ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR
EUROPE (UN/ECE)
Regional Population Meeting
Budapest, 7-9 December 1998
Josef Schmid
(Bamberg, FRG)
Population Ageing
- Its Dynamics, its Social, Economic
Implications at Family, Community and Societal Levels
Josef Schmid, Austrian-born 1937, demographer
and sociologist, Professor on population studies at the
University of Bamberg, FRG, studied economics at the universities
of Munich (FRG) and Innsbruck (Austria), Diploma 1965; thereafter
sociology, psychology and philosophy at the University of Munich,
Scientific Assistant and Ph.D., specialised in the sociology of
population change. In 1980 chosen elevation to the chair of
Population Studies („Bevölkerungswissenschaft") at the
University of Bamberg, the first chair of its kind to be
established in Germany.
Main interests of research revolve around the following
issues:
- Post-industrial demographic structures and their
consequences for the life of future generations;
- Population and the development ofin Third World countries;
and
- Social systems and the politics of sustainability.
Prof. Josef Schmid is member of IUSSP, EAPS, member of the
scientific board of the Federal Institute for Population Research
(BIB), Wiesbaden, and the German Society for Human Ecology (DGH),
Berlin.
Executive Summary
Population ageing is the process of a gradual shift of
demographic weights toward the older age-groups in the age
structure. SinceBetween 1950 and the end of the 1980s, the
proportion of people aged 65 and older has until the end of the
1980s, increased by a third or more in the United Kingdom and the
United States and by more than a half in pre-reunificationformer
West Germany. The ageing process is projected to go on in the
decades ahead for all ECE countries. All these countries are
expecting a re-einforced "gerontological transition"
after the year 2000 when the baby boom cohorts will reach the age
of retirement.
The European history of population and modernisation went
through a demographic transition of low levels of
fertilitybirths and deathsmortality against a background of
unforeseen prosperity among individuals who prudently and
cautiously planned their life course. But even this first modern
setting served as a basis for further modernising steps and
brought about a post-industrial society which has generated the
most recent demographic structure and which has gone through a
"second demographic transition". From then on, the age
structure seemed to have been put upside down. It has undergone
the most visible change - from a slightly growing population with
a solidly situated age pyramid to a constrictive one, implying an
ageing of the population. The second demographic transition
re-einforced mortality decline, pushed mortality of some younger
age-groups close to zero, but displayed its principal effects in
the growing group of the elderly. Life tables show the rising
number of years people have to live through because of fewer
early deaths and ever more survivors in old-age groups.
When we analytically divide relative aageing and absolute
ageing, then we find the relevant determinants forof each kind of
ageing. Relative or "bottom-up" ageing means a growing proportion of the elderly by virtue of a
fertility decline and a dwindling youth base in anthe age
composition. Here the elderly grow inas a percentage of the total
population even if their numbers dido not change at all. The
determinants are the excess of births over deaths or vice versa,
and their quantitative consequences over time. Absolute or "top-down" ageing refers to a real
prolongation of the lifespan. Its most important determinants we
find are found in the national life tables, the medical
statistics and the success and progress of the research in
gerontology. Here also rises the proportion of people who are at
older ages but regardless of other biosocial shifts in the
population such as deaths and over births.
Demographic ageing is a very slow process and, is
consequently, underestimated as a shape-changing movement.
Initially, it consists of small increments which slightly raises
the mean age of the population but which, eventually, contributes
to a new demographic structure. Although the phenomenon is not a
new one to demographers, it is apt to stir up the modern states.
The trend is clearly toward an ageing of European populations
without any prospect in the near future, of a reversal of the
factors contributing to it. The existing structure generates an
ever growing proportion of the elderly and will entail unique
social and economic problems. At the same time, modern medicine
and gerontology will need to face more degenerative
illnessesdiseases. The rising cost of medical treatments and the
growing number of patients that requireing such treatments will
lead to a financial shortfall which has to be narrowed by
budgetary reserves.
To keep the welfare system functioning, policy makers must
bear in mind the attitudes of those of working age with respect
to the age of retirement, and the willingness and capability of
employers to encourage their employees to contribute to state-run
pension schemes or contribute to it by themselves via taxation.
All European countries feel already affected by shortcomings
which regularly occur at one ore more of these crucial points in
the fabric of a social security system. Social planning must take
into account the number of older persons who are able to stay at
home and are self-supporting, as well as those who are in a
morbid state and must be kept in a medical centre, at least in an
institution for the old attached to a hospital. Each group has
its own organisational needs and requires a staff with a state of
the art training in the care and nursing of older persons.
