


Session 9: Risk acceptance criteria and land use planning

Workshop on Accident Analysis and Risk Assessment
20-22 November 2013, Ispra, Italy




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Stimulating innovation
Supporting legislation*

PLANTS

- Petroleum Depo
- Explosive Factory
- Sulfur Dioxide Tank Wagon
- Ammonia Refrigerator unit

Meteo



File FIT code	Pasquill Stability Classes	Wind speed (m/s)	Meteo aggregation description
1	C	3.6	slightly unstable (daytime)
2	F+G	2.3	very stable (night)

Table C5.2. Pasquill Atmospheric Stability Classes.

Surface Wind Speed ^a (m/s)	Relative Cloud Coverage				
	Day			Night	
	0/8 - 2/8	3/8 - 5/8	6/8 - 8/8	< 3/8	> 4/8
< 2	A	A - B	B	F	F
2 - 3	A - B	B	C	E	F
3 - 5	B	B - C	D	D	E
5 - 6	C	C - D	D	D	D
> 6	C	D	D	D	D

^a At a height of 10 m.

Petroleum Depo

2 Gasoline tanks

$h = 11\text{m}$

$D = 21\text{m}$

$m = 2735\text{ tons}$

2 Kerosene (2 Jet A1) tanks

$h = 9.1\text{m}$

$D = 34\text{ m}$

$m = 6491\text{ tons}$




Petroleum Depo: Accident Scenarios

Fire due to roof failure
 $f = 10^{-3} \text{ y}^{-1}$



Large release of fuel
 (overfilling, tank failure)
 $f = 10^{-3} \text{ y}^{-1}$



UVCE
 $f_G = 10^{-4} \text{ y}^{-1}$
 $f_k = 10^{-5} \text{ y}^{-1}$

Pool Fire
 $f_G = 9 \cdot 10^{-4} \text{ y}^{-1}$
 $f_k = 9.9 \cdot 10^{-5} \text{ y}^{-1}$

Explosive Factory


Cloud, Air-Propane 92000m³
Propane mass 4770



$$R = 35\text{m}$$

PEMEX Mexico City

The PEMEX LPG Terminal, of 16,000 m³ capacity, in Mexico City, was regularly supplied by 3 refineries. At 5:35 am of November 19, 1984, the control room noticed a pressure drop in the pumping station, without however being able to find its cause. An 8-in diameter pipeline between a spherical storage tank and a group of cylindrical vessels was leaking. The leak lasted between 5-10 min, while a 0.4 m/s wind was in the area. A large vapor cloud was formed, followed by a VCE. The resulting casualties included 550 deaths and more than 6,400 wounded.



- 2 spherical storage tanks diameter 16.5 m.
- 4 spherical storage tanks diameter 14.5 m.
- 5 cylindrical storage tanks diameter 2 m, length 19 m.
- 3 cylindrical storage tanks diameter 2 m, length 16 m.
- 21 cylindrical storage tanks diameter 2 m, length 13 m.
- 14 cylindrical storage tanks diameter 3.5 m, length 21 m.
- 4 cylindrical storage tanks diameter 3.5 m, length 32 m.

Minimum height beneath storage tanks = 2 m
Height of tubing over storage tanks = 0.5 m

Multi-Energy method

Explosive cloud total volume (m3)

Total substance mass (kg)

Congested area

Region	Vol. Spazio (m3)	% substance filling	Blast strength class
1	<input type="text" value="81596"/>	100.	Blast strenght 10

Not congested area

Explosive cloud volume (m3)

Blast strength class

Baker-Strehlow-Tang method


Explosive mass (kg)

Reactivity index

Obstacle index density

flame expansion index

Ignition height




Area layout and photographs after the explosion [Arturson 1987, Lerdo de 1985, Pietersen 1988].

Local observations

P_s over 0.3 bar
(within 200m)

Sulfur Dioxide Tank Wagon

- S1 Catastrophic failure of tank during tank wagon change $f=10^{-7}$ (**50t**)
- S2 Failure of the Flange $f=10^{-5}$ (**20 min release**)
- S3 Failure of the Flexible pipe $f=10^{-5}$ (**20 min release**)



Release of ammonia from the refrigeration system

- The scenario estimates release of Ammonia during loading into the refrigeration system. Loading operations take place every 2 years (**$f_m = 1.37 \cdot 10^{-3}$**).
- Ammonia is transferred from road tanker into the refrigeration system using a flexible hose 18 mm in diameter (**$f = 10^{-2}$**).
- The scenario assumes hose rupture and release lasting 5 minutes (300 s).

