TRANSPORT AND SECURITY

Transmitted by the Governments of the Russian Federation, Slovakia and Ukraine, and the Danube Commission

Note: The Working Party noted at its twenty-sixth session that work to enhance security on inland shipping should be carried out in close cooperation with other relevant bodies such as the European Union and the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (CCNR). Governments, the European Commission and the river commissions were invited to transmit their ideas and concrete proposals of relevance to the mandate of the summer sessions of this Working Party, i.e. concerning possible amendment of the European code for inland waterways (CEVNI) (e.g. by tightening the regime of access to vessels, including a post of a security officer on board certain types of passenger vessels), introduction of possible security-related provisions in the future River Information Service (RIS) and relevant amendments to the European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways of International Importance (AGN) (TRANS/SC.3/WP.3/52, para. 9).

Reproduced below are some comments on this matter received from the Governments of the Russian Federation, Slovakia and Ukraine, and some information from the Danube Commission.

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RUSSIAN FEDERATION

1. Pursuant to the introduction of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), the Russian Federation is taking the necessary measures to ensure the security of vessels and port facilities. Paramount importance is attached to ensuring that the requirements of the Code are fulfilled on vessels engaged on international voyages and at ports performing freight operations with vessels engaged in international navigation. These are expected to be fully compliant with the ISPS Code by 1 July 2004.

2. Lawmakers have begun to prepare for the passage of a Federal Transport Security Act.

3. Additional measures have already been taken to enhance security at facilities that pose the greatest potential hazard to the public (hydro-engineering structures).

4. A risk assessment of inland water transport is currently being conducted. The purpose of this exercise is to identify the most vulnerable facilities as far as security is concerned and arrange for whatever protection is necessary.

5. We think it essential to continue joint, coordinated work between all interested Governments to ensure security on inland waterways. For the time being, however, it would be premature to amend the AGN Agreement and CEVNI before a proper risk assessment of inland waterway transport has been carried out and adequate measures taken to neutralize any risks.

6. In this work it is important to be alert to the danger of adopting overly stringent measures that could hamper inland water transport economically and organizationally.

SLOVAKIA

7. Amendments should be made to article 1.04 (“General obligation to exercise vigilance”) of CEVNI (TRANS/SC.3/115/Rev.2). Paragraph 1 (d) should be more explicitly worded as follows:

“(d) Causing harm to crew members and other persons on board the vessel or damage to barges moored alongside, port or wharf facilities and the environment”.

8. We are of the view that other ECE documents adequately reflect the requirements cited in the report of the Working Party on its twenty-sixth session (TRANS/SC.3/WP.3/51, para. 9) regarding security on inland waterway transport.

UKRAINE

9. Security on board vessels is a very topical issue. Shipowners are reducing crews to a minimum, and consequently access by unauthorized persons to vessels not only in port but also when under way is not properly controlled. On his own, a boatmaster steering the vessel from the wheelhouse cannot simultaneously monitor navigational instruments while keeping an eye on all parts of the vessel, especially at night, and this makes it easy for pirates to board the vessel. This was a common occurrence on the Yugoslav section of the Danube during the embargo, when inventory and equipment was stolen and plundered from vessels belonging to a number of shipping companies.
10. Provision should be made for closer supervision of the movement of vessels by the police and other supervisory agencies, and River Information Services (RIS) should be introduced to help to ensure the security of vessels.

11. This, however, will require vessels to be equipped with Global Positioning System receivers and transponders or sensors for use with automatic identification and tracking systems, and a comprehensive RIS to be introduced throughout the European inland waterway network, from the North Sea to the Black Sea.

12. These and other issues connected with ensuring security on board vessels could be fully explored by the Working Party with a view to making appropriate amendments to CEVNI.

DANUBE COMMISSION

13. The meeting of experts of the Danube Commission on technical questions held in November 2003 considered it would be reasonable to suggest to the Danube Commission, at its sixty-second session, that it should instruct the Commission’s secretariat to begin gathering and analysing material and proposals on issues connected with transport security.

14. At the same meeting, the delegations of Bulgaria and Slovakia put forward the view that security issues should be raised when discussing how to define minimum manning requirements for vessels and river information systems.

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