The divergence of life expectancy between the sexes takes on
new meaning with regard to the the living arrangements of older
persons. Older men are more often married than women who are more
often widowed after entering the older age groups. WhileAs with
increasing age the mortality of (mostly married) men also
increaserises faster, women enter widowhood, to a much greater
extent, widowhood. In addition to impressive changes in age
distribution in the past few decades, dependency ratios bring to
the fore the impending burden which coming generations will have
to bear.
Growing pressures on public budgets and on funding of social
security or protection systems have become the key issues in the
economics of population ageing: how to. This means the
financinge of retirement pensions under severe conditions.?
In order to bring more balance in this deficient accounting of
increasing menumbers of claimants and decreasing numbers of
contributors one has to look again at relevant dimensions, namely
the demographic dimension, and additionally at the principle on
which the financing of the retirement pensions is based, and the
dimension of investment to raise the level of productivity and
the organisational levels for old-age lifestyles and care.
As services industries now account for up to 60 per cent of
GDP, the solution of social security problems can only come from
a higher productivity and from investment in its coefficients.
The living base of modern productivity and
competitivenesscompetitiveness, in which demography, occupational
formation and economy flow together, is human capital. So the
highly qualified human capital assuring productivity and economic
success will contribute to overcoming societal strains and
shortcomings. Investing in young people to form a resource base
means a qualitative rejuvenation which can provide for the needs
of a quantitatively ageing society. Action to channel knowledge,
productivity and wisdom, including those of older persons is
needed. Ageing isAgeing is an on-going victory over death which
also the coming generations have a right to enjoy.
The Change of Age Structures in Selected
Countries
(Percentage of Total Population between 1960 and 1996)
| Countries |
under 15 |
16-64 |
65 and over |
| |
1960 |
1996 |
1960 |
1996 |
1960 |
1996 |
| Austria |
22.0 |
17.6b |
65.8 |
67.4b |
12.2 |
15.0b |
| Belgium |
23.5 |
17.9 c | 64.5 | 66.0c |
12.0 | 16.1 c |
| Canada |
33.7 |
20.0 | 58.7 | 67.8 |
7.6 | 12.2 |
| Czech Republic |
- |
18.1 | - | 68.5 |
- | 13.4 |
| Denmark |
25.2 |
17.6 | 64.2 | 67.3 |
10.6 | 15.1 |
| Finland |
30.4 |
18.9 | 62.3 | 66.7 |
7.3 | 14.4 |
| France |
26.4 |
19.3 | 62.0 | 65.4 |
11.6 | 15.3 |
| Germany |
21.3a |
15.9c | 67.8a | 68.2c |
10.8a | 15.8c |
| Greece |
26.1 |
18.6 | 65.8 | 67.6 |
8.1 | 15.8 |
| Hungary |
- |
17.8 | - | 67.9 |
- | 14.2 |
| Iceland |
34.8 |
24.2 | 57.1 | 64.3 |
8.1 | 11.4 |
| Ireland |
30.5 |
23.9 | 58.6 | 64.7 |
10.9 | 11.5 |
| Italy |
23.4 |
15.3b | 67.6 | 68.9b |
9.0 | 15.8b |
| Luxembourg |
21.4 |
18.5 | 67.9 | 67.3 |
10.8 | 14.2 |
| Netherlands |
30.0 |
18.4 | 61.0 | 68.3 |
9.0 | 13.3 |
| Norway |
25.9 |
19.5 | 63.2 | 64.6 |
10.9 | 15.9 |
| Poland |
- |
22.2 | - | 66.5 |
- | 11.3 |
| Portugal |
- |
17.5 | - | 67.7 |
- | 14.8 |
| Spain |
27.3 |
16.2 | 64.5 | 68.2 |
6.2 | 15.6 |
| Sweden |
