's national and bi-lateral capabilities, Norway will submit a request for Assistance to both the Copenhagen and Bonn Agreement by using <b>CECIS -Command Post Exercise</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Acknowledgement of receipt for this request for assistance should have been made, by each member state, within 24 hours.</li> <li>Offers of assistance period began on September 6<sup>th</sup> and ended on September 8<sup>th</sup>.</li> <li>Member states utilised Stage 2 to review internal protocols for receiving requests for assistance and for providing assistance.</li> <li>Exploring/documenting best practices and challenges were included in this stage in order to develop the country specific report to be presented at the workshop on September 25<sup>th</sup>.</li> <li>Norway, as the scenario host country, review own internal protocols for receiving assistance and will share those best practices and challenges.</li> </ul>
Stage 3 – Workshop	25 <sup>th</sup> . September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Representatives from the different countries, EU and others meet to review Stages 1 &amp; 2 in Langesund, Norway.</li> <li>Each member state and EU presents their effort during Stages 1 &amp; 2.</li> </ul> <p>The evaluation team captures lessons learned during the workshop and provides them in an after action report, which will be summarized and presented by the end of 2017.</p>
Post workshop – After Action Report	October – December 2017	Recommendations from the Workshop After Action Report, and any potential updates to the manuals/protocols, will be vetted thru the Copenhagen Agreement and Bonn Agreement. In



		addition will important findings be incorporated in the Final report from the exercise.
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## Appendix 2 Workshop Guidelines

- This is an open, low-stress, no-fault environment. Varying viewpoints, even disagreements, are expected and will be mitigated through the facilitation process.
- The success of the workshop is based upon the review and presentation of each member state's and EU's NaRA protocols from stages 1 and 2.  
If some countries are not able to attend the workshop, they should submit a presentation to the organizer, which will give the presentation.
- The best practices and challenges discussed during the workshop will be solely for the benefit of each member state/EU and assessed as possible updates to the manuals/protocols/plans to the respective agreements.
- Decisions should not set a precedent and may not reflect an organisation's final position on any given issue. This is an opportunity to discuss and present multiple options and possible solutions.
- Issue identification, while valuable, should not be the only focus. Suggestions and recommended actions that could improve response and preparedness efforts, as well as identification of best practices and challenges (and how to mitigate those challenges) should be the focus.
- After the exercise and during the post workshop after action period, any changes to the Copenhagen and Bonn Agreement or associated manuals/plans/protocols will be accepted only after consensus within the respective agreements.

### Participants

**Players:** Representatives from each country and EU.

\*Respond to the situation presented based on expert knowledge of response procedures, current plans and procedures, and insights derived from training and experience.

\*Responsible for presenting country-specific best practices, challenges, and lessons learned as a result of the NaRA exercise that occurs during stages 1 and 2.

**Observers:** If any, support the group in developing responses to the situation during the discussion. However, they will not participant in the moderated discussion period.

**Facilitator:** Ole Kristian Bjerkemo, Norwegian Coastal Administration, will moderate discussions at the workshop; including the provision of additional information and resolving questions as required.

**Evaluators:** An evaluation team will be established and led by a representative from Norway, supported by representatives from Denmark and Iceland. The goal of exercise evaluation is to identify best practices and areas of improvement for the coordinated response.



## Workshop Logistics

### Location

Quality Hotel Skjærgården  
Stathellevn. 35 3970 Langesund ,  
Norway



### Refreshments

Food and refreshments will be available.

### Check-in at hotel

Information will be provided later.

On arrival at the exercise venue (the morning of the workshop), all participants should check in at the SCOPE registration desk

### Safety/ Emergency Procedures

In the event of a fire/ emergency drill (or an actual incident), all participants should follow hotel emergency procedures and attempt to group together with other exercise participants at the hotel's designated emergency muster locations. Participants should return to the exercise venue only when it is safe and authorized to do so.

