Border Crossing Facilitation

Safe TIR

Note By The International Road Transport Union (Iru)

Shortly after the first TIR system crisis where it was noted that the TIR operation was terminated with real false stamps and that it was not possible to confirm the information contained in the TIR Carnet, the Administrative Committee for the TIR Convention 1975 adopted a Recommendation on 25 October 1995 to strengthen the security of the TIR System, by comparing the information contained in the TIR Carnet with the electronic information. The Recommendation stipulated that:

"...Customs authorities should transmit to the competent national guaranteeing associations, if possible via central or regional offices, by the fastest available means of communication (fax, electronic mail, etc.) and if possible on a daily basis, at least the following information in a standard format in respect of all TIR Carnets presented at Customs offices of destination, as defined in Article 1 (l) of the Convention…"

The SafeTIR system was implemented in response to the Recommendation and was considered as a very important tool in order to rapidly detect possible irregularities relating to international transit operations conducted under the TIR regime.

1. SafeTIR data transmission

Though the transmission of information related to the termination of the TIR operation is completed by most of the Contracting Parties, it must be stressed out that only 0,4% of the data is transmitted within 24 hours. In fact, the present average transmission period is 13 days. Data received later than one week is of no value and does not meet the Risk Management requirements set out.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average transmission period</th>
<th>Within 1 day</th>
<th>Between 2 to 4 days</th>
<th>Between 5 to 7 days</th>
<th>Above 7 days</th>
<th>No transmission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>BGR, FIN, FRA, LBN, LIT, NOR, SWE</td>
<td>ARM, BLR, CHE, CZE, DNK, HUN, LVA, POL, MDA, ROM, RUS, YUG</td>
<td>ALB, AUT, AZE, BEL, HRV, CYP, ESP, EST, DEU, GRC, IRN, ITA, KAZ, KYG, MAR, NLD, PRT, SVK, SVN, SYR, MKD, TUR, TKM, UKR, GBR</td>
<td>GEO, IRL, ISR, JOR, KWT, TUN, UZB</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned in the Recommendation the transmission should be daily
2. **The Reconciliation Procedure**

Furthermore, in addition to the transmission, the Administrative Committee introduced the Reconciliation Procedure in the Recommendation on 25 February 2000. This procedure does not meet the Risk Management requirements. As an example, 5096 requests for reconciliation have been generated between the 01.01.03 to the 31.05.03. Therefore, all these 5096 requests are cases at risk because the information contained in the TIR Carnet is not confirmed by an electronic information. However, only 54% of these requests have been replied to and the average time delay was 33 days, when such requests for reconciliation should be replied to within 24 hours.

Consequently, the lack of transmission data makes the reconciliation procedure inefficient. Therefore the Risk Management aims as set out in the Recommendation are not being fulfilled. In cases of suspicion, or in cases where the data in the TIR Carnet is not the same as the electronic information database, no action can be undertaken because no confirmation of termination has previously been transmitted.

Despite the permanent work of IRU with the TIRExB, the TIR Secretariat and the contracting parties in order to improve the functioning of the SafeTIR system, there is still a long way to go before the intentions of the 1995 Recommendation are met.

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