22.4 |
18.6 | 65.9 | 63.8 |
11.8 | 17.3 |
| Switzerland |
23.5 |
17.6 | 66.3 | 67.5 |
10.2 | 14.9 |
| Turkey |
41.2 |
31.7 | 55.1 | 63.5 |
3.7 | 4.8 |
| United Kingdom |
23.3 |
19.3 | 64.9 | 64.9 |
11.7 | 15.7 |
| United States |
31.0 |
21.7 | 59.7 | 65.5 |
9.2 | 12.8 |
| G7 |
27.9 |
18.9 | 62.9 | 68.9 |
9.2 | 14.2 |
| EU-15 |
24.3 |
17.4 | 65.2 | 67.1 |
10.4 | 15.5 |
| OECD Total |
- |
21.5 | - | 66.9 |
- | 12.6 |
- not available
a Ex-FRG only
b 1994
c 1995
Source: Labour Force Statistics: 1976-1996,
OECD, Paris, 1997
The Growing Number of Centenarians
(1960 and 1990)
| Country |
1960 |
1990 |
| |
Number |
Per million |
Number |
Per million |
| Austria |
25 |
3.5 |
232 |
29.8 |
| Denmark |
19 |
4.1 |
323 |
62.8 |
| England & Wales |
531 |
11.6 |
3890 |
76.3 |
| Finland |
11 |
2.5 |
141 |
28.3 |
| France |
371 |
8.1 |
3853 |
67.9 |
| Germany (West) |
119 |
2.2 |
2528 |
40.0 |
| Iceland |
3 |
17.0 |
17 |
66.7 |
| Italy |
265 |
5.4 |
2047 |
35.5 |
| Netherlands |
62 |
5.4 |
818 |
54.7 |
| Norway |
73 |
20.4 |
198 |
70.7 |
| Sweden |
72 |
9.6 |
41 |
68.1 |
| Switzerland |
29 |
5.4 |
583 |
50.4 |
Source: Kannisto, 1994.
Dependency ratios by subregions, 1950-2025 *
| Dependency ratio |
1950 |
1975 |
2000 |
2025 |
| |
ECE
region |
| Total |
63,5 |
68,7 |
64,7 |
75,3 |
| Youth |
44,6 |
42,9 |
35,7 |
35,6 |
| Aged |
19,0 |
25,8 |
29,0 |
39,7 |
| |
| |
Western Europe |
| Total |
62,1 |
72,2 |
63,7 |
80,5 |
| Youth |
38,9 |
40,0 |
29,2 |
31,0 |
| Aged |
23,2 |
32,2 |
34,5 |
49,6 |
| |
| |
Southern Europe |
| Total |
67,8 |
75,6 |
66,2 |
66,5 |
| Youth |
52,6 |
55,2 |
42,9 |
37,0 |
| Aged |
15,2 |
20,4 |
23,3 |
29,6 |
| |
| |
Eastern Europe |
| Total |
62,9 |
65,3 |
68,1 |
74,0 |
| Youth |
47,2 |
41,8 |
38,5 |
37,5 |
| Aged |
15,7 |
23,5 |
29,6 |
36,6 |
| |
| |
North America |
| Total |
64,6 |
66,5 |
60,2 |
78,2 |
| Youth |
44,7 |
42,1 |
34,6 |
35,9 |
| Aged |
19,9 |
24,4 |
25,6 |
42,3 |
| |
|
|
|
|
* Number of persons under 15 years and 60 years and
over per 100 persons aged 15 to 60 years
Source: ECE-Secretariat, in: Stolnitz, 1992, p.
26
Population distribution among those 60 and
over, by age and subregions, 1950-2025
(Per cent)
| Age group |
1950 |
1975 |
2000 |
2025 |
| |
ECE region |
| 60 and over |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
| 60-74 |
78,9 |
75,7 |
72,1 |
72,1 |
| 75 and over |
21,1 |
24,3 |
27,9 |
27,9 |
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
Western Europe |
| 60 and over |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
| 60-74 |
78,1 |
74,7 |
69,1 |
68,8 |
| 75 and over |
21,9 |
25,3 |
30,9 |
31,2 |
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
Southern
Europe |
| 60 and over |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
| 60-74 |
80,1 |
78,8 |
76,3 |
74,4 |
| 75 and over |
19,9 |
21,3 |
23,7 |
25,6 |
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
Eastern
Europe |
| 60 and over |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
| 60-74 |
79,7 |
77,9 |
76,9 |
73,8 |
| 75 and over |
20,3 |
22,1 |
23,1 |
26,2 |
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
North
America |
| 60 and over |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
| 60-74 |
78,9 |
72,8 |
66,5 |
72,2 |
| 75 and over |
21,1 |
27,2 |
33,5 |
27,8 |
| |
|
|
|
|
Source: ECE-Secretariat, in: Stolnitz, 1992, p. 27
|