### Exercise/workshop Identification

All personnel participating in the workshop will be provided an identification badge during check-in to help maintain personnel accountability. Please wear your badge throughout the duration of the workshop, while at the workshop venue.



## Appendix 3 List of participants

Last name	First name	Organization	Country
Benjaminsen	Lill Veronika	Norwegian Coastal Administration	Norway
Bjerkemo	Ole Kristian	Norwegian Coastal Administration	Norway
Buch	Mathias	Naval Staff Denmark	Denmark
Buxhoeveden	Alexander von	Swedish Coast Guard	Sweden
Cirnat	Marian	European Maritime Safety Agency	Portugal
Honarmand	Arya	European Commission	
Huisman	Johannes	Rijkswaterstaat	Netherland
Iversen	Torben	Naval Staff Denmark	Denmark
Jensson	Helgi	The Environment Agency of Iceland	Iceland
Kristinsdottir	Sigríður	The Environment Agency of Iceland	Iceland
Lunde	Synnøve	Norwegian Coastal Administration	Norway
Osdal	Per Jan	Norwegian Coastal Administration	Norway
San Martin	Roberto	European Maritime Safety Agency	Portugal
Semb	Per Øyvind	Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection	Norway
Sørensen	Jimmy	Maritime Assistance Service Denmark	Denmark
Tolstrup	Michael	Naval Staff Denmark	Denmark
Visser	Michiel	Rijkswaterstaat	Netherland



## Appendix 4 Agenda

Time	Topic	Speaker
0830 – 0900	Registration	Elin Nilssen
0900 – 0915	<b>Opening Remarks/ Introductions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Welcome</li> <li>Opening Comments and administration</li> </ul>	Stig Wahlstrøm, Project manager  Ole Kristian Bjerkemo
0915 – 1000	<b>Scenario Host Presentation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preparations</li> <li>Notification – SafeSeaNet</li> <li>Request for Assistance through CECIS</li> </ul>	Ole Kristian Bjerkemo Lill Veronika Benjaminsen Ole Kristian Bjerkemo
1000 – 1015	Break	
1000 – 1200	<b>Lessons learnt in each of the countries/organisations involved</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maximum 15 minutes each in addition to 5 minutes for questions or clarifications</li> </ul>	Denmark Sweden Iceland EU EMSA Netherlands
1200 – 1300	Lunch	Norway
1300 - 1430	Lessons learnt in each of the countries/contracting parties involved <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10 minutes on each presentation (these countries have submitted their presentations)</li> </ul>	Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland UK
1430 - 1445	Break	Norway
1445 – 1530	Group discussions - Lessons learnt, recommendations, next steps (2 or 3 groups)	
1530 – 1555	Presentations from group discussions	
1600 – 1615	Closing remarks	Rep. from EU (TBD) or Norway



## Appendix 5 Questions which the different countries/organizations should consider

### Stage 1: Notification (All involved states and EC)

*Notification: Discuss the ability and process to receive and make proper notifications of an oil and HNS spill in accordance with the SafeSeaNet (SSN) procedures*

#### Key Issues

1. Knowledge of the system
2. Contact between the daily user of SSN and the oil spill preparedness and response body in the respective country
3. If your country was responsible for the notification. Are there any challenges?
4. Challenges because of the use of the training environment

### Stage 1: Notification – Scenario Host Nation (Norway)

*Communications: Discuss ability to effectively communicate both internally, while conducting the response, and externally while conducting notifications and request / offers of assistance.*

#### Key Issues

1. As the scenario host nation, balancing the response while also communicating externally may create additional best practices and challenges worth sharing.
2. What processes were either in place and were changed or were newly implemented as a result of this exercise?

#### Preliminary Questions

1. What does the host nation or requesting party see as key or critical components of information that they would want reported to them?
2. Frequency of reports? Any other data requirements?
3. What new procedures, if any, will be established regarding internal requestor communications resulting from an incident enacting the *MOSPA Agreement*?
4. What new procedures, if any, will be established regarding bi-lateral communications between the neighbouring countries?
5. Discuss the ability to effectively balance communications between internal, national, bi-lateral, and multi-lateral components.
6. Discuss how information was shared during this exercise; what worked and what did not work.
7. Discuss the process for accountability of the notifications made and acknowledgements received.
8. Discuss the personnel requirements for maintaining an effective communication team in order to conduct internal, national, bi-lateral, and multi-lateral notifications.

### Stage 2: Requests for Assistance – All Countries and EC

*Requests for assistance: Discuss the ability and process to request and offer assistance during an oil spill in accordance with the CECIS and its guidelines.*

#### Key Issues



1. Knowledge of the CECIS and requests for assistance process
2. Validate your country's role and ability to offer assistance. Identify best practices and challenges during this process.
3. Any challenges with the CECIS command post exercise module compared with the "original" version

### Preliminary Questions

1. Based on the given scenario, explain the process for receiving a request for assistance and exploring your internal protocols for determining the ability to assist.
2. What type of information should be included in the initial request for assistance?
3. Does the overall request and offers of assistance process work for your country? If not, what modifications to the process would you recommend?
4. Do you have an internal best practice that you utilize for your agencies (federal, state and local) and commercial entities, when determining if you can offer assistance that you would like to share?
5. What is your country's process to make an assistance determination (actions taken)?
6. What is your country's process to respond once an assistance determination has been made (actions taken)?
7. Discuss your protocols for removing response resources / personnel from your national response system to support another country's response.
8. Discuss customs and border protection requirements for allowing equipment and personnel to enter your country when an emergency occurs (land and maritime), and determine who from your country will ensure safe and secure personnel and equipment movement.

## Stage 2: Requests for Assistance –Scenario Host Nation (Norway)

### Key Issues

1. Validate your country's role when making a request for assistance and receiving those offers of assistance.
2. Identify best practices and challenges during this process.

### Preliminary Questions

1. Based on the given scenario, explain the process and internal protocols for requesting assistance.
2. What type of information should be included in the initial request for assistance?
3. Does the CECIS system capture all of the pertinent/required information? If not, elaborate.
4. Does the overall request and offer of assistance process work for your country?
5. If not, what modifications to the process would you make?
6. Do you have an internal best practice that you utilize for your agencies (federal, state and local) and commercial entities, when determining if you can offer assistance that you would like to share?
7. What is your country's process when determining a need for assistance (actions taken)?
8. What is your country's process to initiate the request for assistance process once that determination has been made (actions taken)?
9. As resources are offered and eventually deployed, how do you incorporate those resources, and personnel, into your response framework and command system?



10. Do they interact at the national level or do you incorporate them at lower levels; i.e. regional and local.
11. How do you overcome any language barriers and individual country differences during a response? Do you have examples of this during a real-world event or exercise?
12. Do you stand up roles or positions to function as liaisons for external resources and personnel?
13. What role do your embassies or state entities play during a response?
14. How do you effectively collect consistent data (statistics for oil recovery, wildlife, modelling, weather, etc.) when mitigating multiple international response protocols and potential differences in data capture?
15. Discuss the approval process in place for the use of, and presence of another country's vessels/aircraft/personnel in the waters or air space of the other country and who needs to be aware of, and "approve" of the operation prior to it commencing.
16. What Norwegian agencies govern the movement of personnel and equipment across the border into their respective countries?
17. What are the protocols/ restrictions for moving, storing, cleaning, and returning contaminated response equipment (e.g. boom, skimmers, etc.)?
18. Discuss customs and border protection requirements for allowing equipment and personnel to enter your country when an emergency occurs (land and maritime), and determine who from your country will ensure safe and secure personnel and equipment movement.
19. Discuss border requirements when the response shifts from one nation's water to another due to marine environmental conditions.
20. Discuss process in place for the disposal of oil originating in one country and recovered on the other, both offshore and onshore.